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The Ontario Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) sets minimum workplace 
conditions in areas such as pay, working time, holidays and leaves, and termination and 
severance of employment. Yet there is mounting evidence of inadequacies in the 
enforcement of the ESA, which limit its ability to provide an effective floor of workplace 
rights for Ontario’s employees. Drawing on administrative data collected by the Ministry 
of Labour’s Employment Standards Program, this study presents a detailed portrait of 
the enforcement model currently used in Ontario. Adopting a conceptual framework that 
emphasizes the importance of compliance and deterrence, along with proactive and 
reactive enforcement measures, the study examines the prevalence and characteristics 
of employee complaints and workplace inspections, the number and kinds of violations 
alleged or detected through these means, and the resolution of complaints and 
violations, including the outcome of settlements, the use of compliance and deterrence 
measures, the recovery of unpaid wages, and the incidence and outcome of OLRB 
reviews of ESO orders. 
The study reveals a number of important trends. First, the volume of ESA 
complaints received by the Ministry of Labour has decreased in recent years. Between 
2008/09 and 2012/13, the number of ES complaints submitted annually dropped 
substantially, but has levelled off at about 15,000 per year since 2012/13. The absolute 
number of non-unionized Ontario employees increased during that time period; 
consequently, whereas in 2008/09, there was one complaint submitted for every 173 
non-unionized employees, in 2014/15, there was one complaint submitted for every 285 
non-unionized employees.  Moreover, relatively few complainants – fewer than one in 
ten (9%) – are still working for the employer they file the complaint about, a proportion 
that has remained relatively constant across time, and which suggests that accessing 
the claims process may be a risky venture.   
Another key trend in ES enforcement in Ontario from 2008/09 to 2014/15 is the 
expanded use of settlements, which accounted for 4% of complaint outcomes in 
2008/09, and 15% of complaint outcomes in 2014/15. As a whole, settlements tend to 
yield a smaller percentage of the total claim amount compared to those assessed by an 
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ESO. When a settlement is facilitated by an ESO, almost 40% of complaints are settled 
for less than half of their total claim, whereas when a settlement is not facilitated by an 
ESO, fewer than 30% of complaints are settled for less than half of their total claim. 
Assuming that the nature of cases that are facilitated by an ESO are similar to those 
that are not facilitated, the facilitation by ESOs is associated with resolutions that are 
overall less favourable to complainants. Whether this relationship is an effect of ESO 
involvement, or whether it reflects differences in the nature of the complaints or the 
complainants that are involved in facilitated settlements, compared to those that are not 
facilitated, is an open question. Further investigation is required to determine the 
reason(s) for disparities between the outcomes of non-facilitated and facilitated 
settlements.  
The use of proactive inspections in the Ministry of Labour’s toolkit of enforcement 
strategies has been limited, or at best sporadic, over the past several decades. In more 
recent years, between 2011/12 and 2014/15 specifically, the number of inspections 
conducted by the Ministry of Labour has increased. The number of inspections that 
detect ES violations is quite high – ranging from 75% to 77% in the years between 
2011/12 and 2013/14. In particular, inspections that are triggered by an expanded 
complaint investigation detect high rates of ES violations; indeed, between 2011/12 and 
2014/2015, fully 82% of such inspections found infractions, indicating that verified 
individual complaints are a good source for identifying problematic workplaces.  
Ontario's ES enforcement system relies primarily on compliance tools which aim 
to bring the employer into compliance with the law without imposing a sanction. 
Whereas Compliance Orders are the primary tool used in response to violations found 
in workplace inspections, Orders to Pay Wages are the primary tool used in response to 
violations detected through the complaints process. The ESA also allows for the use of 
deterrence tools that impose a penalty on employers who have violated the law (i.e., 
Notices of Contravention, Certificates of Offence (tickets and summonses) issued under 
Part I of the Provincial Offences Act (POA) and prosecution under Part III of the POA). 
Such tools are used far more infrequently than compliance measures, however. When 
deterrence tools are used, they tend to result in relatively small penalties ($250 or 
8 
 
$360), raising questions as to whether such penalties have the effect of deterring 
unlawful behaviors. 
Employees, directors, and employers may apply to have an order issued under 
the ESA (or the failure to issue an order) reviewed by the Ontario Labour Relations 
Board (OLRB), a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal that makes decisions entirely 
independent of the Ministry of Labour. Overall, about one in five (19%) complaints in 
which monetary orders are issued prompts a review application, the majority of which 
are initiated by employers. Directors subject to an order seek review in about one in ten 
cases (9%). Among cases where review is sought, by far, the largest number of 
applications is resolved through settlements. This finding is of potential concern, since 
for both employer- and director- initiated reviews of monetary orders, settlements are 
associated with inferior outcomes for employees compared to those adjudicated by the 
OLRB. However, settlements of employee-initiated applications for OLRB review of 
complaint denials by ESOs are more favourable for employees compared to those 
adjudicated by the OLRB.1  While these results may be viewed as offsetting, the fact 
that employer- and director- initiated reviews are far more frequent and that the threat of 
a review application to the OLRB may be used strategically earlier in the enforcement 
process would indicate that the need for concern about settlements remains.   
The enforcement system fails when workers who have experienced monetary 
violations are unable to recover the money owed to them. Data show that, in most 
cases when employers do not voluntary comply with ESOs’ assessments, recovery 
rates are quite low. Only 39% of all complaints with a monetary order (Orders to Pay 
Wages, Orders to Compensate/Reinstate) issued during the period between 2009/10 
and 2014/15 were fully recovered, 6% were partially recovered, and 56% were not 
recovered. In monetary terms, of the $47.5 million that was ordered to be paid to 
employees, only about $19 million was collected (40%), constituting a collective loss to 
employees of about $28 million. Globally, 70% of complaints with monetary orders were 
sent to collections for recovery, with some inconsistent variation across time. Of those 
cases sent to collection, only about 20% were subsequently satisfied fully, while the 
                                                        
1
 Again, the question of whether this is a causal relationship as opposed to merely an association 




remainder was not, a disturbingly low success rate that clearly contributes to the low 
rate of recovery for monetary orders. Despite moving responsibility for collections away 
from private collection agencies and into a unit within the Ministry of Finance in 2014, 
there does not seem to have been a noticeable improvement in collection rates. The 
recovery of entitlements is even more challenging in the context of employer bankruptcy 
and insolvency. 
On the basis of these findings, this study outlines a series of options that have 
the potential to strengthen enforcement of the ESA. These options include augmenting 
the accessibility of the complaints system for employees alleging ES violations; further 
investigation of the Ministry of Labour’s increased use of settlements; expanded use of 
proactive inspections, including expanded investigations and unannounced blitzes; 
greater use of the deterrence measures available in the Ministry of Labour’s 
enforcement system; and strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Labour to recover 
entitlements for complainants through measures such as a provincial wage protection 
fund.   
 
A. Background  
 
1. Introduction 
 Enacted in 1968, Ontario's Employment Standards Act (ESA) establishes 
minimum conditions of employment for the majority of workers2 in the province, 
including those related to wages, hours of work, overtime pay, vacations, public 
holidays, and termination and severance. The level of minimum entitlements for each 
employee is established by the ESA itself or by regulations promulgated under the 
statute. These entitlements reflect a collectively-established, normative judgment about 
minimally decent working arrangements that must be provided to all Ontario employees, 
regardless of their bargaining power in the labour market (Ontario 1965, 1978; Thomas 
2009).  
                                                        
2
 Although we attempt to use the term “employees” consistently across this study, we occasionally use 
the term “workers” while recognizing that, as a matter of law, the ESA does not apply to all workers but 
only to those in an employment relationship, subject to a further set of exemptions that are explored in 
Vosko, Noack and Thomas (2016). 
10 
 
If the promise of employment standards (ES) is to be fulfilled, however, 
employees must be able to effectively access the rights to which they are legally 
entitled. It is not enough to have laws on the books; they must be enforced to become 
the operative law of the labour market. Moreover, the enforcement of ES is not a private 
problem. The ESA creates statutory rights enforceable by the state and thus positions 
state officials as those who bear principal responsibility for the Act’s enforcement and 
provides them with a range of enforcement tools. State actors must make an additional 
set of decisions about how to enforce the Act within the parameters of the available 
statutory powers and in the context of the prevailing administrative and financial 
constraints. The importance of these enforcement decisions cannot be underestimated, 
because they crucially determine the extent to which the ESA actually provides covered 
employees with the rights that it promises. Enforcement failures lead to the 
conventionalization of law-breaking and the erosion of the rule of law (Carson 1979). 
The question of how best to enforce regulatory schemes in general and ES 
regimes in particular has been the subject of extensive scholarly and public policy 
debate. In a separate study prepared for the Changing Workplaces Review (CWR), 
Kevin Banks (2016) presents a literature review on issues of access to the complaints 
process and models of enforcement and their effectiveness. Broadly speaking, the goal 
of the present study is to map the enforcement model currently used by Ontario's 
Ministry of Labour by examining the prevalence and characteristics of employee 
complaints and workplace inspections, the number and kinds of violations alleged or 
detected through these means, and the resolution of complaints and violations, 
including the outcomes of settlements, the use of compliance and deterrence measures, 
the recovery of unpaid wages, and the incidence and outcome of OLRB reviews of ESO 
orders. The present study also considers the enforcement of the ESA in the particularly 
challenging context of employer bankruptcy and insolvency. 
While this study is primarily empirical, drawing on administrative data collected 
by Ontario Ministry of Labour's Employment Practices Branch to present a detailed 
portrait of existing enforcement practices and outcomes, it also aims to provide analytic 
assessments that offer the Special Advisors options to consider in formulating their 
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recommendations for reform. To contextualize these assessments, we begin by 
providing a brief conceptual framework. 
1.1 Conceptual Framework 
Academic discussions of enforcement have focused on two crucial dimensions: 
reactive versus proactive enforcement and compliance versus deterrence.  
1.1.1 Reactive and Proactive Enforcement 
Worker-initiated complaints are the foundation of most regimes for enforcing 
employment and labour rights. After all, workers are the ones who experience violations 
directly and have the most direct and immediate interest in obtaining a remedy. 
However, complaint-driven enforcement suffers from numerous problems. First, there 
may be barriers to workers accessing the claims process. Workers may fear reprisal if 
they make a claim against their current employer, notwithstanding that reprisal is 
unlawful. They may not be aware of their rights and thus may not know that their rights 
have been violated, a situation exacerbated when entitlements are not universal but 
rather are subject to various exemptions and qualifications, a matter discussed in the 
study prepared for the CWR by Vosko, Noack and Thomas (2016). These barriers may 
not be evenly distributed across the labour market and this uneven distribution can lead 
to a second problem with complaint-based enforcement: the source and type of 
complaints may not be aligned with the underlying problems in the labour market. For 
example, workers in one sector may complain about violations more frequently than 
workers in another notwithstanding that violations may be more prevalent in the latter, 
but have become normalized as working conditions (Weil and Pyles 2005). Similarly, 
workers may make disproportionately fewer complaints about violations of a particular 
standard compared to others, perhaps reflecting the greater difficulty they might 
experience in determining whether they are entitled to that particular right. Third, a 
complaint-driven enforcement model presents limited opportunity for enforcement to 
achieve systemic effects by adopting strategies that may involve using leverage to 
influence the top of supply chains, rather than continually responding to complaints 
being voiced at the bottom (Weil 2008, 2010). In a complaint-driven system, 
complainants also bear the full cost of initiating their complaint (including any potential 
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reprisal risks) while the benefits of their resolution may spill over to other workers who 
receive redress as a result of the complaint. 
These problems with complaint-driven enforcement point to the need for a 
greater role for proactive enforcement. Proactive enforcement strategies attempt to 
allocate enforcement resources in accordance with established priorities. This allocation 
process often involves the identification of sectors or particular employers where 
enforcement officials have reasonable grounds for believing that violations are more 
prevalent and/or that workers are more reluctant to raise complaints. Resources may 
also be deployed to engage parties who are not the legal employer in implementing 
measures designed to increase compliance by the entities that are. In Ontario, proactive 
enforcement priorities may be formulated at different levels of the enforcement regime, 
including the province, the region, and the individual enforcement officer, based on 
available information. 
In practice, most enforcement systems combine reactive and proactive strategies 
to different degrees – and Ontario is no exception. However, the mix has varied across 
time. For example, in Ontario proactive enforcement was virtually non-existent for many 
years but was re-introduced in response to criticism of the provincial Auditor-General in 
2004 (Auditor General 2004; Tucker et al. 2014). In this study, we investigate 
enforcement in the period after proactive inspections were re-introduced and, as a 
consequence, changes over time are not as readily apparent. However, reactive 
enforcement has been and, as we shall see, continues to be, the dominant strategy 
used in Ontario.  
In thinking about how to combine reactive and proactive enforcement strategies, 
it is crucial to acknowledge the important role that both play in constructing an effective 
enforcement regime. It would be unacceptable not to provide workers who experience 
violations with an effective remedy as a cost of expanding proactive inspections. 
Conversely, regimes that rely solely on reactive complaints have the potential to be 
more expensive and less effective than those that also incorporate proactive measures. 
It is necessary therefore to consider options that combine both elements of an effective 
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enforcement regime that do not unduly sacrifice one or the other3 and that take into 
consideration the resources available for enforcement. In some jurisdictions, there is 
more than one agency with enforcement powers for labour standards, which allows for 
some division of labour. For example, in the United States, the federal Department of 
Labor focuses on proactive and strategic enforcement, but can rely on state-level 
Departments of Labor to address individual complaints. In Canada, the federal and 
provincial governments each have exclusive jurisdiction over the workers they cover, so 
there is no possibility of dividing up enforcement responsibilities in a manner similar to 
the United States; consequently, the province remains entirely responsible for all 
aspects of ES enforcement for those employees under its jurisdiction with the exception 
of unionized workers who must rely on the grievance procedure and are left without 
access to administrative enforcement by the Ministry of Labour.4  
1.1.2 Compliance and Deterrence Measures 
Compliance refers to a set of strategies, including the provision of information, 
persuasion, and negotiation that seek to generate observance of the law. In a 
compliance framework, when violations are detected, voluntary compliance is 
encouraged through the use of strategies such as facilitating settlements or issuing 
orders that require the violator to do that which he or she should have done in the first 
place. Strategies oriented to compliance emphasize encouraging voluntary adherence 
to the law or, achieving adherence after the fact, rather than detecting and punishing 
wrongdoing (Gunningham 2010). Compliance strategies are generally based on the 
view that most employers do not intentionally violate the law but rather do so out of 
incompetence or ignorance and therefore are not deserving of punishment. These 
approaches are also a noteworthy feature of new governance paradigms (Vosko, 
Grundy and Thomas 2014), based on the premise that engaging employers in 
                                                        
3
 Expanded investigations are a noteworthy example of an enforcement strategy that rests at the 
intersection of reactive and proactive enforcement. Expanded inspections occur when, in response to a 
complaint, an ESO detects a violation that he or she has reason to believe may be affecting other 
employees of that employer. This leads to the ESO turning the individual investigation into a broader 
inspection to determine whether or not other employees are affected. 
4
 Ontario workers can seek to enforce monetary entitlements under the ESA in small claims court, but to 
our knowledge few do; furthermore, making civil actions the standard way to pursue a monetary ESA 
claim would shift the burden of enforcement onto employees' shoulders and likely result in a large 
proportion of those owed money foregoing their entitlements (on unions and ES enforcement, see Vosko 
and Thomas 2014).  
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cooperative relationships with regulatory officials will lead to joint problem solving that 
may even produce outcomes that go beyond compliance. In any event, a compliance 
emphasis avoids the promotion of adversarial relations that may impede the 
achievement of better adherence to the law (Johnstone and Sarre 2004; Gray 2006; 
Lobel 2012; Gunningham 2015). Compliance measures used in Ontario typically include 
public outreach and education and, when violations are detected, Orders to Pay Wages 
or Orders to Compensate and/or Reinstate, which are oriented exclusively towards 
restoring the employee to the position they would have held had the employer adhered 
to the law.  In this study, we are not able to determine the systemic impact of 
compliance measures on overall violation rates or on whether they reduce repeat 
violations. Instead, we are concerned with the extent to which compliance measures 
achieve their most basic objective: getting employees what they are owed.5 
In contrast, deterrence refers to the detection and punishment of wrongdoing. 
Theorists identify two types of deterrence: specific and general. Specific deterrence 
refers to the idea that regulated entities that have been subject to legal punishment will 
take measures to refrain from the illegal activity in the future (Gunningham 2010). The 
punishment of wrongdoing can also have a “general deterrence” effect, whereby it may 
discourage others from choosing to engage in illegal activities. The concept of general 
deterrence thus captures the broader effects that flow from the punishment of individual 
actors. Both types of deterrence are premised on the existence of rational, self-
interested actors, who conduct themselves according to a cost-benefit analysis of the 
consequences of their actions; they calculate the risk of being detected and punished 
against the benefits gained from violating the law. Deterrence strategies may also 
discourage incompetent or inadvertent violators by drawing their attention to the 
consequences of being in violation of the law and thus encouraging them to better 
inform themselves of and manage their obligations in order to avoid penalties. In either 
case, for deterrence measures to be effective, there must be a substantial risk that law-
breaking will be detected and that non-trivial punishments will follow.   
Deterrence measures in Ontario include Notices of Contravention and tickets or 
summonses issued under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act (POA). In either case, 
                                                        
5
 Reinstatement orders are relatively rare and thus we did not specifically investigate their use. 
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the penalty is a relatively small fine. A more serious deterrence measure is a 
prosecution under Part III of the POA, which could result in a higher fine or jail time. The 
most serious deterrence measure is a prosecution under the Criminal Code which might 
be possible in some cases, such as if an employer intentionally deprived employees of 
their wages. As a general matter, deterrence measures have not been a central pillar of 
most labour and employment enforcement regimes and this appears to also be the case 
in Ontario's ESA enforcement system, where deterrence measures of any kind are 
rarely used. Given how infrequently deterrence is used in Ontario, it is not possible to 
assess its efficacy in generating either specific or general deterrence.6 
 Just as reactive and proactive measures exist in combination, so too do 
compliance and deterrence measures. In the latter case, it is not just a matter of 
thinking about the appropriate quantity of each approach, but rather how the two might 
be combined to the best effect. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) developed the "responsive 
regulation" approach with the aim of transcending the debate about the relative merits of 
compliance versus deterrence. The key idea was that rather than having to choose 
between the two approaches, compliance and deterrence elements can be combined 
effectively in a way that is responsive to the regulatory context. The model Ayres and 
Braithwaite developed, and for which responsive regulation is best known, is that of an 
enforcement pyramid which starts with persuasion at the base and provides that if and 
only if this fails to secure compliance, regulators should escalate to the next 
enforcement measure, and continue to escalate as needed, eventually reaching the 
most serious sanctions, with the greatest deterrence effects, at the top of the pyramid. 
The assumption that gives the pyramid its shape is that most regulatory activity would 
take place at the bottom and that fewer and fewer regulatory interventions would be 
necessary as sanctions became more serious. The hammer of deterrence is perceived 





                                                        
6
 See Weil (2010) for a careful discussion of the complexities both of designing and measuring deterrence 
effects.  Although Weil’s insights are valuable, the data needed to replicate the methods used in his study 
are not available to us. 
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Figure A.1: The Enforcement Pyramid 
 
 In this study, we do not introduce the enforcement pyramid because we endorse 
this approach, but rather because of its popularity and influence among government 
regulators. Another means of combining compliance and deterrence measures is 
articulated in Weil’s (2008, 2010) approach to strategic enforcement. Unlike Ayres and 
Braithwaite's pyramid, this approach is not premised on the idea that most employers 
violate the law out of ignorance or incompetence and therefore enforcement should 
always begin with education and other compliance measures and only escalate when 
those measures have failed, but is, rather, based on a sophisticated understanding of 
business environments that may be conducive to the production of labour standards 
violations. Indeed, Weil argues that enforcement should be approached with a kind of 
“regulatory jujitsu” which uses compliance and deterrence measures in a variety of 
strategic combinations that are responsive to the context.  
 Regardless of the model, however, it is noteworthy that there is widespread 
agreement that deterrence measures have an important role to play in an effective 
enforcement regime. In this study, we consider how frequently deterrence measures are 
used in Ontario, the purposes for which they are used and penalties that are imposed. 
1.1.3 Combining the Two Dimensions of Enforcement 
Although we have talked about the two dimensions of enforcement separately, 
they can be logically combined in four different ways, as shown in the matrix in Figure 
A.2. There has been little discussion in the literature of the merits of these four 
combinations, but we think they are worthy of consideration. In the analyses that follow, 
we map how the activities of Ontario's ES enforcement system are situated relative to 








Figure A.2: Combining the two dimensions of enforcement 
 
   Enforcement Measures 








Then, by way of conclusion, we outline options for reform that follow from the empirical 
evidence, and are aimed at achieving the optimal combination of enforcement strategies 
to ensure effective workplace regulation in Ontario.                 
 
B. Research Findings 
 
Our empirical analysis is divided into seven distinct sections, each of which 
reflects key aspects of Ontario's ES enforcement regime. Section one on complaints 
and claims examines reactive enforcement and its outcomes. An analysis of 
complaints (and their associated claims) is an appropriate starting point as they are 
dominant in Ontario’s reactively-oriented regime and thus an area towards which 
considerable resources are directed. Section two focuses on settlements. These are 
compliance measures that resolve complaints through an agreement between the 
employee who is alleging violation and the employer subject to the allegation about how 
the matter should be resolved. Settlements merit separate treatment because their use 
has steadily increased across time, and because Ontario has recently allowed 
settlements to be facilitated by an Employment Standards Officer. The third section on 
inspections investigates proactive enforcement and its outcomes. Virtually non-existent 
for many years, in recent years proactive inspections (including targeted/blitz 
inspections and expanded investigations) have become a more important feature of the 
Ministry of Labour’s enforcement system. Section four addresses the use of 
compliance and deterrence measures, in terms of their frequency and context. 
The remaining sections take up specific aspects of Ontario’s ES enforcement 
regime that merit particular consideration. Section five considers reviews involving the 
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Ontario Labour Relations Board. The ESA provides for a review of an Employment 
Standards Officer's orders (or failure to make an order) and Notices of Contravention. 
Thus, reviews can occur either in the context of compliance or deterrence, though an 
overwhelming majority of reviews occur in the compliance context. The issue of reviews 
requires separate consideration because it takes complaint resolution outside of the 
Ministry of Labour and into the domain of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), 
an independent administrative tribunal. The outcomes of OLRB reviews impact ES 
enforcement in several ways: first, OLRB decisions about the interpretation and 
application of the ESA and its regulations can affect how and what ESOs do in the 
future;7 second, OLRB involvement can shape enforcement outcomes by virtue of their 
re-assessment of the money that employees are ultimately found to be owed or that 
employers must pay where a Notice of Contravention has been upheld; and, the OLRB 
settlement process may provide space for strategic behaviour that influences the 
effectiveness of Ministry of Labour compliance measures.  
The sixth section is concerned with the recovery of monetary entitlements found 
to be owing to an employee. The importance of recovery is obvious: a judgment is 
worthless unless it can be enforced. In this section, we describe the process for 
recovery and examine the empirical data on the percentage of employees’ entitlements 
that are actually collected. Finally, section seven considers ESA enforcement in the 
context of non-operational businesses, and particularly those that are formally bankrupt 
or insolvent. Here the issue of recovery is particularly sharp since, by definition, the 
employer lacks sufficient funds to pay its debts, including the amounts to which its 
employees are entitled under the ESA. The topic of wage recovery in bankruptcy is 
complex, and goes beyond the ESA and provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the 
particular difficulties of enforcing the ESA clearly affect Ontario workers, and influence 
the province's ES regime.  
Methodological Notes  
 The principal source of data for the ensuing empirical analysis is the Ministry of 
Labour’s Employment Standards Information System (ESIS), the chief administrative 
data set retained under the provincial ESA containing information on all complaints 
                                                        
7
 An assessment of the OLRB’s substantive effect on the law is outside the scope of this study. 
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submitted and their outcomes, violations detected, inspections conducted, settlements, 
the use of enforcement mechanisms, wage recovery, and reviews. A central feature of 
the ESIS database is that it provides a nearly-complete census of Ontario's ES 
enforcement activities and their outcomes that is not otherwise publically available (for 
more information, see Appendix A).  
Although it captures a variety of information related to the ESA and its 
enforcement, the ESIS is primarily a tracking and record-keeping system. Like other 
sources of administrative data, ESIS has several limitations which merit note. First and 
foremost, as an indicator of reactive enforcement practices, it only captures the 
experiences of those who are successful in entering the administrative system. The vast 
majority of employees who experience a violation do not complain, so they are not 
captured in administrative data (Noack, Vosko and Grundy 2015; on the case of the 
United States, see Weil and Pyles 2005). Moreover, there is no straightforward 
relationship between violations on the ground and the types of complaints that enter the 
system; indeed, industries with high rates of violations, which have become normalized, 
may generate relatively few complaints, and vice versa (Weil and Pyles 2005). For this 
reason, ESIS data cannot be considered an accurate snapshot of ES violations in 
Ontario.  
Second, as it was not designed for research purposes, the ESIS has not 
undergone the same quality control and data verification processes as survey data from 
large statistical agencies. Thus, the dataset includes inconsistencies, some of which 
appear to result from complainants’ discrepancies in reporting (such as complainants 
who indicate that they are "still working" for an "out of business" employer), and some of 
which appear to occur when one aspect of the database is updated, but additional 
information remains in the system (such as when a complaint is listed as being "denied" 
but also has an Order to Pay Wages issued for it). In many instances, it is not possible 
to verify which information is correct, and thus our general approach has been to let 
these inconsistencies persist, unless there is clear evidence upon which to base a 
decision.  
Finally, following the standard practice of the Ontario government, a substantial 
portion of this analysis relies on change across fiscal years to correspond with the 
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budget cycle, defined as April 1 – March 31, ranging from 2008/09 to 2014/15 (although 
information about some aspects of enforcement is not available for this entire period). 
Unlike the Ministry of Labour, however, we rely on the fiscal year in which an event first 
occurred or entered into the ES enforcement system as the key indicator: that is, any 
activity related to a complaint is classified using the fiscal year when the complaint was 
received by the Ministry of Labour (even though the activity itself – such as an OLRB 
review – may have occurred in a later year). Similarly, any activity related to an 
inspection is classified with the fiscal year when the inspection took place. As a result, 
the data shown here will differ from reports published by the Ministry of Labour.  
 
1. Complaints and Claims
8 
1.1 Trends in Complaints 
The volume of ESA complaints received by the Ministry of Labour has decreased 
in recent years. Between 2008/09 and 2012/13, the number of ES complaints submitted 
annually dropped substantially (see Graph 1.1), but levelled off at about 15,000 per year 
starting in 2012/13.9 Notably, the absolute number of non-unionized Ontario employees 
increased during that time period; thus, whereas in 2008/09, there was one complaint 
submitted for every 173 non-unionized employees in Ontario, in 2014/15, there was one 







                                                        
8
 In this analysis, to enhance precision, and following the convention of other scholars working in this area 
internationally, the term “complaint” is used to refer to the entire submission made by an employee to the 
Ministry of Labour. Each complaint includes one or more “claims” which refer to alleged violations of 
particular employment standards. The Ontario MOL does not use the terms “complaints” and “claims” in 
the same way in its own reporting.   
9
 These include complaints that were not formally accepted, out of jurisdiction or cancelled, in order to 
reflect the total volume of Ministry of Labour intake. The number of complaints that were accepted and 
handled by the Ministry of Labour is slightly lower. 
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Graph 1.1: ES Complaints Submitted to the Ministry of Labour, Relative to the 
Number of Non-Unionized Employees in Ontario, 2008/09 to 2014/1510 
 
There could be many reasons for this decline in complaints and the parallel 
change in the ratio of complaints to non-unionized workers. In theory, the decline in 
complaints could be evidence of greater employer compliance with the ESA, the result 
of changes in reporting behaviour, or an indicator that proactive inspections are 
detecting more violations thus reducing the need for employees experiencing violations 
to file complaints. The inspection data in section three suggest that the latter 
explanation is unlikely to account for this decline, leaving us with the possibility of better 
compliance or changes in reporting behaviour or a combination of the two. It is possible 
that administrative measures have improved compliance. Increased efforts to inform 
employers of their duties and workers of their rights might reduce violations as would 
increases in proactive inspections, including blitzes, which target sectors where high 
rates of violations are suspected. In the absence of reliable empirical evidence about 
the frequency of ESA violations and how they have changed over time, there is little 
more that we can say about the hypothesis that violations have become less frequent. 
                                                        
10
 The number of non-unionized employees in Ontario for each fiscal year is estimated using Statistics 
Canada's Labour Force Survey, Public Use Microdata Files. 
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That leaves us with the third alternative: that there have been changes in reporting 
behaviour. We do not have enough evidence about how reporting behaviour may have 
changed over time to draw strong conclusions, but because changes to the complaints 
process brought about by the 2010 Open for Business Act (OBA) may have affected 
reporting behaviour, we discuss this issue in somewhat greater detail.  
Non-unionized employees who experience ES violations can respond in at least 
four ways: 1) remain silent and do nothing; 2) attempt to resolve the matter directly with 
their employer; 3) make a complaint to the Ministry of Labour; or 4) sue their employer. 
The real and/or perceived risks of reprisal for making an ES complaint either directly to 
one’s employer or to state officials, or for suing one’s employer are well-documented in 
the scholarly literature (Ruckelshaus 2008; Alexander 2013; Griffith 2015), suggesting 
that employees often choose to remain silent and not complain. As a result of changes 
authorized by the OBA, employees are generally required to attempt self-help by 
resolving the matter directly with their employer before they are permitted to make a 
complaint to the Ministry of Labour.11 The development of this policy was aimed directly 
at increasing the number of employees who attempt to resolve the matter directly with 
their employer and, as a consequence, reducing the number who make complaints to 
the Ministry of Labour.12 As a result of the OBA, it is reasonable to assume that more 
employees pursue self-help than had been the case prior to its enactment. From 
2011/12 onwards, the first full year for which this requirement was in place, more than 4 
out of 5 complainants (84%) reported that they had either contacted or attempted to 
contact their employer. We do not know whether the OBA also increased the number of 
employees who remain silent rather than attempt self-help or complain directly to the 
Ministry of Labour and seek an exemption from the self-help requirement. Moreover, we 
                                                        
11
 The OBA gave the Director the power to specify steps that must be undertaken as a condition of 
making a complaint to the MOL, including attempting resolution with the employer. The Director exercised 
this power. However, the ESA also gave the Director discretion to relieve employees of this requirement. 
12
 When this policy was enacted as part of the 2010 Open for Business Act, the then-Minister of Labour 
noted, “[i]n many instances, those claims are because the parties don’t have the information beforehand 
where they can resolve the claim before it has to be dealt with by one of our employment standards 
officers” (Fonseca cited in Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2010a: 1899).  
Furthermore, the then-Minister of Economic Development and Trade characterized the rationale 
for the OBA as follows: “the proposed changes included in the Open for Business Act would encourage 
employees and employers to settle disputes at an early stage, avoiding unnecessary costs for both 
parties, let alone the time involved for both, and allowing employment standards officers to focus on the 
current backlog of claims” (Pupatello cited in Legislative Assembly of Ontario 2010b: 1552). 
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have no information on the outcome of self-help efforts either before or after the OBA 
and how often workers who do not obtain a satisfactory resolution pursue a complaint 
with the Ministry of Labour. Hence, while it appears that, as intended, the self-help 
requirement reduced the number of complaints reaching the Ministry of Labour, there is 
no way of determining whether this legislation also has the unintended and undesirable 
consequence of increasing the number of workers who remain silent about unresolved 
violations. Some data suggest, however, that the self-help requirement may indeed 
have had this effect.  
First, relatively few complainants – fewer than one in ten (9%) – are still working 
for the employer they file the complaint about.13 Over a quarter of complainants (28%) 
report that they had been fired. An additional 15% say that they were laid off and 24% 
say that they quit (see Appendix B, Table 1.1). The extremely low proportion of 
employees who file complaints against their employers while still on the job – which has 
remained relatively constant across time – is noteworthy as it supports suggestions by 
scholars (Bernhardt et al 2013; Vosko 2013) as well as the Auditor General of Ontario 
(2004) that accessing the complaints process may be a risky venture for those who 
remain on the job and wish to retain it. As noted, the Director may relieve employees of 
the obligation to contact their employer and there are now several formal grounds for 
exemption from this requirement, such as if a complainant is a young worker, a live-in 
caregiver, or fears retaliation. By far, the most commonly cited reason for not contacting 
or attempting to contact an employer was fear, cited by almost half (48%) of those who 
did not attempt to resolve the matter directly with their employer. This fear is particularly 
pronounced amongst complainants who were still working for their employer at the time 
that they filed a complaint. Among this group, more than 65% of those who did not 
contact or try to contact their employer indicated that they did not do so because they 
were afraid. These data confirm that fear of retaliation remains widespread among 
workers.  
The balance of evidence suggests that the decline in complaints corresponds to 
the introduction of the OBA, the requirements of which may be dissuading workers from 
                                                        
13
 In 2004, the Auditor General of Ontario found similarly that only 1 in 10 complaints received by the 
Ministry of Labour are from workers who are still employed in the job they filed the complaint about (Office 
of the Auditor General, 2004, 242). 
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pursuing their rights. One option for dealing with this is to remove the discretion of 
the Director of Employment Standards to impose a requirement on employees to 
contact their employer before submitting a complaint.14 Due to the clear evidence 
of fear, particularly among employed complainants, consideration could also be 
given to expanding options for third-party and anonymous complaints where 
employees remain on the job. These options might mirror other similar third-party or 
anonymous reporting systems existing elsewhere, such as in Saskatchewan, which 
allows an employee or a third party to submit a written complaint against an employer, 
which is then investigated, and/or in six American states – Colorado, New Jersey, 
California, Connecticut, Illinois, and New York – which provide for anonymous 
complaints with to the aim of protecting the identity of the claimant (for a review of such 
measures, see Vosko 2013, 860-861). 
1.2 A Profile of Complaints and Claims 
 When employees complain to the Ministry of Labour, their complaints can include 
claims related to one or more standards outlined in the ESA. Typically, complaints 
include claims for only one or two standards. Two out of every five complaints (41%) 
include a claim for one standard only, and another 31% include a claim for two 
standards only. Just over one in ten complaints (12%) is for four or more standards. 
These results suggest that complainants are quite specific about the claims for which 
they are seeking restitution. Complaints relating to businesses that are still in operation 
are slightly more likely to have a claim for one standard alone, compared to complaints 
relating to businesses that are no longer in operation, which are more likely to include 
claims for two or three standards. 
 By far, the three most common standards for which claims are made relate to 
unpaid wages, termination pay, and vacation pay/time.15 The high prevalence of claims 
relating to these three standards is similar across industries, with the notable exception 
                                                        
14
 Specifically, the ESA provides that the Director of Employment Standards shall not assign a complaint 
to an ESO unless the complainant has taken steps specified by the Director to facilitate the investigation 
of the complaint (s.96.1(1)). From 2010 onwards, the Director has exercised this discretion to require that 
complainants contact their employer to discuss the ESA issue under contention before filing a claim.  
However, the ESA (s 91.1(2)) gives the Director discretion to assign a complaint. 
15
 Approximately 20% of complaints include a claim for vacation pay exclusively, or for an amount beyond 
that which would accrue for other claims in the complaint (such as those for unpaid wages, overtime pay, 
public holiday pay, minimum wage, and termination pay).  
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that only 43% of complaints with a claim for unpaid wages relate to retail trades, 
whereas in other industries more than half of complaints include a claim for unpaid 
wages. In contrast, complaints related to retail trades are more likely to include a claim 
for termination pay. More than half of complaints related to the retail trades include 
claims for termination pay compared to 44% of complaints related to other industries 
(see Appendix B, Table 1.4). Appendix Table 1.1 profiles the proportion of complaints 
submitted with a claim for each standard between 2008/09 and 2014/15.16 It 
demonstrates that overall, between 2008/09 and 2014/15, claims for unpaid wages, 
overtime pay, hours of work/rest periods and reprisals became slightly more common 
among the complaints submitted, whereas claims for vacation pay and for termination 
pay have become slightly less common. The increase in the proportion of complaints 
with reprisal claims, in particular, provides additional evidence to suggest that the OBA's 















                                                        
16
 Claims included in less than 1% of all complaints are excluded from Appendix Table 1.1; among active 
ES standards, these include those related to equal pay for equal work and temporary help agencies 
(THAs). 
Among those complaints that relate specifically to THAs (n=1922), THA claims are more 
prevalent. In this group, fully 6.8% claimed failure to provide required information, 4.6% claimed reprisal 
by the client business of the THA, 2.5% submitted that the client business was restricted from hiring the 
assignment employee, and 1.8% claimed that they had been charged prohibited fees.    
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Graph 1.2: Proportion of Complaints Submitted With a Claim for Each Standard, 




Not surprisingly, compared to complaints filed against operational businesses, 
complaints filed against non-operational businesses18 are more likely to include claims 
for termination pay and severance pay, as well as for vacation pay. In contrast, 
complaints filed against operational businesses are more likely to generate claims for 
public holidays/pay, overtime pay, reprisals, deductions from wages, limits on hours of 
work, leaves of absence and minimum wage (see Appendix B, Table 1.2).  
 
                                                        
17
 Here, percentages add to more than 100%, since complaints can include a claim for more than one 
standard. 
18
 In this analysis, complaints were considered to relate to a non-operational business if they met any one 
of the following criteria: the complainant reported that the business was no longer operating, in 
receivership or bankrupt; the complainant reported that they did not contact their employer because their 
workplace had closed down or their employer had gone bankrupt, or the complaint was assigned to one 
of the Ministry of Labour's specialized Bankruptcy/Insolvency Claims Units.  
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Graph 1.3: Proportion of Complaints Submitted With a Claim for Each Standard, 




1.3 Complaint Outcomes 
 After an individual files a complaint, it is first routed to a claims/document 
processor who makes an initial assessment of whether the complaint falls under the 
jurisdiction of the ESA and whether it includes the minimum necessary information to 
proceed.19 Next, the complaint is forwarded to an ESO who collects information from all 
parties, and who may engage in other fact-finding activities, including meeting with the 
parties. Through their investigation, ESOs assess whether each claim included in a 
complaint is substantiated. ESOs then assess what amount is owing to the complainant 
for each validated claim. Complaints and claims are thus validated or denied by an ESO 
based on the balance of probabilities and on the available evidence. As a result of their 
investigation, ESOs can also assess entitlements for ES violations that were not 
included in the original complaint.  
 From an administrative perspective, an ES complaint can have five possible 
outcomes. A complaint can be withdrawn by the complainant, because the issue has 
been resolved or because they do not want to pursue the complaint for other reasons. 
                                                        
19
 The final determination of whether a complaint falls under the jurisdiction of an ESA, or involves an 
ESA issue, rests with an ES Regional and/or District Manager.  
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Employees who are still working for the employer that they filed the complaint against 
are more likely to withdraw their complaints than other complainants (35% of those still 
working withdraw their complaints, compared to 22% overall). There is no information 
available about why employees in general withdraw their complaints. Consequently, it is 
difficult to offer an explanation for the greater likelihood of current employees to 
withdraw their complaints; this pattern may be because current employees are more 
likely to come to a satisfactory informal resolution with their employer, or because they 
are more likely to experience employer pressures to withdraw their complaint. A 
complaint can also be settled by the two parties at any point in the process (see section 
two for more details on settlements). Complaints that are withdrawn or settled are not 
formally assessed by ESOs, though in practice, some assessment may have taken 
place, depending on the point in the process at which a complaint is withdrawn or 
settled. Among complaints that are formally assessed by an ESO, there are two 
possible outcomes: the complaint may be denied or validated by the ESO. Complaints 
are considered to be validated when one or more of the violations alleged are fully or 
partially substantiated upon investigation by an ESO. If the complaint is validated, the 
employer may agree to voluntarily comply, or the ESO may need to order compliance 
(for information on the additional use of deterrence measures, see section four). 
 Overall, about 7 out of every 10 complaints (70%) are formally assessed by an 
ESO. This proportion has been steadily decreasing across time: whereas in 2008/09, 
78% of complaints were assessed by an ESO, in 2014/15 only 59% of complaints were 
assessed (see Appendix B, 1.1). For the 30% of complaints that are not assessed by an 
ESO, the majority (21% overall) are because of withdrawals. About one in ten 
complaints overall (9%) are resolved through settlements, though settlements have 
become more common recently: whereas settlements accounted for 4% of complaint 
outcomes in 2008/09, they accounted for 15% in 2014/15 (see Appendix B, Table 1.1); 







Graph 1.4: Proportion of Complaints Assessed, Settled, and Withdrawn, 2008/09 




Among assessed complaints, overall, a violation is found 69% of the time (see Appendix 
B, Table 1.1). Complaints related to the accommodation and food services industry are 
most likely to have violations, with 78% of assessed complaints resulting in violations 
(see Appendix B, Table 1.3). Violations are also more likely to be found for complaints 
filed against small firms. The difference between large and small firms is most 
noticeable when comparing complaints relating to firms with 1-5 employees, which have 
a violation rate of 80%, and complaints relating to firms with more than 200 employees, 
which have a violation rate of only 49% (see Appendix B, Table 1.4). The vast majority 
of these violations relate to monetary claims. Among assessed complaints, 69% 
included monetary violations, and only 1.6% included non-monetary violations. The 
percentage of assessed complaints that result in a violation declined slightly in the 
2014/15 year, though it is too soon to say whether this is part of a trend (see Appendix 
B, Table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1 Incidence of All Violations, Monetary Violations and Non-Monetary 
Violations, Among Assessed Complaints, 2008/09 to 2014/15 (n=84,471) 
 
 

















Any violation 70.3% 68.4% 70.4% 70.7% 67.9% 69.5% 66.6% 69.3% 
Monetary violation 69.8% 67.8% 69.7% 69.9% 67.0% 68.1% 65.3% 68.5% 
Non-monetary 
violation 
1.0% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 2.2% 2.5% 2.5% 1.6% 
 
For complaints where a violation is found and an entitlement is assessed, the ESO can 
request voluntary compliance on the part of the employer, which is achieved in about 
half of these cases. An ESO can also order compliance. This order can take the form of 
an Order to Pay Wages directed at either the employer or a related-employer (s.103), a 
Directors’ Order to Pay Wages (s.81), an Order for Compensation and/or Reinstatement 
(ss.104, 74.16, 74.17), and/or an Order to Pay Fees (s.74.14).20 There has been a 
notable decline in the number of complaints with voluntary compliance during triage 
(i.e., at the ESO I level) across time. Concomitantly, among assessed complaints, the 
proportion that requires ESO investigation has risen. This trend may be the result of the 
establishment of the self-help requirement under the OBA, insofar as many employers 
who were voluntarily complying early in the complaint process may now comply at the 
self-help stage and never enter the system, with the result that the proportion of formal 
ES complaints involving recalcitrant employers is increasing.  
 A business’ operational status is also associated with the likelihood of achieving 
voluntary compliance. Among businesses that are not operational, only 6% achieve 
voluntary compliance. In contrast, three out of five businesses (63%) that are still in 
operation achieve voluntary compliance (see Appendix B, Table 1.2). The high 
proportion of cases relating to non-operational businesses that require the use of ESO 
orders underscores the difficulty of recovering wages from such entities (as discussed in 
section six on recovery). 
Fortunately, the percentage of non-operational businesses appears to be 
declining; in 2008/09, 22% of complaints were related to businesses that were not in 
                                                        
20
 Orders to Pay Fees are very rarely issued, and thus are not discussed in this study. 
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operation, compared to only 8% in 2014/15. One noticable finding is the relatively high 
proportion of complaints (15%) relating to non-operational businesses in the 
accomodation and food services industry, compared to other industries where only 
about 10% of complaints relate to non-operational businesses (see Appendix B, Table 
1.3). This result likely reflects the high level of business turnover in the accommodation 
and food services industry more generally.  
1.4 Claim Validation and Monetary Entitlements 
Among complaints where a violation has been found, by far the most prevalent 
entitlements are for termination pay, vacation pay,21 and unpaid wages (see Graph 1.5). 
Not surprisingly, termination and severance pay violations are more likely to relate to 
businesses that are not in operation than from their operational counterparts. Almost 
three quarters (73%) of validated complaints relating to businesses that were not in 
operation included an entitlement for termination pay (see Appendix B, Table 1.2). 
Graph 1.5: Proportion of Complaints Where a Violation has been Found with an 




                                                        
21
 Roughly 28% of complaints with a violation include a monetary entitlement for vacation pay exclusively, 
or for an amount beyond that which would accrue for other assessed entitlements (such as those for 
unpaid wages, overtime pay, public holiday pay, minimum wage, and termination pay). For some 
complaints, however, entitlements for vacation pay are not separately recorded (i.e. an assessed 
entitlement for unpaid wages might include both the unpaid wage amount and the associated vacation 
pay owing). Consequently, these results provide only a general estimate of the prevalence of entitlements 
for vacation pay.  
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Another way to assess validation rates is by considering the proportion of claims (not 
complaints) for each standard that are substantiated upon investigation by an ESO. For 
instance, among those who claimed they were unlawfully deprived of termination pay, 
85% were found to have an entitlement (see Graph 1.6). A similarly high validation rate 
exists for workers claiming unpaid wages, where 85% of those who made a claim in this 
area were awarded an entitlement for this standard. Other areas where claims are good 
indicators of violations include vacation pay/time (78% of those claimed were awarded 
it), public holidays/pay (64% of those who claimed it were awarded it) and overtime pay 
(64% of those who claimed it were awarded it). Thus, the vast majority of wage-related 
claims are validated. Other types of claims are less likely to be validated by an ESO. 
For instance, although there has been an increase in reprisal claims, only one-fifth of 
people who make a claim related to reprisal are awarded an entitlement in this area (the 
proportion of validated reprisal claims has also increased over time). Standards with low 
validation rates suggest that the regulations governing these requirements may be 
difficult for people to understand, or that they are particularly difficult to prove in a 
manner satisfactory to ESOs. The lower proportion of validated claims for hours of work, 
minimum wage, severance pay and overtime pay might be attributable in part to the 
complex exemptions and special rules in these claim areas (Vosko, Noack and Thomas 
2016). Notably, ESOs sometimes award entitlements for standards that were not initially 
claimed by complainants, most commonly vacation pay and termination pay, reflecting 
their holistic approach to assessment. The ability of ESOs to detect violations that 
employees have not themselves raised, highlights the benefit of expanded 














 There are consistent trends in the entitlement amounts of validated claims across 
time. Not surprisingly, severance pay consistently yields the largest median entitlement, 
followed by leaves of absence, reprisals, and termination pay (see Appendix B, Table 
1.1). In a labour market characterized by high levels of unemployment, the relatively 
large dollar value of severance and termination pay claims, both of which relate to job 
loss, underline the scope of hardship that these claims generate. Similarly, leave of 
absence and reprisal violations commonly involve loss of employment and generate 
substantial losses for the workers affected. 
  While the entitlement amount for the most commonly submitted and validated 
claim – unpaid wages – is typically smaller, these amounts may represent a large 
proportion of many employees’ expected weekly and monthly earnings, especially for 
those in low wage jobs. Graph 1.7 illustrates the distribution of total entitlements and 
entitlements owing for each standard, for complaints submitted during the seven year 
period under consideration. Consistently, about half of complainants' total entitlements 
                                                        
22
 This graph shows the percent of claims with monetary entitlements for each standard, except for the 
standards relating to leaves, limits on hours of work/rest periods, THAs restricting client businesses from 
hiring, and THAs not providing required information, where the percent of claims with both monetary and 
non-monetary entitlements are shown. 
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are for $1000 or more, a substantial sum of money that has not been received by an 
employee, and may subsequently cause them or their family hardship.  
Graph 1.7: Distribution and Median of Entitlements (Overall and by Standard) 




Taken together, these results show that the majority of complaints lead to the detection 
of violations, which reinforces the value of a reactive enforcement system in identifying 
and remedying ES violations. The total entitlements that workers are assessed as being 
owed can be substantial: about half are consistently for $1000 or more, a loss which 
may result in employees’ inability to meet their basic expenses, or cause them to incur 
debt. The substantial nature of these entitlements suggests that one option may be to 
give ESOs the power to order liquidated damages in addition to the amount of the 
order to pay. If this power is granted, a further option could be to specify that 
damages are mandatory and perhaps fixed as a percentage of what is owed (e.g., 
in the U.S. at the federal level, liquidated damages are equal to the amount of 
back wages owed). Measures of this sort could augment deterrence effects as well as 
provide for greater compensation to workers with validated entitlements (see also 




 As described in the preceding profile of ESA complaints and claims, once a 
complaint has been sent to an ESO several outcomes are possible. One possibility is 
that a complainant and his or her employer may settle the complaint by agreeing to 
certain terms in order to resolve it. The use of settlements in minimum standards 
enforcement regimes merits special consideration for several reasons. Some scholars 
have raised concerns about their use because settlements potentially involve the 
negotiation of minimum standards instead of their enforcement, which may lead workers 
to accept less than their legal entitlement (Fairey 2005). Further, the use of settlements 
potentially allows for the contracting out of ES (Fairey 2005), and can turn questions of 
law enforcement into matters of dispute resolution (Vosko et al. 2012).  
In Ontario's ES enforcement system, settlements are divided into two types: non-
facilitated and facilitated settlements.23 Non-facilitated settlements, outlined in s.112 of 
the ESA, may be reached at any point after the complaint is filed and require that a 
written agreement be provided to the ESO outlining the agreement. After a settlement is 
reached and recorded, and the parties do what they agreed to do in the terms of the 
settlement, the complaint is considered withdrawn. A complainant can apply to the 
OLRB to void a settlement if it was reached as a result of fraud or coercion. Facilitated 
settlements (s.101) were introduced under the OBA in 2010 and involve the ESO as an 
agreement facilitator between the employee and the employer. According to the Ministry 
of Labour’s Administrative Manual for Employment Standards (AMES)24 appendix on 
facilitated settlements, this approach may be appropriate where there are credibility 
issues; the facts are unclear; the application of the law is uncertain; or each party’s 
evidence has equal strengths and weaknesses. However, facilitated settlements are not 
appropriate where it is clear there has been a contravention or where a contravention is 
not clear, but there is a language barrier, one or more parties has an intimidating 
manner, or there is an imbalance in negotiating ability between the parties. Where 
                                                        
23
 This section discusses settlements that occur before or during the period when an ESO assesses a 
complaint. Settlements may also occur in the context of OLRB reviews of ESO orders (or their failure to 
issue an order); we discuss those settlements in section five on reviews. 
24
 In preparing this study, we relied primarily on the AMES 2013 as we only received  
access to the updated AMES at the final stages of review; as a result, we only refer to the updated AMES 
in a few places where we have been advised of changes by the MOL. 
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facilitated settlements are undertaken, the ESO is not to assist in drafting the terms of 
the settlement. Rather s/he is involved in “[h]elping parties understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of their cases; providing parties with information on how the ESA applies to 
their cases; [and] helping parties to frame their position and communicate with each 
other” (Ministry of Labour undated: 3). That is, ESOs assist the parties in coming up 
with what the terms of a settlement could be. For facilitated settlements, the terms of the 
agreement must be established before an ESO makes a decision on the entitlements 
related to the complaint. Again, either the complainant or employer may apply to the 
OLRB to void the settlement if it involved fraud or coercion.  
As previously noted, a key trend in ES enforcement in Ontario from 2008/09 to 
2014/15 has been the expanded use of settlements, which accounted for 4% of 
complaint outcomes in 2008/09, and 15% of complaint outcomes in 2014/15. This trend 
may correspond to the persistently low rates of recovery for monetary entitlements from 
employers who do not voluntarily comply (see section six). Employees' perceptions that 
there are low monetary recovery rates, or that unsettled complaints take a long time to 
be resolved, create an incentive for employees to settle for less than they believe they 
are owed rather than risk getting less or going without while they wait for their claims to 
be assessed and paid.   
2.1 Use and Outcomes of Facilitated and Non-Facilitated Settlements 
Non-facilitated settlements account for the majority of the increase in settlement 
usage between 2008/09 and 2014/15. Since their introduction in 2010, the proportion of 
complaints resolved via facilitated settlements has remained relatively steady (see 











Graph 2.1: Use of Settlements to Resolve Complaints, Overall and by Type, 




Overall, settlements tend to be used for complaints with slightly higher value claims, 
particularly those between $2,000 and $10,000. In terms of the standards claimed, 
settlements are used disproportionately to resolve complaints with a claim for overtime 
pay, public holiday pay, and reprisals. Not surprisingly, settlements are more prominent 
in relation to employers who are still in operation (see Appendix B, Table 2.1).26 There 
are no notable variations in the prevalence of settlements by industry or company size. 
 Where settlements occur, there is no assessment of the complainant’s legal 
entitlement. As a result, settlement outcomes can only be assessed in relation to the 
total claim amount, and compared to the validated entitlement in assessed cases. 
Graph 2.2 compares facilitated and non-facilitated settlement outcomes with the 
outcomes of assessed cases where a monetary claim has been validated. It illustrates 
that, for employees overall, settlements yield a smaller percentage of the total initial 
claim amount compared to those assessed by an ESO (though this analysis does not 
take into account complaints denied by an ESO, presumably some complaints that were 
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 In this graph, facilitated settlements charted in 2009/10 reflect a pilot project in this area prior to the 
implementation of the OBA. 
26
 Appendix Table 1.1 compares complaints that are settled to those that are withdrawn or assessed. It 
should be noted that some withdrawals may involve de-facto settlements, in the form of employer 




settled may have been denied if they were assessed). Furthermore, in almost 40% of 
cases, facilitated settlements are settled for less than half of an employee's total initial 
claim, while fewer than 30% of non-facilitated settlements are settled for less than half 
of an employee's total initial claim, suggesting that the involvement of the ESO 
produces a resolution that is overall less favourable to the complainant.  
Graph 2.2: Percentage of Total Claim Amount Awarded/Settled for, Assessed 





 The fact that settled complaints tend to be resolved for a smaller percentage of 
the initial claim amount than assessed complaints, and the fact that facilitated 
settlements produce less favourable outcomes for the complainant than non-facilitated 
settlements, raises questions that call for further investigation. In theory, these 
differences could be attributed to the relative strength of the complaints that are 
resolved in these different ways, but there is no obvious reason why assessed 
complaints would be stronger than settled ones or why complaints settled without ESO 
involvement would be stronger than those settled with ESO facilitation. Given the 
contexts in which ESOs are directed to use facilitated settlements, they may be more 
likely to be used in situations where the facts of a case are under contention. There may 
also be differences in the characteristics of the complainants, rather than the 
complaints, that explain these outcomes. For instance, complainants who have more 
support, or who are better informed, or who are stronger willed and therefore better able 
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 Complaints with total claim amounts that are missing or $1 or less are excluded from this analysis.  
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to persist in the process may do better in settlements. Finally, there may be some 
aspect of the way that ESOs facilitate settlements that influences their outcomes 
compared to non-facilitated settlements. Regardless, given the rising role of settlements 
and these troubling findings about their potential impact on complaint outcomes, one 
option is to consider a further investigation of the growing role of settlements with 
a view to limiting their use, especially those facilitated by ESOs. A second option 
is to protect workers in the settlement process so as to avoid arrangements that 
fall below minimum entitlements. A third option is to investigate whether 
problems in recovering the amounts ESOs order employers to pay (s. 6) place 
downward pressure on settlement outcomes. These options are not mutually 
exclusive. 
 
3. A Profile of ESA Inspection Types and Outcomes  
 A second major component of ES enforcement in Ontario is the use of workplace 
inspections. In contrast to the reactive process of accepting and assessing individual 
complaints, workplace inspections are a proactive strategy for discovering violations. 
The scholarly literature clearly establishes that proactive inspections are critical to any 
enforcement scheme, since it cannot be assumed that complaints will accurately reflect 
the number or source of violations (see for e.g., Weil and Pyles, 2005). Section 91 of 
the ESA provides ESOs with powers associated with inspections and investigations, 
including the power to conduct warrantless searches, require the production of records 
and question persons who the officer believes may have information relevant to the 
investigation.  
In this analysis, inspections are divided conceptually into three types: expanded 
investigations, targeted inspections, and regular/other inspections. Expanded 
inspections are triggered by an individual complaint and occur when there is an 
indication that an ESO should assess the workplace more fully by conducting an 
inspection. Targeted or blitz inspections are determined at the provincial level, and 
typically take the form of blitzes directed at a particular industry, occupational group or 
form of employment. In contrast, regular inspections are largely determined either by 
individual ESO IIs or regional or district offices on the basis of local conditions and are 
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unconnected with blitzes. In addition, the Ministry of Labour tracks several other types 
of inspections, including re-inspections of previous violators, inspections as a result of 
participating in a self-assessment (compliance check) and random selections. Because 
these types of inspections are less common, they are grouped together with regular 
inspections. 
Typically, an ESO sends the employer a notice of regular inspections in advance 
of a visit (Ministry of Labour 2013a, s.4.7.1).28 In the case of targeted inspections, a 
public announcement is made in an effort to give businesses and/or industries an 
opportunity to comply in advance of a potential inspection. In the case of the former, this 
advance notice streamlines the work of ESOs, but can also give businesses and/or 
industries the opportunity to prepare and, in the case of a regular inspection, to select 
which employees will be present and available for an ESO to speak with on the day of 
an inspection.29 Although we do not have data on the impact of this practice on the 
efficacy of inspections, because of the obvious potential for businesses to take 
advantage of advance notice to hide some violations, an option to consider is to review, 
and possibly suspend, the practice of providing advance notice of inspection. 
The provision of public notice, on the other hand, may broadly motivate employers in a 
sector to bring themselves into compliance, with a reduced risk that they will hide their 
violations since these employers do not know in advance whether or not their firms will 
be selected for inspection. 
3.1 Trends in Inspections 
The use of proactive inspections in the Ministry of Labour’s toolkit of enforcement 
strategies has been limited, or at best sporadic, over the past several decades. Reports 
published by the Office of the Provincial Auditor General in both 1991 and 2004 found 
that proactive inspections were severely under-utilized, despite their effectiveness in 
detecting ESA violations. In more recent years, between 2011/12 and 2014/15 
specifically, the number of inspections conducted by the Ministry of Labour has 
increased.30  
                                                        
28
 The AMES states the following: “[w]hile not required by the Act, advance notice of an inspection should 
be given unless there is a specific rationale for not providing notice” (Ministry of Labour 2013a, s.4.7.2) 
29
 http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/guide/molrole.php. See also Hall et al., 2015. 
30
 ESIS only includes comprehensive data on inspections from 2011/12 onwards.  
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Despite employers receiving advance notice, the number of inspections that 
uncover ES violations is quite high. The proportion of inspections that detected 
violations ranged from 75% to 77% in the years between 2011/12 and 2013/14, but 
dropped to 65% in 2014/15 (see Appendix B, Table 3.1). When monetary and non-
monetary violations are disaggregated, overall 29% of inspections detect both a 
monetary and a non-monetary violation, 27% detect only non-monetary violations, and 
10% detect only monetary violations. Put another way, about 39% of inspections find a 
monetary violation whereas fully 56% find a non-monetary violation. There was little 
change in this distribution in the years between 2011/12 and 2013/14. However, in 
2014/15, the decline in the proportion of inspections detecting violations is almost 
entirely accounted for by a decline in the detection of monetary violations (alone or in 
combination with non-monetary violations). There is no clear explanation for this 
change, nor any indication of whether it reflects the beginning of a larger trend.   
Table 3.1 Incidence of all violations, monetary violations and non-monetary 
violations, among inspections, 2011/12 to 2014/15 (n=7,004) 
 
 Fiscal Year of Inspection 
Total 
 
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Any violation 76.5% 77.4% 74.7% 64.6% 73.4% 
Monetary violation 41.1% 41.2% 41.2% 30.6% 38.6% 
Non-monetary violation 57.5% 59.9% 57.6% 47.8% 55.9% 
 
3.2 Analysis of Inspection Results by Inspection Type 
Targeted inspections account for about half (53%) of all inspections conducted in 
Ontario, although there is substantial variation by fiscal year (see Graph 3.1), 
presumably due to variations in provincial directives (Ministry of Labour 2013b). For 
example, in 2012, the Ministry of Labour’s blitz of temporary help agencies yielded 
strong results, which may account for the higher use of targeted inspections (64%) in 
the 2012/13 fiscal year. Expanded investigations appear to be becoming more common, 
seemingly at the expense of regular/other investigations, though it is too soon to assess 











Expanded investigations detect the highest rates of ES violations; fully 82% of such 
inspections find infractions (see Appendix B, Table 3.2). Such high rates of detection 
suggest that verified individual complaints are a good source for identifying problematic 
workplaces and industries, a finding that is consistent with the results of other studies 
(Weil and Pyles 2005). Targeted and regular inspections, in contrast, detect violations 
72% and 70% of the time; predictably similar yields since documented violations are not 
the motivation for either type of inspection (see Appendix B, Table 3.2). Expanded 
investigations also yield the highest levels of monetary violations (overall about 46%), 
whereas targeted and regular inspections find monetary violations 36% and 38% of the 
time respectively. This result is unsurprising, since expanded investigations are 
presumably triggered as a result of finding a monetary violation31 for one employee that 
might affect others, while targeted and regular inspections are triggered by suspicions 
that there might be a problem in a particular sector or with a particular employer. It is 
worth noting that there appears to be no particular relationship between the type of 
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inspection and the standards for which violations are found, with the exception that 
expanded investigations tend to detect violations of overtime pay requirements more 
frequently. For inspections overall, violation rates are lowest for firms with 50 or more 
employees (about 68%) and highest for firms with 11 to 19 employees (79%).   
3.3 Types of Violations found by Inspections 
Among the 73% of inspections which detect a violation, the most common 
(monetary) violation is for public holiday pay (46%), followed by non-monetary violations 
related to record keeping, excess hours of work, and written agreements for vacation 
pay (see Graph 3.2). The next most common monetary violation is for overtime pay, 
identified as a concern in 21% of inspections. Notable here is the radically different 
profile of ES violations that are detected by inspections compared to those identified in 
individual complaints (compare with Graph 1.5). The three most prominent violations 
among validated complaints (termination pay, vacation pay/time, and unpaid wages) are 
detected far less frequently in the context of ES inspections. Since generally inspections 
do not target termination pay contraventions and because ESOs generally do not 
conduct inspections of businesses that are not in operation, the absence of termination 
pay is expected, but the low rates of violation for vacation pay and unpaid wages 
suggest that complaints and inspections capture very different profiles of violations, and 
that both are necessary in a comprehensive enforcement system. Neither complaints 
nor inspections alone appear to provide an accurate depiction of the full range of ES 




















 The number of employees in inspected workplaces is another central metric in 
any evaluation of the effectiveness of particular types of inspections as well as 
inspections overall. Unfortunately, ESIS data do not permit an assessment of the exact 
number of employees affected by ES violations in a single workplace. The only 
information available is the number of employees affected by the violation of a particular 
ES standard; inspections that detect the violation of multiple standards might do so for 
the same employees multiple times, or slightly different combinations of employees 
each time. The number of employees affected by violations of an ES standard within a 
single workplace typically ranges from a single employee to several thousand. In about 
half of all inspections, fewer than 10 employees are affected by each violation of an ES 
                                                        
32
 In this context, “non-monetary entitlements” related to compensation issues largely refer to employers’ 
failures to secure agreements required by statute in order to deviate from the standard. For example, with 
respect to the non-monetary entitlement related to excess daily hours of work, whereas employees may 
work in excess of eight or a number set by the employer, they must agree to do so and agreements must 
be in writing. Presumably, in this instance, ESOs are finding that employees are working longer hours but 
the employer is unable to produce the written agreement required, which represents a non-monetary 
violation of the ESA on the assumption that employees are being paid for all of the hours they worked. 
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standard that is detected. Notably, however, small businesses are more likely to be 
inspected than larger businesses: whereas about 23% of Ontario businesses have 
fewer than 20 employees, fully 69% of businesses that were inspected have fewer than 
20 employees. This use of inspections parallels the high rates of substantiated 
violations among complaints relating to small firms, especially those with fewer than 20 
employees. 
3.4. Inspection Entitlements 
Inspections typically yield lower rates of monetary violations than complaints, and 
when monetary violations are detected, typically result in lower average entitlements per 
employee. For instance, the median average entitlement per employee for unpaid 
wages resulting from an inspection is $132, compared to a median entitlement of $662 
for unpaid wages resulting from an individual complaint (compare Graph 1.7 and 3.3). 
Similarly, the median average entitlement per employee for minimum wage violations 
detected in an inspection is $129, compared to a median entitlement of $293 for 
minimum wage violations detected in an individual complaint. These differences in 
magnitude may reflect the higher-stakes of individual complaint-making: such 
complaints are largely initiated by employees themselves, who must be sufficiently 
motivated to undertake the work (especially collecting documentation) and spend the 
time required to pursue a complaint. Moreover, complaints include claims for 
termination and severance pay, or for compensation in relation to a violation of re-
instatement rights, which typically involve much larger sums of money. At the same 
time, with regard to the most common monetary violation detected in workplace 
inspections, relating to public holiday pay/time, the fact that almost half of affected 












Graph 3.3: Distribution and Median of Average Monetary Entitlements Owed to 




 Collectively, the preceding findings highlight the value of expanded investigations 
and, to a lesser extent, targeted inspections, in unearthing ES violations, and monetary 
violations in particular. One option is to strengthen the proactive model of 
enforcement with a view, in particular, to identifying monetary violations of the 
type being detected via complaints. A related option is to increase the role of 
expanded investigations as a bridge between the reactive and proactive 
dimensions of the ESA enforcement regime, such that validated complaints routinely 
trigger workplace inspections whenever there is an indication that the problem goes 
beyond the particular situation of a specific employee. Indeed, greater use of 
inspections to detect monetary violations could result in a reduction in the number of 
individual complaints, and thus make more efficient the use of enforcement resources. 
 
4. The Use of Compliance and Deterrence Tools in ES Enforcement 
Whenever an ESO detects an ES violation, stemming from either an individual 
complaint or a workplace inspection, they alert the employer, who can voluntarily agree 
to rectify the situation, and, if applicable, pay any entitlement owing to the workers. 
Regardless of whether an employer voluntarily agrees to rectify the situation, an ESO 
can use a series of compliance and deterrence tools. Briefly, compliance tools include 
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Compliance Orders, Orders to Pay Wages (for employers, directors, and related 
employers), and Orders to Compensate and/or Reinstate. Deterrence tools include 
Notices of Contravention, Part I tickets or summonses and Part III prosecutions under 
the Provincial Offences Act (POA).  
4.1 Compliance Tools 
ESOs have several compliance tools at their disposal. The most open-ended 
compliance tool is a Compliance Order (s.108), in which an employer is ordered to 
modify their business practices in order to conform to the law going forward. No money 
is owed as a result of a Compliance Order, and thus they are typically used for non-
monetary violations, although they may also be issued in relation to monetary violations, 
presumably to signal that an employer needs to adjust its compensation processes on a 
more global level. Compliance Orders are rarely used in the context of complaints, but 
commonly used in relation to inspections (see Appendix B, Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In more 
than three-quarters of inspections where violations were detected (78%), a Compliance 
Order was issued. Compliance Orders are also sometimes issued for inspections where 
the employer complies voluntarily with the ESA. The Ministry of Labour advises that the 
purpose of issuing Compliance Orders in such cases is to help ensure that the employer 
complies going forward. 
 Where monetary violations have been found, an ESO can issue an Order to Pay 
Wages (s.103). In this context, "wages" refers to any monies owing, including 
severance pay, termination pay, public holiday pay, and vacation pay, and not solely the 
narrow category of unpaid wages. Orders to Pay Wages are typically first issued against 
the direct employer who has been found in violation of the Act. The ESA also allows for 
parties other than the immediate employer to be made responsible for the employers’ 
liabilities. Where the employer is a corporation, directors may have Orders to Pay 
Wages issued against them, although their liability is limited (ESA, Part XX & s.106, 
107). In particular, directors’ liabilities are limited to six months of unpaid wages and 
twelve months of vacation pay and they are not liable for unpaid termination and 
severance pay. As well, under certain circumstances separate businesses may be 
found to be related employers who are jointly and severally liable for violations of the 
Act and for wages owing to an employee of any of them (ESA, s.4).  
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Orders to Pay Wages are rarely used in the context of workplace investigations 
(see Appendix B, Table 4.2). Only 1% of inspections where violations are detected 
triggered any type of Order to Pay Wages, presumably because of the high rates of 
voluntary compliance among inspected employers. In contrast, Orders to Pay Wages 
are the typical outcome for complaints with a monetary entitlement where the employer 
does not voluntarily comply. Overall, Orders to Pay are issued in about 72% of these 
complaints (see Appendix B, Table 4.1). Among the remaining complaints with 
monetary violations where an employer has not complied but no Order has been issued, 
two-thirds (66%) appear to be formally bankrupt or insolvent, and an additional 8% 
appear to be non-operational (and in some of the remaining cases, the complainant did 
not know the operational status of the business). The Ministry of Labour advises that 
ESOs are directed to issue Orders even if the employer is out of business. However, if 
the employer is formally insolvent, ESO orders are of no force and effect under the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act; instead, proofs of claim are the mechanism to register 
the debt.  
In about 16% of complaints with monetary violations, where the employer has not 
complied voluntarily, an Order is issued against a corporation’s directors (often to more 
than one director simultaneously). The low proportion of Orders to Pay Wages issued 
against directors is difficult to interpret, since no information is available to assess how 
many non-compliant businesses were also corporations; that is, there is no way of 
knowing the number of times that ESOs have the option to issue an Order to Pay 
Wages to a Director. Only about 1% of complaints with non-compliant employers trigger 
an Order to Pay Wages for a related employer. This finding reflects the relatively 
stringent criteria for identifying a related employer under the Act; currently, related-
employer liability is available in a limited number of circumstances and certainly does 
not cover arms-length relationships that typically exist in supply chains. This study 
cannot delve into the topic of supply chain regulation, but it is one that has attracted 
much attention (see for e.g., Hardy and Howe, 2015). One option to consider is further 
investigation of related-employer liability, including the possibility of extending it 
substantially beyond its current boundaries to supply chain situations. 
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 In addition to the commonly-used Order to Pay Wages, ESOs have three further 
compliance tools at their disposal. Orders to Compensate and/or Reinstate (under 
s.104) provide employees with restitution for retaliation or reprisal and for violations of 
the leaves of absence provision,33 in the recognition of the hardship that these actions 
incur. In addition, two types of Orders can be issued in the context of Temporary Help 
Agency workers. Orders to Compensate and/or Reinstate (under s.74.17) provide 
restitution for retaliation or reprisal by the client business of a THA, and Orders to 
Compensate (under s.74.16) provide compensation for THAs’ failure to give referrals 
and violations of other ESA obligations imposed upon them. Given the relatively specific 
circumstances in which these orders can be issued, it is not surprising they are typically 
not used in the context of workplace inspections and are rarely used in the context of 
complaints: only about 3% of non-compliant employers with monetary violations were 
issued one of these other types of orders (see Appendix B, Table 4.1).34  
 Taken together, these results show that compliance tools are widely used in 
Ontario's ES enforcement system. Whereas Compliance Orders are the primary tool 
used in response to violations found in workplace inspections, Orders to Pay Wages are 
the primary tool used in response to violations detected through the complaints process. 
In situations where an ESO issues an Order to Pay Wages or an Order to Compensate 
and/or Reinstate, an administrative cost of the greater of $100 or 10% of the amount 
found owing is added to the order (see s.103(3)). While this cost may create an 
incentive for employers to voluntarily comply or to settle, it is not intended to serve as a 
deterrence measure and thus is not considered as such for the purpose of this analysis. 
The central goal of compliance measures is to bring the employer into compliance with 
the law and to make sure that employees receive their ESA entitlements; they do not 
impose any sanction on the employer for violating the law.  
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 They are also available for the Retail Business Establishments and Lie Detectors provisions. 
34
 Standards that can generate compensation/ reinstatement orders are not part of inspections.  
(Inspections are typically geared towards detecting contraventions that affect most/all employees of a 
business. Reprisals and leaves are particular to individual employees and thus are typically addressed 
through the complaint process.) 
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4.2 Deterrence Tools 
In situations where violations are detected, ESOs have additional enforcement 
powers that do involve the imposition of a penalty and hence involve deterrence.35 
Under the ESA, there are three deterrence measures. These are Notices of 
Contravention (NOCs), Certificates of Offence (tickets or summonses) issued under 
Part I of the POA and prosecution under Part III of the POA. In an appropriate case, an 
employer could be prosecuted under the Criminal Code where the failure to pay was 
deliberate or amounted to a fraud. To our knowledge, criminal sanctions have not been 
used in the context of ESA violations, although this should not prevent the Special 
Advisors from considering the criminal law as an option in appropriate cases. In the 
discussion that follows, we review each of these deterrence powers and comment on 
their use. 
Notices of Contravention (NOCs) and tickets are the first level at which penalties 
may be formally imposed for non-compliance with the ESA. These recently-established 
sanctions aim to provide ESOs with a greater range of deterrence measures that are 
less severe than Part III prosecutions. There is a fundamental legal difference between 
the NOCs, and Part I tickets/summonses and Part III prosecutions. NOCs are 
administrative monetary penalties (AMPs), while tickets/summonses and Part III 
prosecutions are regulatory offences. Administrative penalties are generally considered 
to be a more flexible mechanism for enforcing compliance insofar as they can be 
imposed without judicial involvement and do not have to comply with the stricter 
procedural requirements that regulatory offences attract. Moreover, administrative 
penalties, including their size and the procedures for imposing them, can be addressed 
entirely in enabling legislation, in this case the ESA, and do not require amendments to 
the POA or new or revised regulations. Because AMPs can be imposed without a 
conviction and a formal finding of guilt, they might be perceived as having a lesser 
deterrent effect; however, that depends on whether an employer who receives a NOC 
                                                        
35
 We are cognizant of the fact that the goal of deterrence is also to achieve compliance with the law and 
that there can be terminological confusion by characterizing deterrence as different from compliance.  
However, much of the enforcement literature has adopted the compliance-deterrence distinction and so 
we have decided to use it here despite its potential to obscure this basic point.  
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perceives it differently than one who is issued a ticket or summons.36 Here, we do not 
differentiate between NOCs and tickets in seriousness, since both involve low-level 
penalties and decisions. Part III prosecutions, however, are more serious and thus are 
considered separately from NOCs and tickets. 
4.2.1 Notices of Contravention (NOCs) 
While the power of ESOs to issue NOCs and tickets is fairly recent, NOCs are 
the older of the two, dating from the amendment of the ESA in 2000. Section 113 
provides:  
 
113. (1) If an employment standards officer believes that a person has 
contravened a provision of this Act, the officer may issue a notice to the 
person setting out the officer’s belief and the prescribed penalty for that 
contravention. 
 
The penalty for a first contravention is $250, for a second contravention in a three-year 
period it is $500 and for a third or subsequent contravention in a three-year period it is 
$1,000 (set out in Ontario Regulation 289/01). If the contravention affects more than 
one employee, and is not for a violation of a posting or record-keeping requirement, the 
fine is multiplied by the number of employees. A person who is served with a NOC is 
deemed to have contravened the ESA unless he or she applies to the OLRB for a 
review within 30 days (as described in section five). NOCs are available for any violation 
of the Act and so could potentially be used widely. However, according to the 
Administrative Manual for Employment Standards, NOCs:  
 
[ma]y be issued when an officer believes that a person (which includes a 
corporation) contravened any provision of the Act. Particular consideration 
should be given to issuing an NOC when the officer believes that the 
employer was aware of their responsibilities under the Act but was 
deliberately non-compliant. It is Program policy that a Certificate of 
Offence (“ticket”) under the Provincial Offences Act is the preferred 
compliance tool, rather than an NOC. Accordingly, an NOC is typically 
issued only if the provision that was contravened is not a “ticketable 
offence” (i.e. is not listed in any of the three schedules of offences for 
which a Certificate of Offence may be issued) (Ministry of Labour 2013a, s 
                                                        
36
 The Supreme Court of Canada recently commented on the distinction between an AMP and a crime 
and upheld their use.  See Guindon v. Canada (2015).  For a discussion of AMPs and their use, see Law 
Reform Commission of Saskatchewan (2012).  For a more detailed discussion of administrative penalties 
and regulatory offence prosecutions in the context of occupational health and safety regulation (favouring 





It appears to be that the view of the Ministry of Labour that NOCs are primarily to be 
used for deliberate non-compliance, notwithstanding that the statute provides that 
NOCs may be issued for any contravention regardless of whether or not it is deliberate. 
Indeed, the ESA makes it clear that NOCs may be issued in conjunction with other 
compliance and deterrence measures.  
 
113 (7) An employment standards officer may issue a notice to a person 
under this section even though an order has been or may be issued 
against the person under section 74.14, 74.16, 74.17, 103, 104 or 108 or 
the person has been or may be prosecuted for or convicted of an offence 
with respect to the same contravention. 
 
It should also be noted that NOCs must be served on the violator in accordance with 
s.95 of the Act, which permits service through a variety of means, including verifiable 
mail. This makes it easier to serve NOCs than tickets, which must be served in person.  
Whether because of Ministry of Labour policy or for some other reason(s), ESOs 
rarely issue NOCs. Over the six-year period for which data are available, there were 
almost 46,000 complaints which detected a violation. In about half of those cases 
(48%), the employer did not voluntarily comply, but in only 392 instances, or 1% of all 
complaints with violations, were NOCs issued (see Appendix B, Table 4.1). While NOCs 
are used somewhat more frequently when violations are detected on inspections than 
they are when they are detected by complaint, the incidence is still extremely low. 
Overall, while Compliance Orders were issued in over three-quarters of all inspections 
in which violations were detected, NOCs were issued in only 2% (see Appendix B, 
Table 4.2). (However, the frequency of the use of NOCs for 2014/15 is substantially 
higher than in previous years, perhaps indicating a shift in policy.) If we combine the 
total number of violations detected on complaints and inspections for the three years for 
which we have complete data (2012/13 to 2014/15), we find that NOCs were used in 
1% of cases where violations were detected.  
In terms of sanctions, about three-quarters of all NOCs are for the lowest 
amount, $250, indicating that they are primarily issued to first offenders. In about a 
quarter of cases, the fine is for more than $250, either because multiple employees 
were affected or it was a second or subsequent offence. Employers infrequently seek to 
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have NOCs reviewed by the OLRB (10% of NOCs stemming from complaints, 4% of 
NOCs stemming from inspections; see Appendix B, Table 5.1), perhaps reflecting the 
small stakes generally involved. The more troubling finding is that a high percentage of 
employers apparently do not pay the NOC penalty. Only 51% of complaint NOCs and 
68% of inspection NOCs are satisfied. For the three years where complete information 
is available (2012/13 to 2014/15) only 50% of $125,000 in NOC penalties assessed in 
relation to complaints and investigations have been recovered (see Appendix B, Table 
4.3). On the basis of these findings, an option is to make administrative monetary 
penalties more effective by increasing their amounts, strengthening collection 
processes, streamlining policies surrounding how they can be challenged, and 
augmenting the resources provided to the administrative tribunal that determines 
challenges to penalties.  
4.2.2 Part I Tickets  
The ESA makes it an offence to contravene the act or its regulations, or to fail to 
comply with an order or direction issued by an ESO (s.132). Regulatory offences can be 
prosecuted in two different ways. Part I of the POA 37 allows for officers to commence a 
prosecution by way of a certificate of offence, better known as a ticket.38 Ontario 
Regulation 950, made pursuant to the POA, determines which violations of provincial 
statutes are ticketable offences. There were no ticketable offences under the ESA until 
the regulation was amended in 2004 (O. Reg. 162/04); since that time ESOs have been 
empowered to issue tickets when they detect violations of the listed offences. There are 
currently 59 ticketable ESA violations; they range across the statute and include both 
non-monetary violations (e.g., failure to post materials) and monetary ones (e.g., failure 
to pay minimum wages). The amount of the fine is set by the Chief Justice of the 
Ontario Court of Justice. Currently it is $295 for every violation. As well, there is a victim 
fine surcharge added to each fine of $60 and an administrative fee of $5, for total of 
$360 (O.Reg. 161/00).39 Money collected from these fines goes to the municipality in 
                                                        
37
 (R.S.O. 2000, c. P. 33) 
38
 There is also a provision in the POA for commencing a Part I prosecution by issuing a summons. The 
maximum penalty on conviction is $1,000.  To our knowledge, summonses are not frequently used in 
ESA enforcement. 
39
 The $5 administrative fee does not seem to be added in all cases.  As well, if the ticket is contested the 
amount of the fine may be reduced. 
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which the offence occurred, while the victim fine surcharge goes into a Victims’ Justice 
Fund and is used to compensate the victims of crime. A defendant who receives a ticket 
can contest the charge and is entitled to a judicial hearing at which the prosecutor has 
the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
As noted above, it is the policy of the Ministry of Labour that where an offence is 
ticketable, ESOs should issue tickets rather than NOCs. ESOs are not advised to issue 
tickets only for intentional violations as is the case of NOCs, but it may be the case that 
ESOs operate with a similar understanding about the appropriate use of tickets. In any 
event, it is clear that tickets are also infrequently issued, with about 277 issued per year, 
on average (see Appendix B, Table 4.4).40 Over the three years for which we have 
reliable data on violations detected both by complaint and inspection and on the use of 
deterrence tools (2012/13 to 2014/15), tickets were issued in roughly 3.5% of all cases 
where violations were found, and 3.9% of cases where monetary violations were 
found.41 Assuming that NOCs and tickets are not being issued in the same cases, 
adding together the number of NOCs and tickets issued each year, low-level deterrence 
measures were used in 4.6% of all cases with violations and 5.1% of all cases with 
monetary violations. 
About 7% of tickets issued are contested (based on data from 2008/09 to 
2012/13 only, see Appendix B, Table 4.4), and the majority of these result in convictions 
(the remainder are primarily withdrawn or dismissed). No data are available on the 
percentage of tickets paid, preventing comparisons to the analysis provided above for 
NOCs.  
In light of the infrequent use of NOCs and tickets, consideration could be 
given to the routine imposition of one or the other when employers commit 
monetary violations. Consideration could also be given to advising ESOs that 
low-level sanctions are not appropriate for intentional wrongdoing. 
                                                        
40
 These data are compiled from information published in the Ministry of Labours online 'Convictions 
Archive' collected across many years: 
http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/enforcement/archive.php 
41
 These can only be considered rough estimates, since violations are grouped based on the fiscal year 
the complaint was received or the business was inspected, and prosecutions are grouped based on the 
fiscal year of the conviction. Still, it is evident that rates of NOC use are quite low.  
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4.2.3 Part III Prosecutions 
The second way in which regulatory offences can be prosecuted is through an 
information requirement. Part III of the POA sets out the procedure to be followed. 
Unlike tickets, ESOs do not have the power to lay an information requirement, but rather 
can make a recommendation, which initiates the process for determining whether to 
launch a Part III prosecution. Ultimately, it is up to the Legal Services Branch of the 
Ministry of Labour, which is part of the Ministry of the Attorney General, to determine 
whether to launch a Part III prosecution based on the strength of the evidence and 
whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. Defendants are entitled to a 
judicial trial and their guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If convicted, 
defendants are liable to be fined up to $50,000 or imprisoned for up to 12 months. 
Corporations are liable to be fined up to $100,000 for a first offence, $250,000 for a 
second offence and $500,000 for a third or subsequent offence. Directors of 
corporations can also be charged if the director fails to comply with an Order to Pay 
Wages issued against the directors pursuant to ss.106 and 107 (s.136). Finally, where 
the employer is a corporation, an officer, director or agent of the corporation may be 
prosecuted for authorizing or permitting or acquiescing in the contravention (s.137).  
The AMES (Ch. 7A) now provides ESOs with guidance on when to recommend 
prosecutions.42 The manual advises that the purpose of prosecutions is to deter 
potential offenders. The threshold criterion for recommending a prosecution is that 
sufficient evidence exists to establish the offence. Beyond that, the manual sets out six 
factors that should be taken into consideration (AMES 7A.2):  
 The seriousness or gravity of the offence 
 History of compliance with the ESA 
 Any mitigating or aggravating circumstances 
 The availability of effective alternatives to prosecution 
 Program identification of targeted contraventions for general deterrence 
 The necessity of maintaining public confidence in the legislation 
                                                        
42
 We are uncertain about when Chapter 7A was first added to the AMES but received a copy in March 
2016.   
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More detailed information on each factor follows. For example, in regard to the factor of 
seriousness, the failure to comply with an order is the first issue identified, but this is 
followed by nine other considerations including violations of core entitlements such as 
minimum wage, repeat violations, multiple contraventions, etc. The AMES then states 
that Part I prosecutions are generally used for first offenders or less serious offenders 
while Part III prosecutions are generally used for more serious offenders and/or repeat 
offenders. It also notes that it is program policy that a prosecution against a director of a 
corporation should only be commenced under Part III. 
In fact, Part III prosecutions are used exceedingly infrequently. Each prosecution 
can involve more than one defendant and more than one charge. In the period between 
2008/09 and 2014/15, there were 92 businesses prosecuted for ES violations under the 
POA, involving 292 charges. For the three years for which complete data are available 
(2012/13 to 2014/15), 41 prosecutions were launched, comprising roughly 0.18% of 
cases with violations detected by complaints and inspections (0.20% of cases with 
detected monetary violations). Moreover, penalties for Part III violations are relatively 
low. The total value of penalties of all fines in those years was $835,926. The average 
fine per business was $20,388, while the average penalty per charge was $7,740. This 
average penalty per charge is only 15% of the $50,000 maximum penalty for 
individuals, and 8% of the maximum of $100,000 for corporations (for a first offence).  
There are a few notable exceptions. For instance, in the case of R v. Blondin 
(2012), the Ministry of Labour had issued one hundred and thirteen Orders to Pay 
Wages totalling over $125,000. The owner refused to comply and was prosecuted. 
Justice of the Peace Bubrin extensively cited a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in an occupational health and safety case, Regina v. Cotton Felts, on the importance of 
deterrence in sentencing. In Cotton Felts the court held, “[A]bove all, the amount of the 
fine will be determined by the need to enforce regulatory standards by deterrence” and 
then went on to talk about both specific and general deterrence.43 He then sentenced 
the defendant to three months imprisonment and a fine of $40,000. His corporations 
were fined an additional $240,000. These fines were in addition to an order to pay 
restitution to the employees whose rights were violated. While the Blondin case is 
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 Regina v. Cotton Felts (1982) 2 C.C.C. (3d) 287 cited in R. v. Blondin, 2012 ONCJ 826 (CanLII). 
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exceptional in terms of the sentence, the violation of the ESA for which Blondin was 
charged was not. Employers are rarely prosecuted for the initial violation of the Act 
(e.g., failing to pay wages) but rather for disobeying orders to pay or interfering with 
ESOs. That is, they are prosecuted for defying the authority of the state rather than for 
violating workers’ rights.44 Of the 57 charges filed under Part III in 2013/14 and 2014/15, 
only about half (27; 47%) were related to non-payment of wages.45  
An option thus is to mandate that Part III prosecutions are normally 
initiated where there is evidence that an ESA violation has been intentional. 
4.2.4 Criminal Prosecutions 
A comprehensive analysis of the application of the Criminal Code to violations of 
ES is beyond the scope of this study, but often the line between a regulatory offence 
and crime is the presence of mens rea – a guilty mind – which typically requires an 
unlawful intent or reckless disregard. For that reason, it is somewhat unusual to advise 
ESOs that they should especially think about regulatory offence charges in contexts 
where the employer has a guilty mind. After all, speeding tickets are issued without 
regard to whether the driver intended to speed or was reckless in failing to keep the 
vehicle within the speed limit. The fact that the driver was driving in excess of the speed 
limit is sufficient to make the regulatory offence complete, absent a defense of due 
diligence. The addition of intentional or reckless behaviour would lead to consideration 
of a criminal charge, such as dangerous driving.  
Therefore, one might ask whether criminal prosecutions should be considered in 
cases which involve intentional violation of the legal obligation to pay wages. For 
example, in some instances an employer might have by deceit, falsehood or other 
fraudulent means defrauded an employee of money owed under the ESA.46 In such a 
case, the employer would not only have violated the ESA, but would have also 
                                                        
44
 It is typically easier to establish the offence of failure to abide by an order (i.e. the Crown just has to 
establish that an order was issued and then not complied with) than it is to establish the initial 
contravention. However, it is not clear to us that this tendency satisfactorily explains why there is almost 
never a prosecution in the first instance for the violation of workers’ rights. 
45
 Fourteen of the charges are made under the general offence section of the ESA (s.132), so it is not 
possible to determine the violation that gave rise to the charge.   
46
 In is interesting to note that in 1935 the Criminal Code was amended to make it a crime to intentionally 
pay a worker less than the established minimum wage. Although the law was not enforced, it remained on 
the books until the early 1950s. 
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committed the crime of fraud.47 Interestingly, the defendant in R v. Blondin (2012) was 
arrested in Alberta in 2014 and charged with five counts of fraud and one count of theft 
in relation to a moving company scam (Ho 2014). It is an open question as to whether 
he could have been criminally prosecuted for fraud for his ES violations in Ontario. For 
this reason, in cases where there is intentional violation of the ESA, an option is 
to refer egregious cases to the Crown for possible criminal prosecution. 
4.3 Balancing Compliance and Deterrence in ES Enforcement 
Overall, Ontario’s ES enforcement regime clearly privileges the use of 
compliance tools over the use of deterrence tools. Moreover, when deterrence tools are 
used, they tend to result in relatively small penalties ($250 or $360), which employers 
may perceive as just a cost of doing business. With the exception of a few notable 
cases, it is unclear whether the deterrence tools that are being used in Ontario truly 
have the effect of deterring unlawful behaviours. The compliance-deterrence literature 
contains numerous suggestions about how best to combine compliance and deterrence 
measures, but regardless of the model chosen, be it a pyramid or regulatory jujitsu, 
there is near universal agreement that deterrence measures must be a meaningful part 
of an enforcement strategy so that employers have confidence that there is a level 
playing field and also recognize that they cannot expect simply to pay what they owe in 
the event they are caught violating the ESA. Moreover, deterrence measures, especially 
administrative penalties and regulatory offences, should not be reserved for employers 
with a guilty mind, which is primarily the realm of the criminal law. Deterrence is also 
useful in spurring employers to become knowledgeable about their ESA obligations and 
to develop systems to ensure that their obligations are being met. To this end, 
consistent with the preceding analysis, an overarching option is to expand the use of 
deterrence measures for the enforcement of ESA violations, including their more 
frequent use, the imposition of higher penalties, and greater publicity to promote 
general deterrent effects.  
 
                                                        
47
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380. 
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5.  OLRB Reviews 
5.1 Introduction 
The ESA provides that applications for review may be made in three situations: 
1) ESO Orders to Pay Wages, Fees, Reinstate and/or Comply;48 2) the refusal of an 
ESO to make an Order; and, 3) Notice of Contravention. The OLRB, which hears the 
review applications, is a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal that makes decisions 
entirely independent of the Ministry of Labour; consequently, once the application for 
review is made, the matter leaves the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour. While the 
OLRB rules and procedures apply, the right to a review is granted by the ESA, which 
also establishes the parameters for the review. For example, with respect to reviews of 
ESO orders, the Act provides that applications for reviews must be made within 30 days 
of the order being served but provides that under certain conditions an extension of time 
may be granted by the OLRB (s. 116(4)(5)). Here, we do not provide a complete 
description of the rules governing reviews, but only describe several key elements to 
support the analysis that follows. The discussion below focuses on applications for 
review of Orders to Pay Wages, Compensate, or Reinstate and Compliance Orders, 
followed by a brief discussion of NOC reviews. 
 If an employer is seeking review of an Order to Pay Wages (s.103), s/he must 
pay the full amount ordered to the Director of Employment Standards, who will hold the 
money in trust but, if the order for which the review is sought is for a violation of the 
leave of absence or reprisal provision, then the employer is required to pay the lesser of 
the full amount or $10,000.49 Directors are not required to post the amount of the order, 
even to the extent of their liability, as a condition of having it reviewed. Considering the 
period between 2011/12 and 2014/15, 83% of employer-initiated reviews of monetary 
orders were accompanied by a deposit, while 13% of Director-initiated reviews of 
monetary orders were accompanied by a deposit. These monies are distributed in 
accordance with the terms of a settlement if one is reached or according to the Board’s 
decision (s.117).   
                                                        
48
 As noted above, we do not address Orders to Pay Fees (or their review) in this study.  
49
 There are further refinements in the legislation but it is not necessary to go into greater detail for our 
purposes.   
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 The rationale for not requiring directors to post the amount of the order, even to 
the extent of their liability, as a condition of having it reviewed is not clear, although it 
may reflect a continuing unease about making directors personally responsible for 
unpaid wages, even though a limited obligation to do so has been included in general 
incorporation acts in Canada from the beginning (Tucker 2008). However, the absence 
of a requirement to post the amount of the order as a condition of review may 
encourage directors to challenge orders more frequently than might otherwise be the 
case and, more importantly, it increases the risk that workers who are owed money will 
ultimately be unable to recover it.50 Indeed, the rate of recovery for complaints where a 
Director Order to Pay Wages has been issued is lower than when an Order to Pay 
Wages issued to the employer alone (see section six). One option is to require that 
directors post the amount of an Order to Pay Wages to the extent of their liability 
as a condition of having it reviewed. 
For reviews of orders (or failures to issue an order), the ESA provides that the 
OLRB shall determine its own practice and procedure (s. 116(9)), but also grants the 
OLRB a number of explicit powers, including the power to summarily dismiss an 
application without a hearing because it does not make out an arguable case. About 
one-fifth of all applications for review are dismissed summarily, that is without a hearing 
(20%, see Appendix B, Table 5.2), which constitutes about one-fifth of all applications.  
Employer and director applications are summarily dismissed about 24% of the time, 
while employee applications are summarily dismissed about 13% of the time. The data 
do not provide an explanation for this difference in summary dismissal rates.  
Also of particular interest is s.120 which empowers the OLRB to authorize a 
labour relations officer (LRO) to attempt to effect a settlement of a disputed order. There 
is no requirement that the ESO who issued the order participate in the settlement 
process but settlements of Compliance Orders must be approved by the Director of 
Employment Standards. According to the OLRB Information Bulletin No. 24 (January 
                                                        
50
 The Ministry of Labour advises that the rationale for not requiring directors to pay into trust is because 
the money assessed to be owing is already either put into trust as part of a review of the underlying 
corporate order, or subject to collection if it wasn’t reviewed. This scheme is premised on the scope of 
review of a Director's Order to Pay Wages being limited only to the issue of whether the director was a 
director at the time that the unpaid corporate liabilities accrued; the review is not to look into the merits of 
the corporate order. However, we cannot find any statutory basis for so limiting a Director's Order to Pay 
Wages and are advised that the OLRB allows directors to challenge the merits of the order.  
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2016), LROs do not decide cases or act as advisors to any of the parties; their role is to 
help the parties reach a settlement. In so doing, they will often explain the case law, but 
they do not offer legal advice (OLRB 2016). Settlements are final and binding unless the 
employee can demonstrate to the Board that it was entered into as a result of fraud or 
coercion (s.120(5)). As with other adjudicatory bodies, settlements are an important 
dispute resolution mechanism to manage case load, but the settlement process must be 
designed to limit the opportunity for strategic behaviour that allows one party to gain 
unfair leverage over the other. If cases are not summarily dismissed, settled or 
withdrawn, they are adjudicated by the OLRB, which holds an evidentiary hearing. The 
OLRB has the same powers as an ESO and may substitute its findings for those of the 
ESO (s. 119(6)). In short, the review is not an appeal, but rather a trial de novo.  
5.2 A Brief Methodological Note 
As in other sections of this study, and unless otherwise indicated, our analysis 
herein is based on the ESIS database. The OLRB maintains its own database of 
information about applications for review, but we do not have access to it for the 
purposes of this study. The only public report of OLRB reviews of ESA applications 
(described by the OLRB as “Appeals”) is in the OLRB’s annual reports. In attempting to 
compare the data from those reports with the ESIS data, we have discovered some 
differences. Where possible, below we include information from the OLRB Annual 
Reports to complement our analysis of ESIS data, but without access to the OLRB 
database we cannot fully explain these differences or offer a view as to which database 
might be more accurate. One key difference in this analysis is that, as described 
previously, cases are typically classified by the fiscal year in which the complaint was 
submitted, or the inspection took place, and not based on the date when the review was 
initiated. In addition, only reviews where a final decision has been recorded in ESIS are 
included in some of these analyses, resulting in substantially lower numbers of cases 
for the 2014/15 fiscal year.  
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5.3 The Landscape of Review Applications 
5.3.1 Frequency 
Graph 5.1 presents the total number of reviews received annually, as reported by 
the OLRB and as recorded in ESIS.51 After a substantial decrease between 2011/12 
and 2012/13, the number of applications for review appears to be slowly increasing, 
though it is not possible to discern whether this constitutes a trend.  
Graph 5.1: Comparisons Between Reviews Recorded in the Ministry of Labour 
Employment Standards Information System (ESIS) and Reported by the OLRB, 




Based on the ESIS, applications for review are made in about 8% of all assessed 
complaints; this proportion varies little over the four years covered (see Appendix B, 
Table 5.1). Applications for review of orders arising out of inspections are very rare, 
likely reflecting the fact that most orders on inspections are not written for monetary 
violations. About 62% of all applications for review are initiated by employers; 31% by 
employees and the remainder (7%) by directors of corporations (see Appendix B, Table 
5.2). 
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 To provide an accurate comparison, for Graph 5.2 only, reviews are classified by the fiscal year when 
the Ministry of Labour received notice of the review. Reviews in-progress are also retained.  
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Overall, about one in five (19%) complaints for which monetary orders are issued 
are subject to a review application, the majority of which are initiated by employers. 
Directors subject to an order seek review in about one in ten cases (9%). Employees 
primarily seek review when the ESO has denied a complaint; applications for review of 
denials are made in 7% of such cases (see Appendix B, Table 5.1).    
5.3.2 Outcomes 
Reviews can have five outcomes: allowed; allowed in part; dismissed; settled; 
and withdrawn.52 By far, the largest number of applications are resolved through 
settlements (about 55%, see Appendix B, Table 5.2), whose importance we flagged 
earlier. (When withdrawn applications are excluded from the calculation, the ESIS data 
show that 77% are settled, a proportion consistent with that reported by the OLRB). The 
next most common outcomes are summary dismissal (20%) and withdrawal of the 
application (10%). Overall, only 5% of reviews are allowed, 2% are allowed in part and 
8% are dismissed after a hearing.  
Another way of describing the outcomes of reviews is by who is applying and the 
type of order being challenged. Graph 5.2 tracks the three most common reviews: 
employees challenging denials, employers challenging monetary orders and directors 
challenging monetary orders. While the profile of outcomes is roughly similar for 
employers and employees, with the main differences being withdrawn and dismissed 
complaints, directors' applications for a review of a monetary order clearly have a 
different outcome profile than other types of reviews. If we measure success as the rate 
at which reviews are allowed or allowed in part, directors fare far better (25%) than 
employers (5%) and employees (5%; see Appendix B, Table 5.3); it is not possible to 
ascertain the dynamics behind these findings, though this may be related to the fact 
that, at least in some cases, directors reviews are limited to an assessment of whether 
they were a director at the time that the liabilities accrued, and not the merits of the 
order (or failure to issue and order). By contrast, directors are more likely to have an 
adjudicated application dismissed than employers (10% compared to 6%), although fully 
12% of employees applications are adjudicated and dismissed. Directors are the least 
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 In this analysis, we treat each individual request for review as a separate instance regardless of 
whether multiple applications for review are related to the same complaint or inspection. 
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likely to settle (39%) compared to employers (60%) and employees (53%). Notably, 
employees withdraw complaints far more frequently than others, 17% compared to 5% 
for employers and 2% for directors, perhaps reflecting their inability to effectively 
independently navigate the OLRB review process.  
Graph 5.2: Outcomes of OLRB Reviews, Overall and by Type, 2011/12 to 2014/1553 
 
 
5.3.3 Financial Outcomes 
Turning our attention to financial outcomes, beginning with an analysis of 
employer and director applications for review, Graph 5.3 illustrates the stark differences 
in outcomes between reviews that are adjudicated by the OLRB and those that are 
settled. With respect to employer-initiated reviews of monetary orders, settlements 
produce far worse outcomes for employees than do adjudications. As recorded in ESIS, 
in the case of employer-initiated reviews, employees are more likely to get nothing (no 
money owed) from settlements, compared to if the review was adjudicated (14% 
compared to 29%) and are much less likely to get 100% of what was ordered (6% 
compared to 56%; see Appendix B, Table 5.3).54 This tendency is partially offset by 
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 In this analysis, we treat cases dismissed without a hearing as summarily dismissed. 
54
 We have been advised that in some cases, the OLRB settlement award is recorded as $0 because the 
employer has made arrangements to pay an agreed upon amount directly to the employee, instead of 
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employees more frequently getting part of what was ordered in settlement than 
adjudications (80% to 15%), which is to be expected since settlement would normally 
involve a compromise. However, in the context of employer-initiated reviews of 
monetary orders, it is employees who appear to be giving up part of what the ESO has 
assessed as being owed. Moreover, unless it can be assumed that employees are 
substantially more likely to agree to settlements only when the likelihood of employer 
success or partial success is strong, the fact that adjudications uphold an ESOs 
decision 56% of the time suggests that employees are frequently foregoing some part of 
their entitlement as a cost of getting a settlement. A comparison between adjudicated 
and settled director-initiated reviews of monetary orders shows a roughly similar pattern.   
Graph 5.3: A Comparison of Adjudication and Settlement Outcomes for 
Employer- and Director-Initiated Reviews of Monetary Orders by the OLRB, 




 In the context of employee applications for review of denials by ESOs, however, 
settlements produce more favourable results to employees.  As Graph 5.4 shows, half 
of these settlements (50%) result in some money being awarded compared to in only 
25% of adjudicated cases. Moreover, settlements also result in higher-value awards to 
employees than adjudications.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
having it paid from the monies held in trust by the OLRB. We do not know how often this occurs or the  
rationale for permitting it.    
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Graph 5.4: A Comparison of Adjudication and Settlement Outcomes for 





 More research into the OLRB settlement process would be required to better 
understand its dynamics and explain its outcomes, but we can suggest a few possible 
factors. To begin, it is helpful to understand the incentive structure facing the parties.  If 
a case goes to adjudication, the OLRB is more likely than not to uphold ESO orders in 
their entirety (about 55% of the time in employer-initiated reviews and 75% of the time in 
employee-initiated reviews). Therefore, the initiator has an incentive to settle, while the 
other party would be better off holding out for adjudication, everything else being equal.  
The fact that employees agree to settlements of employer-initiated reviews well over 
half the time (60%), therefore, raises a question about whether there are institutional 
pressures operating on employees that are leading them to accept inferior outcomes.55   
 First and foremost, the OLRB is focused on dispute resolution in the context of a 
labour relations system in which “give and take” is the norm.  Where getting to “yes” is 
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 A similar question could be asked about employers settling in employee-initiated reviews, but for 
several reasons there is less cause for concern, including the fact that employee-initiated reviews are 
much less frequent and employees gain no strategic advantage in their dealings with ESOs and 
employers by threatening to initiate a review. Finally, many of the factors discussed below, such as the 
implications of delay in attempting to obtain money that is owed, do not operate for employers when faced 
with an employee-initiated review for a failure to issue an order or for an order that provides less than 
what the employee believes is actually owed. 
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the overarching goal, there are likely to be strong incentives to settle disputes rather 
than support for ensuring that minimum standards are upheld. In addition, all mass 
adjudication regimes are under pressure to avoid the creation of backlogs that result in 
delay and the OLRB is no exception. Each year the OLRB carries forward hundreds of 
ESA review cases from previous years (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: ESA Review Cases Carried Over to Next Fiscal Year 
 
Fiscal Year 
  2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Number of Cases Pending 628 359 377 614 
 
Because the OLRB does not have the power to limit the submission of 
applications, it must find other ways of managing its workload, and settlement is the 
principal tool it has to reduce the pressure on scarce adjudicatory resources.  For 
example, in 2014/15, 86% of all OLRB cases were resolved without a hearing, including 
88% of ESA cases (OLRB Annual Report 2014/15). In this environment, LRO success 
in settling cases is likely to be institutionally encouraged, even if that involves 
employees foregoing a non-trivial amount of their assessed entitlement.   
For employees, there is also the question of delay which might also generate 
pressure to settle. Although the timeline for applying for review is rather short (30 days), 
the time to disposition after an application has been made is not. In 2014/15, 36% of 
ESA cases were not disposed of within 168 days. We do not have data on the average 
amount of time it takes after an application for review has been filed until an ESA case 
is adjudicated, but it would be safe to assume that almost all adjudicated cases are 
resolved after, perhaps well after, the 168 day mark. The overwhelming majority of ESA 
complaints are made after the employment relationship has been severed and so it can 
be reasonably assumed that many complainants lack resources that enable them to 
hold out for final adjudication and so again may be tempted to settle for less than their 
entitlement. Finally, it is notable that the Director of ESA is required to approve 
settlements of s.108 Compliance Orders but not s.103 Orders to Pay Wages or s.104 




In view of the preceding findings, an option is to modify the OLRB review 
process and to better protect employees. In particular, consideration might be 
given to creating an independent worker advisor to assist workers whose 
monetary entitlements are being challenged before the OLRB.  
5.4 Review of Notices of Contravention 
We discuss the use of Notices of Contravention in the previous section on compliance 
and deterrence measures. As noted, an employer can challenge a Notice of 
Contravention by applying to have it reviewed by the OLRB (s.122). The ESA further 
provides that on a NOC review the onus is on the Director of the ESA to establish on a 
balance of probabilities that the person against whom the notice was issued 
contravened the Act. As previously demonstrated, NOCs are used infrequently. 
Between 2011/12 and 2014/15, ESOs issued an NOC for 244 complaints, and in 25 of 
these complaints (10% of the time) employers sought a review of one or more NOCs 
(NOCs issued as a result of an inspection were even less likely to be reviewed; see 
Appendix B, Table 5.1). Approximately a quarter of applications for review of a NOC 
(26%) were summarily dismissed, 19% were withdrawn and 11% were settled. Among 
the 43% of cases that were adjudicated by the OLRB, the application for review was 
dismissed about half of the time. Assuming that the settlements provided the employer 
with some relief, we can conclude that employer challenges to NOCs yielded them a 
benefit of some kind – by allowing the review, in whole or in part, or by way of a 
settlement – about a third of the time. 
 
6. Recovery of Monetary Entitlements 
 A key component of ES enforcement is recovering any monies that are owed. In 
this section, we focus primarily on the recovery of monetary entitlements that arise as a 
result of individual complaints. Compared to complaints, a smaller proportion of 
workplace inspections generate monetary entitlements, and among those that do, the 
vast majority are satisfied through voluntary compliance by an employer, resulting in a 
relatively high recovery rate (see Appendix B, Table 6.3), and thus they are not 
discussed below.  
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Although it is not our focus here, for both complaints and inspections, 
Compliance Orders, which by definition do not include a monetary component, are very 
likely to be satisfied (97% for those stemming from complaints, and almost 100% for 
those stemming from inspections). Given the wide range of violations that are subject to 
a Compliance Order, what is required to satisfy one also varies considerably. For 
example, an employer that fails to post the Ministry of Labour prepared ESA poster may 
be subject to a Compliance Order which is satisfied by posting (s.2). ESOs are required 
to verify that the order has been complied with and this can be done either by 
observation or by having the employer complete and return a Notification of Compliance 
Form (AMES, 7.5.7).  Assuming a large majority of Compliance Orders involve posting 
and record-keeping violations, this might account for the extremely high rates of 
satisfaction for Compliance Orders. Nevertheless, the high rates of Compliance Orders 
which are satisfied, particularly for workplace inspections, highlight the importance of 
proactively-oriented enforcement in promoting adherence to the law.   
6.1 Recovery Mechanisms for Complaints 
As previously described, the complaints process provides a number of paths for 
the resolution of monetary claims. First, workers are encouraged to attempt to resolve 
ESA complaints with their employer. In some unknown proportion of cases, the matter is 
resolved and it is probably fair to assume that some workers recover monies from their 
employer.56 Second, after an ESO becomes involved, the employer may settle, with or 
without facilitation by the ESO. As described in section two, we know that the use of 
settlements is increasing, and that settlements, especially those that are facilitated, 
appear to result in less favourable outcomes for employees compared to complaints 
assessed by an ESO, assuming that all else is equal. However, we can also be fairly 
confident that when complaints are settled, the settlement amount is recovered by the 
employee. If a complaint is not settled (and not withdrawn), the ESO assesses whether 
the employee has experienced an ES violation, and if so, what monies s/he is entitled 
to. At that point, the employer may voluntarily comply with the ESO’s finding. Voluntary 
compliance is achieved in about half of complaints with a monetary entitlement (51%), 
                                                        
56
 We have no way of knowing the outcome of self-help measures and whether the resolution provides 
employees with their full entitlement or is less than the full entitlement.  Presumably, in most cases when 
an employer has agreed to pay something, that amount is recovered by the employee. 
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and where this happens recovery is complete. From 2009/10 to 2014/15, employees 
recovered almost $33 million through employer's voluntary compliance with ESOs’ 
assessments.  
 If voluntary compliance is not achieved, the ESO will normally issue an Order to 
Pay Wages or an Order to Compensate and/or Reinstate; from this point onwards, 
recovery becomes a concern.57 As previously described, an Order to Pay Wages can be 
issued against an employer, a Director, or a related employer. Orders to Compensate 
and/or Reinstate are issued to employers to achieve restitution in specific 
circumstances. Where wage orders remain unpaid, the order can be filed with a court 
and have the same status as a court order (s.126). We have no data on this practice or 
its frequency.58 As well, Orders may be turned over for collection (ESA, Part XXIV). 
While collections were privatized for many years, recently they have come to be carried 
out by a collections unit in the Ministry of Finance.59  
6.2 Recovery Rates for Complaints with Monetary Orders 
In stark contrast to Compliance Orders, recovery rates for monetary orders are 
quite low. When all complaints with a monetary order during the period between 
2009/10 and 2014/15 are considered, only 39% were fully satisfied, 6% were partially 
satisfied, and 60% were not satisfied.60 In monetary terms, of the $47.5 million that was 
ordered to be paid to workers, only about $19 million was collected (40%), constituting a 
collective loss of about $28 million to workers over six years (see Appendix B, Table 
6.1). When we consider how recovery rates for complaints with monetary orders have 
changed across time, rates of full recovery appear to be deteriorating from 2010/11 
                                                        
57
 In about a quarter of complaints with monetary entitlements where the employer does not voluntarily 
comply, no Order is issued, primarily because the business is formally bankrupt insolvent. Presumably in 
these cases, no recovery occurs except via formal bankruptcy/insolvency mechanisms, as described in 
section seven. 
58
 In a commentary directed to us, the MOL advises that it files unpaid wage orders with the court 100% 
of the time. 
59
 In 2014, collections became the responsibility of the MOF. In addition to the sums owed, the Director 
may authorize the collector to collect a reasonable fee and/or costs from the employer, which is added to 
the amount of the order in question: however, the numbers of recovery measures to which fees or costs 
are attached are sufficiently low that they are not reported here. 
60
 In cases where an order has been reduced to zero dollars as the result of an OLRB review, the order is 
considered to be satisfied. Similarly, in cases where an order has been partially reduced as the result of 
an OLRB review, the order is considered to be satisfied if the reduced amount is paid. In cases where a 
Director's Order to Pay Wages has been issued, even if it is for a lesser amount than the employer Order 
to Pay Wages, if the Director's Order is satisfied, full recovery is deemed to have occurred.  
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onwards (see Graph 6.1). This deterioration is obviously a concerning trend for which 
there could be many possible reasons but for which we have no explanatory data.  
 Globally, 70% of complaints with monetary orders are sent to collections for 
recovery, with some inconsistent variation across time. Of those orders sent to 
collection, only one in five (20%) is subsequently fully satisfied, while the remainder are 
not, a disturbingly low success rate that clearly contributes to the low rate of recovery 
for monetary orders.  
Graph 6.1: Outcomes of Monetary Orders Issued in Response to ES Complaints, 




 Considering those complaints with monetary orders, there are several trends 
related to which complaints are fully satisfied. Interestingly, workers who have been 
fired are more likely to have their order fully satisfied than workers who are still on the 
job, who quit or have been laid off (see Appendix B, Table 6.2). Complaints relating to a 
retail trade business are also slightly more likely to have their orders fully satisfied. 
Finally, complaints with unpaid wage entitlements are less likely to be fully satisfied, a 
rather concerning result, given the prominence of unpaid wage entitlements among 
complaints overall. We have no clear explanation for these divergent trends, except to 
suggest that they reflect the different types of circumstances in which an employer is 
willing and able to comply with an Order to Pay Wages.  
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6.3 Recovery Rates for Complaints with Different Types of Orders  
Rates of recovery are not consistent across different types of monetary orders. 
For Orders to Pay Wages, there were differences in the rate of recovery depending on 
whether the Order was made solely against the employer, against the employer and 
one or more directors or against the employer and a related employer. Overall, recovery 
rates are lower for complaints where a Director Order to Pay Wages or a related 
employer Order to Pay Wages is issued (see Appendix B, Table 6.1). Considering the 
period under study, for complaints where an Order to Pay Wages is issued only to an 
employer, 41% are fully satisfied, whereas in cases when a Director Order to Pay 
Wages is issued, only 28% are fully satisfied, and in cases where a related employer 
Order to Pay Wages is issued, 26% are fully satisfied. This finding may reflect that fact 
that Director and related employer Orders to Pay Wages are made in more difficult 
situations, particularly those where there are already problems in obtaining recovery 
from the direct employer. Notably, the collections process seems to be more effective 
when directors are involved; 27% of complaints with a Director Orders to Pay Wages 
that were sent to collections are ultimately satisfied, compared to only 17% for cases 
with an Order to Pay Wages issued only to the direct employer and 16% for cases with 
an Order to Pay Wages issued to a related employer.  
 Though they are fewer in number, recovery rates for Orders to Compensate 
and/or Reinstate are substantially higher than for Orders to Pay Wages. Indeed, fully 
three-quarters (76%) of complaints with an Order to Compensate and/or Reinstate have 
these orders satisfied. These relatively high rates of collection likely reflect the particular 
circumstances in which these Orders are issued. Few orders to reinstate are issued and 
so most workers only receive compensation for the ESA violation they experienced.  
More importantly for recovery purposes, the employers subject to these orders are 
overwhelmingly likely to be in business at the time the order is issued, which facilitates 
recovery, even though Orders to Compensate and/or Reinstate tend to be for higher 
dollar amounts than Orders to Pay Wages.  
 6.4 Improving Recovery Strategies 
The enforcement system fails when workers who have experienced monetary 
violations are unable to recover the money owed to them. These data show that, in 
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most cases, when employers do not voluntary comply with ESOs’ assessments, 
recovery rates are quite low. When voluntary and ordered compliance are considered 
together, the rate of full recovery for monetary entitlements hovers at about 65%. Put 
another way, about a third of complainants who are deemed to have money owed to 
them as a result of a validated ES violation ultimately receive no money. Of greater 
concern, however, is that this rate appears to have slightly declined in the most recent 
years (see Graph 6.2), resulting from the combination of the smaller proportion of 
complaints resolved through voluntary compliance, and the decline in complaints where 
monetary orders are fully satisfied, though it is not yet possible to establish whether this 
reflects a larger trend.  
Graph 6.2: Recovery of Monetary Entitlements for Complaints, Including Both 
Those with Employer Voluntary Compliance and Those Requiring the Use of a 




The perception that complainants may not receive the money that they are owed, 
even after their complaint has been validated by an ESO, may be contributing to the 
increased willingness of complainants to accept settlements earlier on in the complaints 
process. If workers are aware, or are made aware, of the difficulty they may experience 
recovering a monetary order, they may feel that they are better off accepting less, 
instead of facing the possibility that they may never recover the full amount to which 
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they are entitled. Thus, the damage attributed to relatively low recovery rates are not 
limited simply to the amount of money that is not recovered from monetary orders, but 
may also include the potential loss to complainants who settle for an amount that is 
below what they would be entitled to if their complaint was assessed. It is therefore 
necessary to consider the backward linkages between problems in the recovery system 
and its implications for the dispute resolution mechanisms that are available under the 
ESA (see sections two and five). Since many settlements are reached prior to an ESO 
assessing a complaint, we cannot estimate the amount of losses workers may suffer as 
a result of a lack of faith in the province's recovery and collections systems, but they 
may be considerable.  
The most straightforward and certain way to insure that workers are paid their 
monetary entitlements under the ESA is for there to be a provincially-based fund which 
makes up for any shortfalls in wages that result from non-recovery. One option may be 
the creation of an Ontario wage protection fund. The structure of such a fund, 
including any limits on the amount of recovery,61 and how it should be funded62 are 
issues that would need to be considered in such an option. The measures that follow 
are inferior from the point of view of providing workers with low-cost and certain means 
of recovering their ESA entitlement. However, if the wage protection fund option is not 
pursued, other options merit consideration. One alternative approach to assuring that 
workers are able to secure the monies they are owed is by requiring employers to 
post a bond or to carry some form of insurance that would guarantee there would 
be monies available to satisfy workers' claims even in the case of a bankruptcy.   
Another approach to assuring recovery is through the imposition of liabilities on 
parties who are not the direct employer. Currently, both director and related-employer 
liability are available, but they do not necessarily yield higher rates of recovery. This 
stands in contrast to a substantial body of literature that suggests that the expansion of 
liabilities across the supply chain lead to better outcomes for workers (Hardy and Howe 
2015; Hyde 2012; Weil 2010; Rawling 2006). Further study may yield insights as to the 
                                                        
61
 Currently, the federal Wage Earner Protection Act limits recovery to a little less than $4,000, an amount 
that may leave some employees’ monetary entitlements unfulfilled. 
62
 A fund of this sort existed briefly in Ontario in the early 1990s but, as it used public revenue to 
compensate workers for lost wages, its source of funding was criticized for allowing employers “to 
socialize the costs of business failure” (Fudge 1991, 92). 
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reasons why this is not the case in Ontario's ES enforcement system. For instance, 
related-employer liability is currently only available in a limited number of circumstances 
and certainly does not cover many arms-length relationships that typically exist in 
supply chains. An option is to further investigate Director and related employer 
liability, with a view to reforming the current legislation to expand these liabilities, 
including (a) making related employer liability apply to supply chain and 
contracting-out arrangements, and/or (b) expanding the scope of ES entitlements 
that Directors might be liable for. 
By way of conclusion, it should be emphasized that overall the collections system 
is producing low rates of recovery for both compliance and deterrence tools; indeed, 
overall, recovery rates have been declining since 2010/11. In addition to the evidence of 
low rates of recovery of monetary entitlements presented above, as indicated in section 
four, recovery rates of fines resulting from NOCs are also low. Despite moving 
responsibility for collections away from private collection agencies and into a unit within 
the Ministry of Finance, there does not seem to have been a noticeable improvement in 
collection rates for the 2014/15 fiscal year. Consequently, an option is to investigate 
the current collections regime with a view to finding ways to improve its overall 
performance. 
 
7.  The Special Case of Bankruptcy 
A substantial amount of the monies owed to workers are from employers who are 
insolvent or bankrupt (i.e., businesses that are either bankrupt, under the Companies’ 
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) protection, or in receivership).63 Recognized as a 
longstanding problem by provincial policymakers almost since the inception of the ESA 
(Thomas 2003), recovery of unpaid wages in cases of bankruptcy or insolvency is 
difficult because workers become one of several creditors owed money and are paid 
subject to priority ranking as determined by federal bankruptcy and insolvency 
legislation. Large companies (i.e., with 20 or more employees) subject to complaints are 
more likely to be formally bankrupt or insolvent than those that are small, which are 
                                                        
63
 In this analysis, only complaints assigned to one of the Ministry of Labour's specialized 
Bankruptcy/Insolvency Claims Units are considered to relate to formally bankrupt or insolvent businesses 
(i.e., regardless of the complainant's report of a business' status).   
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more likely to cease operating without formally declaring bankruptcy (see Appendix B, 
Table 7.1). Furthermore, those in declining manufacturing and primary industries, where 
large firms have been prominent historically, are also more likely to be subject to formal 
bankruptcy proceedings. Not surprisingly, ES violations for termination pay and for 
severance pay are particularly prominent among complaints relating to formally 
bankrupt or insolvent businesses.  
The Ministry of Labour assists employees by filing Proofs of Claim with the 
Trustee in Bankruptcy or the Monitor, but that is the limit of its ability to recover money 
from formally bankrupt/insolvent entities. No data were available to us on the recovery 
of workers’ wages under federal bankruptcy and insolvency law, but despite the fact that 
recent legislation better protects workers’ wages than was the case in the past, it is still 
reasonable to assume that workers only recover a fraction of what they are owed. Given 
these circumstances, an option is to undertake further study of Ontario workers’ 
wage recovery in bankruptcy. 
 Having said that, there is the question of how the Ministry of Labour assists 
workers in recovering ES entitlements when their employers are insolvent or bankrupt.  
Based on the assessment of an ESO, the Ministry of Labour has the option of filing a 
Proof of Claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy or the Monitor. Among complaints where 
the business appears to be bankrupt or insolvent and where monetary entitlements are 
still owing, the ESIS data show that only 7% have a Proof of Claim filed by the Ministry. 
Further, complaints where a Proof of Claim has been filed are more likely to have ES 
violations for unpaid wages, vacation pay/time and public holiday pay, whereas 
complaints relating to formally bankrupt/insolvent businesses where no Proof of Claim 
was filed were more likely to have ES violations for termination pay and for severance 
pay. Entitlement amounts are also lower for complaints where a Proof of Claim has 
been filed, compared to those where it has not, a finding likely associated with the 
smaller percentage of severance pay and termination pay entitlements (see Appendix 
B, Table 7.2).  
In general, these results are difficult to interpret, since we do not know what 
determines whether or not a Proof of Claim is issued, except that ESOs are advised not 
to issue Proofs of Claim in the rare case when they are satisfied that no recovery is 
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possible. As a result, we cannot suggest any options with respect to the use of Proofs of 
Claim, except to review the use of Proofs of Claim as part of the broader study of 
wage recovery in bankruptcy and insolvency situations. 
 Finally, as discussed in the context of recovery more generally, many workers 
face serious difficulties collecting the monies that they are found to be owed. One 
instance, analogous to bankruptcy and insolvency, that we have not discussed here, is 
the problem of companies that go out of business but that do not formally file for 
bankruptcy or insolvency. These findings further support the consideration of the option 
made in section six (on recovery) for an Ontario wage protection fund or other 
measures to secure wage payments.  
Moreover, to reduce the cost of operating such a fund, it could be 
subrogated to the claims of workers so that the monies paid out, or at least a 
share of them, can be recovered through the bankruptcy process.   
 
C. Conclusion and Options for Legislative and Regulatory Reform 
 
Building on the conceptual framework outlined in Part A that identified the two 
crucial dimensions of Ontario’s ES enforcement regime – namely, reactive versus 
proactive enforcement and compliance versus deterrence – and based on original 
statistical and documentary analysis that demonstrates its overwhelmingly complaint-
driven and compliance orientation, the options we identify for legislative and regulatory 
reform aim to suggest pathways for combining reactive measures to address individual 
complaints and proactive measures to achieve the strategic objective of reducing the 
incidence of violations in the first place. Arriving at an optimal combination of pathways 
should not entail neglecting the former in favour of the latter but, rather, should 
simultaneously strengthen reactive measures and increase proactivity. One promising 
technique for bridging between these two dimensions is to augment the use of proactive 
measures, including strategies such as the greater use of expanded investigations. 
Strengthening reactive and proactive measures cannot be separated from the second 
dimension of our analysis of ES enforcement, that is, the use of compliance and 
deterrence (general and specific). As this study shows, the extreme reliance on 
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compliance measures in Ontario provides employers with few incentives to avoid ES 
violations in the first place. Deterrence measures are an essential requirement of a 
strategic approach to enforcement but while the ESA, the POA and the Criminal Code 
provide regulators with a wide range of deterrence tools, they are rarely used.  
Options for Reform: 
1. Complaints & Claims Options 
1.1. Remove the discretion of the Director of Employment Standards to impose a 
requirement on employees to contact their employer before submitting a 
complaint (pg. 24). 
1.2. Expand options for third-party and anonymous complaints (pg. 24). 
1.3. Give ESOs the power to order liquidated damages in addition to the amount 
of the order to pay. If this power is granted, consideration could be given as 
to whether liquidated damages should be mandatory in certain cases and 
whether they should be fixed as a percentage of what is owed (pg. 34)  
2. Settlement Options 
2.1. Further investigate the role of settlements with a view to limiting their use, 
especially the use of those facilitated by ESOs (pg. 39). 
2.2. Protect workers in the settlement process so as to avoid arrangements that 
fall below minimum entitlements (pg. 39).  
2.3. Investigate further whether problems in recovering the amounts ESOs order 
employers to pay (s. 6) place downward pressure on settlement outcomes 
(pg. 39). 
3. Inspection Options 
3.1. Review, and possibly suspend, the practice of providing employers with 
advance notice of inspection (pg. 40). 
3.2. Strengthen the proactive model of enforcement with a view, in particular, to 
identifying monetary violations of the type being detected via complaints (pg. 
46). 
3.3. Increase the role of expanded investigations as a bridge between the 




4. Compliance & Deterrence Options 
4.1. Investigate related-employer liability, including the possibility of extending it 
substantially beyond its current boundaries to supply chain situations (pg.48). 
4.2. Make administrative monetary penalties more effective by increasing their 
amounts, strengthening collection processes, streamlining policies 
surrounding how they can be challenged, and augmenting the resources 
provided to the administrative tribunal that determines challenges to 
penalties (pg. 53).   
4.3. Routinely impose NOCs and Part I regulatory offence prosecutions when 
employers commit monetary violations (pg. 54). 
4.4. Advise ESOs that low-level sanctions are not appropriate for intentional 
wrongdoing. In cases where there is intentional violation of the ESA, 
mandate that Part III prosecutions normally be initiated (pg. 57). 
4.5. Consider referring egregious cases to the Crown for possible criminal 
prosecution (pg. 58). 
4.6. Overall, expand the use of deterrence measures including their more 
frequent use, the imposition of higher penalties, and greater publicity to 
promote general deterrent effects (pg. 58). 
5. Options for OLRB Reviews 
5.1. Require directors to post the amount of an Order to Pay Wages to the extent 
of their liability as a condition of having it reviewed (pg. 60). 
5.2. Better protect employees in the settlement process in the context of the 
OLRB review process; specifically, consider creating an independent worker 
advisor to assist workers whose monetary entitlements are being challenged 
before the OLRB (pg. 68).  
6. Recovery Options 
6.1. Create a provincial wage protection fund and address crucial issues related 
to its funding and coverage limits (pg. 74). 
6.2.  If a provincial wage protection fund is not created, require employers to post 
a bond or carry insurance sufficient to fund potential ESA liabilities (pg. 74). 
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6.3. Further investigate Director and related employer liability, with a view to 
reforming the current legislation to expand these liabilities, including (a) 
making related employer liability apply to supply chain and contracting out 
arrangements, and//or (b) expanding the scope of ES entitlements that 
Directors might be liable for (pg. 75).  
6.4 Investigate the current collections regime with a view to finding ways to  
      improve its performance (pg. 75). 
7. Bankruptcy Options 
7.1. Undertake further study of Ontario workers’ wage recovery in bankruptcy and 
insolvency proceedings (pg. 76).   
7.2. Review the use of Proofs of Claim, perhaps as part of the broader study of 
wage recovery in bankruptcy and insolvency situations (pg. 77). 
7.3. If an Ontario Wage Protection Fund is created, consider having the fund 
subrogated to the claims of workers so that the monies paid out, or at least a 
share of them, can be recovered through the bankruptcy process (pg. 77).   
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Appendix A: Methodological Notes 
 
Statistical Data Source 
This analysis relies on data collected in the Ontario Ministry of Labour’s 
Employment Standards Information System (ESIS).  ESIS was first implemented in 
2007, and it is used primarily as an information tracking and case management system, 
which stores information on ES complaints and inspections, their movement through the 
ES assessment and enforcement process, and their outcomes. In addition to its role as 
a case management system, ESIS is designed to allow ESOs to quickly generate 
standardized letters used in various aspects of the ES enforcement process by pre-
populating many fields. Finally, and more generally, ESIS is used to manage ESOs’ 
workloads collectively, by routing complaints for investigation and other tasks to Officers 
in specific regions. ESIS information is stored in a SQL database, paired with a user-
interface that allows ESOs to enter data, record activities, and generate letters. As the 
primary administrative database of ES enforcement activities in Ontario, ESIS data 
provide a source of information that is not otherwise available.   
The ESIS database uses a modular structure that links information through 
unique record identifiers. At present, there are eight main modules: claim records, 
events/inspections, compliance tools, operating location, legal entities, appeals (OLRB 
reviews), hours of work applications, and compliance checks (self-assessments).  ESIS 
data were provided to the authors in an anonymized form, by suppressing key fields in 
each module. The analysis in this study relies primarily on information from the claims 
records, events/inspections, compliance tools, and appeals modules. Since these 
modules were launched in ESIS at various points in time, this study uses different time 
periods for different parts of the analysis, in order to make the best use of the available 
data. Information in some key fields – such as those relating to industry or company 
size – was/is not always collected consistently. In order to ensure data quality, 
information is only reported for fiscal years in which there is a robust collection of data 
available for the relevant fields; typically, 50% of cases was used as a minimum 
threshold. More complete information about complaints, investigations, reviews, and the 
use of compliance/deterrence tools is only available for the most recent years.  
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Information is entered into ESIS by a wide range of MOL personnel (ESOs, 
claims processors, registrars, payment recorder, OLRB review recorder), as well as by 
complainants themselves, through the online claim submission form. In addition, ESOs 
may update or verify some of the information entered by a complainant during their 
investigation. These practices have several implications for the data and any data 
analysis. First, complainants may enter inconsistent information in their claim form, and 
this is sometimes preserved in the data (and sometimes reconciled). Second, for ESOs 
particularly, data entry – and especially high-quality data entry – is secondary to their 
main job functions. As a result, although the ESIS data are comprehensive, they are of 
somewhat low-quality in terms of their internal consistency and completeness. As noted 
in the body of text, in this analysis our general approach has been to let these 
inconsistencies persist since the removal of cases with inconsistent information would 
result in a substantial loss of data, reducing a central feature of the ESIS database as a 
near-complete census of Ontario's ES enforcement activities and their outcomes.  
Additionally, it should be emphasized that ESIS was designed to be applicable to 
a wide range of situations, many of which have the potential to be atypical in some way 
or another. As a result, the database contains many open-text fields, which allow 
complainants and ESOs to provide narratives about the specific situation of each case. 
While this approach is certainly desirable from a case management perspective, open-
text fields do not lend themselves well to statistical analysis; because of time and 
resource constraints, the analysis in this study does not incorporate any of the rich and 
detailed information contained in these open-text fields. Further, in order to provide 
users with maximum flexibility, the ESIS appears to have relatively few required-answer 
or forced-choice fields. As a result, some cases are missing information for key fields, 
with little indication as to why – these fields may not be applicable to the case, a 
complainant may not have known the answer to a question, or they may have been 
skipped in error. Following the convention adopted typically in data analysis, cases that 
are missing information for a field are retained in the analysis, but excluded from reports 
based on that field. In cases where a large proportion of cases are missing information 




Data Analysis Approach 
 A key feature of both the ESIS and, concomitantly, this analysis, is its multi-level, 
relational structure, organized typically around many-to-one relationships. For example, 
a single employer (or legal entity), might be linked to multiple complaints; a single 
complaint might be linked to claims for multiple employment standards, and a 
complainant’s monetary entitlement for a single employment standard might be linked to 
multiple payment records. This study relies primarily on three different units of analysis 
situated in this relational structure. The unit used most often is that of the complaint or 
the inspection (i.e., the case). However, in sections one and three of the research 
findings, we occasionally shift to analyze claims for individual ES (where, as previously 
noted, a case can include more than one claim). Finally, in section four of the research 
findings, on OLRB reviews, in some instances, we use applications for review as the 
unit of analysis; and, here, again, there can be multiple applications for review relating 
to a single case. 
To facilitate analysis, data from the main ESIS modules was imported from SQL 
into SPSS, the software program used for the statistical analysis. For each desired unit 
of analysis (and for complaints and inspections separately), SQL data tables were 
merged into flat files that captured the breadth of the available information, using the 
same unique identifiers that facilitate joins in SQL. For each data table, in-progress, 
suspended, voided or rescinded entries were removed prior to amalgamation. Finally, 
the SQL tables that designate field labels were imported via Excel in order to semi-
automatically generate a comprehensive set of syntax to label the SPSS data files.  
The descriptive statistics produced for this data analysis are primarily the result 
of substantial data manipulation, in order to map the progress of each case (complaint 
or inspection) throughout the ES enforcement system. Once the trajectories of each 
case were established, we undertook analysis relating to key demographic features, 
such as fiscal year, firm size, and industrial location, in order to better understand the 
variations between cases. Since these data are necessarily cross-sectional, it is not 
possible to identify causal relationships, and the preceding analysis should be 
interpreted with this caveat in mind.  
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The challenges of using the ESIS data in this analysis, as enumerated above, 
are typical of any research relying on administrative data. The scope and detail 
captured by ESIS, however, allows for a rich analysis of ES enforcement in Ontario that 
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Table 1.1a: Characteristics of ES Complaints, 2008/09 to 2014/15
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# of non-unionized Ontario employees per year 4,022,798  3,922,695  4,027,600  4,082,212  4,077,938  4,193,062  4,247,521  
# of complaints submitted per fiscal year 23,286  20,382  17,093  16,132  15,050  15,507  14,885  122,335   
# of non-unionized employees per complaint 173  192  236  253  271  270  285  240   
# of complaints for fiscal year that have been closed* 23,216  20,314  16,968  15,995  14,847  15,175  14,378  120,893   
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Complainant Work Status
Still Working 7.3% 8.9% 8.6% 9.4% 8.7% 8.5% 9.3% 8.6%
Fired 25.3% 28.0% 29.1% 27.1% 29.4% 28.1% 28.6% 27.8%
Laid Off 17.2% 18.4% 14.1% 13.5% 12.8% 12.5% 11.4% 14.6%
Quit 22.2% 20.8% 24.9% 24.0% 25.5% 26.2% 28.2% 24.2%
Other 28.0% 24.0% 23.3% 26.0% 23.6% 24.6% 22.5% 24.8%
Employer Status
In businessa 77.9% 86.0% 91.1% 85.0% 90.5% 89.9% 92.5% 86.9%
Out of business or bankrupt/insolvent 22.1% 14.0% 8.9% 15.0% 9.5% 10.1% 7.5% 13.1%
Company Sizeb
1 to 5 employees -- -- -- -- 15.3% 18.4% 18.3% 14.5%
6 to 10 employees -- -- -- -- 19.2% 19.4% 18.2% 16.8%
11 to 19 employees -- -- -- -- 19.5% 18.4% 18.0% 17.2%
20 to 49 employees -- -- -- -- 18.9% 18.2% 18.5% 18.9%
50 to 199 employees -- -- -- -- 15.7% 15.1% 15.8% 17.0%
200 or more employees -- -- -- -- 11.4% 10.6% 11.3% 15.5%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services -- -- 20.2% 19.2% 21.1% 21.6% 21.3% 20.7%
Retail trade -- -- 15.3% 14.2% 14.1% 12.5% 12.8% 13.9%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord -- -- 25.5% 27.7% 24.2% 23.6% 25.9% 25.5%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore -- -- 11.2% 11.8% 12.7% 12.2% 12.5% 12.2%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf -- -- 27.8% 27.0% 27.8% 30.0% 27.5% 27.8%
Employment Standard(s) Claimed
Unpaid wages 41.2% 43.9% 48.5% 52.6% 50.5% 52.0% 52.4% 48.0%
Termination pay 47.1% 45.4% 41.5% 43.2% 44.1% 43.0% 41.8% 44.0%
Vacation pay/time 38.4% 35.1% 36.9% 39.9% 34.0% 34.2% 31.5% 35.9%
Severance pay 18.7% 16.5% 12.8% 13.6% 13.3% 13.5% 12.6% 14.8%
Overtime pay 9.0% 8.6% 10.5% 10.8% 11.2% 11.2% 11.7% 10.2%
Public holidays/pay 8.7% 9.5% 11.1% 12.3% 11.7% 11.7% 11.1% 10.7%
Reprisal 6.3% 7.4% 8.2% 7.8% 8.9% 9.8% 10.4% 8.2%
Daily/weekly rest periods 5.1% 6.3% 6.8% 6.6% 7.1% 7.5% 7.9% 6.6%
Deductions from wages 5.5% 6.1% 6.6% 6.8% 7.2% 7.1% 7.1% 6.5%
Leaves of absence 3.4% 4.6% 4.4% 3.9% 4.9% 4.9% 4.6% 4.3%
Minimum wage 2.1% 3.0% 4.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.3%
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
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Table 1.1b: Characteristics of ES Complaints, 2008/09 to 2014/15
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Total Amount Claimed (for all standards combined)
Median $1,280    $1,241    $1,200    $1,255    $1,216    $1,270    $1,250    $1,248    
Less than $300 11.4% 11.4% 11.6% 11.6% 11.8% 11.5% 11.8% 11.6%
$300 to $999 20.5% 21.6% 22.7% 24.4% 24.5% 23.9% 24.1% 22.9%
$1,000 to $1,999 13.1% 13.1% 14.2% 16.2% 16.1% 15.7% 16.5% 14.8%
$2,000 to $9,999 20.7% 21.2% 21.6% 24.6% 24.3% 24.6% 23.8% 22.7%
$10,000 or more 8.9% 8.3% 6.7% 6.9% 6.6% 7.1% 7.3% 7.5%
Claim amount missing, or $1 or less 25.4% 24.4% 23.2% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2% 16.6% 20.6%
Outcome of Complaint
Settled 3.7% 5.8% 6.8% 9.9% 11.9% 12.4% 14.9% 8.7%
Withdrawn 18.6% 22.5% 20.4% 18.2% 21.0% 24.6% 26.1% 21.4%
Assessed 77.7% 71.7% 72.9% 71.9% 67.1% 63.0% 59.0% 69.9%
AMONG ASSESSED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Presence of ES Violations
No ES violation 29.7% 31.6% 29.6% 29.3% 32.1% 30.5% 33.4% 30.7%
One or more ES violations 70.3% 68.4% 70.4% 70.7% 67.9% 69.5% 66.6% 69.3%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.9% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 0.8%
Monetary violations only 69.3% 67.3% 69.0% 69.0% 65.8% 67.0% 64.2% 67.7%
Non-monetary violations only 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.3% 1.3% 0.8%
Violation Rate 
Monetary violation 69.8% 67.8% 69.7% 69.9% 67.0% 68.1% 65.3% 68.5%
Non-monetary violation 1.0% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 2.2% 2.5% 2.5% 1.6%
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Disposition
Voluntary Compliance during Triage 19.2% 12.7% 16.6% 13.3% 13.1% 9.2% 10.0% 14.2%
Voluntary Compliance during Investigation 25.4% 34.9% 39.4% 37.4% 39.9% 43.0% 41.1% 36.0%
Compliance Ordered 55.4% 52.4% 44.0% 49.3% 47.0% 47.8% 48.9% 49.9%
Employment Standards Violatedg
Termination pay 57.1% 51.2% 42.2% 41.6% 44.4% 43.5% 42.4% 47.3%
Vacation pay/time 48.4% 48.2% 45.8% 50.6% 44.9% 43.2% 42.5% 46.7%
Unpaid wages 37.9% 42.9% 47.2% 53.3% 49.1% 49.8% 50.4% 46.1%
Public holidays/pay 8.5% 10.3% 12.6% 13.3% 13.0% 14.3% 13.6% 11.8%
Severance pay 16.1% 11.4% 6.8% 6.3% 5.7% 5.2% 4.8% 9.0%
Overtime pay 6.4% 7.0% 8.8% 8.2% 7.9% 10.3% 10.5% 8.1%
Deductions from wages 4.7% 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.1% 4.7% 4.8% 4.8%
Minimum wage 1.5% 2.3% 3.6% 2.0% 1.8% 2.4% 2.0% 2.2%
Reprisal 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.2% 1.8% 3.0% 3.0% 1.6%
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
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Table 1.1c: Characteristics of ES Complaints, 2008/09 to 2014/15
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Median Entitlement Amount per Standard
Total $1,517     $1,099     $970     $1,016     $975     $1,119     $1,093     $1,109     
Severance pay $6,898     $7,808     $6,273     $5,148     $5,694     $5,869     $6,180     $6,651     
Reprisal $2,275     $3,352     $2,732     $3,350     $2,800     $2,722     $2,602     $2,909     
Termination pay $2,845     $1,232     $1,040     $1,098     $961     $1,124     $970     $1,266     
Unpaid wages $626     $583     $652     $693     $630     $724     $782     $662     
Overtime pay $370     $412     $414     $477     $443     $552     $417     $436     
Minimum wage $180     $280     $268     $308     $412     $598     $219     $293     
Deductions from wages $186     $208     $225     $237     $250     $250     $276     $225     
Public holidays/pay $170     $178     $176     $170     $172     $187     $174     $174     
Vacation pay/time $152     $141     $150     $145     $126     $178     $159     $150     
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $1,517    $1,099    $970    $1,016    $975    $1,119    $1,093    $1,109    
Less than $300 17.0% 19.3% 20.3% 19.0% 19.8% 17.8% 17.8% 18.6%
$300 to $999 24.1% 28.3% 30.4% 30.6% 30.9% 29.0% 30.0% 28.6%
$1,000 to $1,999 13.8% 16.5% 18.2% 19.0% 18.8% 18.5% 19.0% 17.3%
$2,000 to $9,999 23.2% 25.1% 24.4% 26.2% 25.1% 28.2% 26.4% 25.2%
$10,000 or more 21.8% 10.8% 6.7% 5.3% 5.4% 6.4% 6.8% 10.3%
Percentage of Original Claim Amount Awardedh
0 to 49% 13.3% 14.0% 15.8% 18.2% 19.1% 19.4% 20.8% 16.7%
50 to 99% 23.9% 26.6% 27.0% 27.6% 28.9% 28.3% 28.9% 27.0%
100% 21.3% 21.6% 22.6% 16.7% 16.4% 14.2% 11.4% 18.5%
100 to 150% 26.7% 27.7% 25.0% 26.3% 25.9% 26.6% 27.6% 26.5%
More than 150% 14.8% 10.1% 9.5% 11.2% 9.7% 11.6% 11.2% 11.4%
h Among complaints with monetary entitlements, and total claim amounts greater than $1
g  Monetary violations only, among all validated complaints
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
* This analysis only includes closed claims 
a Includes companies where employer disposition is unknown or missing
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
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Table 1.2a: Operational Status of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2008/09 to 2014/15
In Businessa
Out of Business or 
Bankrupt/Insolvent Total 
% of complaints relating to businesses with each status 86.9% 13.1% 100.0%
# of complaints relating to businesses with each status 105,003                 15,890                 120,893                
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Complainant Work Status
Still Working 9.3% 4.1% 8.6%
Fired 31.2% 5.0% 27.8%
Laid Off 12.3% 30.1% 14.6%
Quit 26.9% 6.3% 24.2%
Other 20.3% 54.4% 24.8%
Company Sizeb
1 to 5 employees 14.7% 12.5% 14.5%
6 to 10 employees 16.8% 16.8% 16.8%
11 to 19 employees 17.2% 17.4% 17.2%
20 to 49 employees 18.7% 21.0% 18.9%
50 to 199 employees 17.4% 13.6% 17.0%
200 or more employees 15.2% 18.7% 15.5%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services 19.9% 27.5% 20.7%
Retail trade 14.3% 10.7% 13.9%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 25.9% 21.2% 25.5%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 12.3% 11.1% 12.2%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 27.6% 29.6% 27.8%
Employment Standard(s) Claimed
Unpaid wages 47.8% 49.1% 48.0%
Termination pay 41.1% 63.2% 44.0%
Vacation pay/time 34.3% 46.7% 35.9%
Severance pay 11.7% 35.3% 14.8%
Overtime pay 11.1% 4.9% 10.2%
Public holidays/pay 11.0% 8.4% 10.7%
Reprisal 9.3% 1.0% 8.2%
Daily/weekly rest periods 7.4% 1.4% 6.6%
Deductions from wages 7.2% 2.2% 6.5%
Leaves of absence 4.9% 0.5% 4.3%
Minimum wage 3.5% 1.5% 3.3%
Operational Status
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Table 1.2b: Operational Status of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2008/09 to 2014/15
In Businessa
Out of Business or 
Bankrupt/Insolvent Total 
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Total Amount Claimed (for all standards combined)
Median $1,100 $3,000 $1,248
Less than $300 12.7% 4.3% 11.6%
$300 to $999 23.9% 15.7% 22.9%
$1,000 to $1,999 14.9% 14.0% 14.8%
$2,000 to $9,999 21.4% 31.2% 22.7%
$10,000 or more 5.6% 19.8% 7.5%
Claim amount missing, or $1 or less 21.4% 15.0% 20.6%
Outcome of Complaint
Settled 9.7% 2.2% 8.7%
Withdrawn 23.4% 8.1% 21.4%
Assessed 66.9% 89.8% 69.9%
AMONG ASSESSED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Presence of ES Violations
No ES violation 35.1% 9.0% 30.7%
One or more ES violations 64.9% 91.0% 69.3%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 0.9% 0.3% 0.8%
Monetary violations only 63.0% 90.7% 67.7%
Non-monetary violations only 1.0% 0.1% 0.8%
Violation Rate 
Monetary violation 63.9% 90.9% 68.5%
Non-monetary violation 1.9% 0.3% 1.6%
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Disposition
Voluntary Compliance during Triage 17.9% 1.0% 14.2%
Voluntary Compliance during Investigation 44.7% 5.2% 36.0%
Compliance Ordered 37.4% 93.8% 49.9%
Employment Standards Violatedg
Termination pay 39.9% 73.3% 47.3%
Vacation pay/time 46.2% 48.6% 46.7%
Unpaid wages 45.9% 46.8% 46.1%
Public holidays/pay 13.1% 7.0% 11.8%
Severance pay 4.0% 26.5% 9.0%
Overtime pay 9.5% 3.2% 8.1%
Deductions from wages 5.7% 1.4% 4.8%
Minimum wage 2.6% 0.9% 2.2%
Reprisal 2.1% 0.1% 1.6%
Operational Status
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Table 1.2c: Operational Status of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2008/09 to 2014/15
In Businessa
Out of Business or 
Bankrupt/Insolvent Total 
Median Entitlement Amount per Standard
Total $836                 $4,477                 $1,109                 
Severance pay $4,658                 $7,836                 $6,651                 
Reprisal $2,891                 $3,693                 $2,909                 
Termination pay $858                 $4,333                 $1,266                 
Unpaid wages $574                 $1,059                 $662                 
Overtime pay $444                 $374                 $436                 
Minimum wage $284                 $347                 $293                 
Deductions from wages $240                 $153                 $225                 
Public holidays/pay $180                 $141                 $174                 
Vacation pay/time $115                 $328                 $150                 
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $836                 $4,477                 $1,109                 
Less than $300 22.5% 5.2% 18.6%
$300 to $999 32.4% 15.2% 28.6%
$1,000 to $1,999 18.4% 13.2% 17.3%
$2,000 to $9,999 22.4% 34.8% 25.2%
$10,000 or more 4.2% 31.6% 10.3%
Percentage of Original Claim Amount Awardedh
0 to 49% 18.5% 10.3% 16.7%
50 to 99% 27.4% 25.6% 27.0%
100% 19.9% 13.3% 18.5%
100 to 150% 25.4% 30.5% 26.5%
More than 150% 8.8% 20.4% 11.4%
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
Operational Status
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
a Includes companies where employer disposition is unknown or missing
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support 
f  Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
g  Monetary violations only, among all validated complaints
h  Among complaints with monetary entitlements, and total claim amounts greater than $1
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Table 1.3a: Industry of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2010/11 to 2014/15
Accommodation 










% of Ontario workers employed in each industry* 8.9% 14.7% 27.2% 17.1% 32.0% 100%
% of Ontario businesses in each industry** 6.6% 12.8% 38.0% 13.5% 29.0%
# of Ontario businesses in each industry** 108,039           208,988        618,367            219,222           472,654          
% of complaints relating to each industry* 20.7% 13.8% 25.4% 12.1% 28.0%
# of complaints relating to each industry 12,223           8,140        15,042            7,178           16,583          59,166     
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Complainant Work Status
Still Working 7.0% 9.3% 8.9% 12.3% 6.0% 8.2%
Fired 31.4% 34.5% 28.2% 26.9% 25.3% 28.8%
Laid Off 8.6% 11.0% 13.4% 11.7% 18.2% 13.2%
Quit 27.8% 23.3% 25.6% 23.3% 24.7% 25.2%
Other 25.2% 22.0% 23.8% 25.7% 25.7% 24.6%
Employer Status
In businessa 85.0% 91.1% 91.1% 90.0% 88.4% 88.9%
Out of business or bankrupt/insolvent 15.0% 8.9% 8.9% 10.0% 11.6% 11.1%
Company Sizeb
1 to 5 employees 10.8% 12.9% 18.7% 16.3% 18.0% 15.7%
6 to 10 employees 23.0% 14.1% 16.1% 16.3% 17.4% 17.7%
11 to 19 employees 28.1% 13.9% 13.9% 17.8% 15.4% 17.8%
20 to 49 employees 23.2% 18.6% 12.5% 20.1% 19.9% 18.5%
50 to 199 employees 10.5% 17.4% 18.4% 15.9% 18.6% 16.3%
200 or more employees 4.6% 23.0% 20.4% 13.7% 10.7% 14.0%
Claims Per Standard
Unpaid wages 56.0% 43.4% 52.7% 52.8% 50.3% 51.4%
Termination pay 46.7% 51.5% 45.1% 41.9% 43.4% 45.5%
Vacation pay/time 37.0% 33.5% 37.0% 36.1% 36.5% 36.3%
Severance pay 9.4% 16.1% 13.1% 12.7% 18.0% 14.1%
Public holidays/pay 16.5% 10.9% 11.8% 11.2% 10.7% 12.3%
Overtime pay 11.5% 9.8% 11.0% 9.2% 14.3% 11.6%
Reprisal 9.4% 10.2% 9.8% 9.7% 7.9% 9.2%
Daily/weekly rest periods 11.5% 8.8% 6.0% 7.3% 4.8% 7.3%
Deductions from wages 8.1% 7.6% 7.5% 5.2% 7.1% 7.2%
Leaves of absence 3.6% 5.3% 5.1% 6.0% 3.7% 4.5%
Minimum wage 6.6% 3.6% 3.5% 2.7% 2.2% 3.7%
Industrial Sector (based on the NAICS)c
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Table 1.3b: Industry of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2010/11 to 2014/15
Accommodation 










Total Amount Claimed (for all standards combined)
Median $725          $1,210       $1,390           $1,404          $1,990         $1,315     
Less than $300 18.8% 11.9% 10.2% 9.5% 5.9% 10.9%
$300 to $999 31.5% 23.4% 23.5% 22.5% 18.7% 23.7%
$1,000 to $1,999 14.0% 14.8% 16.2% 16.5% 17.4% 16.0%
$2,000 to $9,999 16.5% 22.7% 26.3% 25.9% 30.6% 24.9%
$10,000 or more 2.8% 7.3% 7.5% 6.5% 11.2% 7.4%
Claim amount missing, or $1 or less 16.4% 19.9% 16.3% 19.2% 16.1% 17.1%
Outcome of Complaint
Settled 11.5% 11.9% 11.7% 12.1% 11.7% 11.7%
Withdrawn 13.7% 14.7% 13.7% 15.0% 12.1% 13.5%
Assessed 74.9% 73.4% 74.7% 72.9% 76.2% 74.8%
AMONG ASSESSED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Presence of ES Violations
No ES violation 21.7% 30.9% 29.4% 31.8% 33.5% 29.5%
One or more ES violations 78.3% 69.1% 70.6% 68.2% 66.5% 70.5%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 1.5% 1.1% 0.9% 1.3% 0.8% 1.0%
Monetary violations only 75.8% 66.5% 68.7% 65.7% 65.1% 68.5%
Non-monetary violations only 1.0% 1.4% 1.0% 1.3% 0.6% 1.0%
Violation Rate 
Monetary violation 77.3% 67.6% 69.6% 67.0% 65.9% 69.5%
Non-monetary violation 2.5% 2.5% 1.9% 2.6% 1.4% 2.0%
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Disposition
Closed - Voluntary Compliance during Triage 11.4% 14.8% 10.6% 10.8% 10.2% 11.3%
Closed - Voluntary Compliance during Investigation 38.4% 47.0% 40.6% 42.6% 34.7% 39.6%
Compliance Ordered 50.2% 38.2% 48.8% 46.5% 55.1% 49.2%
Employment Standards Violatedg
Unpaid wages 55.1% 41.3% 52.4% 52.1% 48.7% 50.5%
Vacation pay/time 46.3% 39.5% 46.9% 47.5% 45.9% 45.6%
Termination pay 44.6% 50.4% 43.7% 42.4% 40.0% 43.6%
Public holidays/pay 18.2% 12.0% 13.7% 12.7% 11.9% 13.9%
Overtime pay 9.1% 7.6% 7.9% 7.3% 12.6% 9.3%
Severance pay 2.3% 7.5% 5.9% 4.5% 9.2% 6.0%
Deductions from wages 5.0% 5.9% 5.2% 2.9% 4.9% 4.9%
Minimum wage 4.2% 2.1% 2.2% 1.6% 1.3% 2.3%
Reprisal 2.0% 2.4% 2.2% 2.2% 1.7% 2.1%
Industrial Sector (based on the NAICS)c
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Table 1.3c: Industry of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2010/11 to 2014/15
Accommodation 










Median Entitlement Amounts per Standard
Total $647          $923       $1,136           $118,810          $1,544          $1,062     
Severance pay $2,906          $4,983       $5,000           $5,000          $7,744          $5,785     
Reprisal $1,811          $2,000       $3,362           $4,455          $4,548          $2,834     
Termination pay $510          $900       $1,200           $1,143          $1,998          $1,045     
Unpaid wages $489          $549       $768           $852          $962          $707     
Overtime pay $413          $329       $487           $429          $533          $461     
Minimum wage $266          $294       $440           $376          $862          $380     
Deductions from wages $103          $265       $300           $231          $450          $250     
Public holidays/pay $167          $147       $166           $182          $204          $175     
Vacation pay/time $78          $150       $200           $186          $206          $157     
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $647          $923       $1,136 $1,200 $1,529 $1,062     
Less than $300 27.9% 21.0% 16.8% 16.5% 11.8% 18.5%
$300 to $999 35.1% 31.3% 29.5% 27.6% 25.3% 29.7%
$1,000 to $1,999 17.0% 17.7% 17.9% 20.5% 20.9% 18.8%
$2,000 to $9,999 17.9% 23.9% 28.9% 29.4% 32.1% 26.7%
$10,000 or more 2.1% 6.1% 6.8% 6.0% 9.9% 6.4%
Percentage of Original Claim Amount Awardedh
0 to 49% 17.1% 19.6% 17.6% 19.6% 18.9% 18.3%
50 to 99% 28.1% 29.0% 28.9% 26.6% 28.8% 28.5%
100% 15.5% 15.3% 15.2% 16.4% 15.6% 15.5%
100 to 150% 28.2% 25.5% 26.1% 26.8% 26.7% 26.7%
More than 150% 11.1% 10.6% 12.2% 10.7% 9.9% 10.9%
h Among complaints with monetary entitlements, and total claim amounts greater than $1
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
g  Monetary violations only, among all validated complaints
a Includes companies where employer disposition is unknown or missing
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
* Data from Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey, public-use microdata, 2010-2015
** Data from Statistics Canada CANSIM Tables: 551-0001, 551-0003, 551-0005, 552-0001
Industrial Sector (based on the NAICS)c
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Table 1.4a: Company Size of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2012/13 to 2014/15
1 to 5 
employees
6 to 10 
employees 
11 to 19 
employees 
20 to 49 
employees
50 to 199 
Employees
200 or more 
Employees Total
% of non-unionized Ontario workers employed in each company size* 100%
% of Ontario companies with each employee size** 56.2% 18.7% 12.0% 8.2% 4.1% 1.0%
% of complaints relating to each company sizeb 17.3% 19.0% 18.7% 18.5% 15.5% 11.1%
# of complaints relating to each company size 4,037      4,437      4,366      4,335      3,629      2,595      23,399 
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Complainant Work Status
Still Working 4.7% 6.1% 7.7% 8.7% 11.0% 13.7% 8.2%
Fired 23.9% 27.2% 27.8% 28.4% 31.8% 40.2% 29.1%
Laid Off 11.7% 13.3% 12.7% 14.6% 12.9% 9.2% 12.6%
Quit 32.6% 28.9% 27.3% 23.9% 20.9% 16.2% 25.7%
Other 27.1% 24.4% 24.4% 24.4% 23.3% 20.6% 24.3%
Employer Status
In businessa 91.2% 89.5% 88.7% 87.4% 89.1% 93.3% 89.6%
Out of business or bankrupt/insolvent 8.8% 10.5% 11.3% 12.6% 10.9% 6.7% 10.4%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services 14.4% 27.8% 33.6% 27.2% 14.4% 7.6% 22.1%
Retail trade 11.2% 11.1% 10.5% 13.5% 15.2% 24.7% 13.6%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 31.2% 23.6% 20.3% 17.0% 28.5% 31.5% 24.7%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 12.7% 11.6% 11.8% 13.5% 11.7% 13.7% 12.4%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 30.5% 26.0% 23.8% 28.8% 30.2% 22.5% 27.1%
Claims Per Standard
Unpaid wages 68.1% 58.6% 54.7% 48.3% 40.0% 27.0% 51.2%
Termination pay 37.1% 43.4% 46.4% 48.5% 50.1% 54.8% 46.1%
Vacation pay/time 41.2% 37.4% 34.8% 32.4% 28.9% 21.1% 33.5%
Severance pay 6.0% 7.6% 9.6% 15.1% 23.3% 30.1% 14.0%
Public holidays/pay 15.8% 14.4% 13.7% 10.8% 8.0% 6.3% 11.9%
Overtime pay 14.3% 12.6% 13.2% 12.2% 9.0% 6.2% 11.7%
Reprisal 9.0% 10.2% 8.2% 9.5% 10.9% 11.7% 9.8%
Daily/weekly rest periods 8.2% 8.8% 8.3% 8.1% 6.9% 5.8% 7.8%
Deductions from wages 8.0% 8.3% 8.5% 8.3% 6.1% 4.7% 7.6%
Leaves of absence 2.8% 3.2% 3.4% 4.5% 7.7% 9.1% 4.8%




Table 1.4b: Company Size of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2012/13 to 2014/15
1 to 5 
employees
6 to 10 
employees 
11 to 19 
employees 
20 to 49 
employees
50 to 199 
Employees
200 or more 
Employees Total
Total Amount Claimed (for all standards combined)
Median $1,248 $1,173 $1,170 $1,425 $1,600 $1,808 $1,311 
Less than $300 10.8% 12.7% 12.3% 10.4% 10.4% 9.5% 11.2%
$300 to $999 26.3% 26.5% 26.5% 22.5% 19.6% 17.6% 23.7%
$1,000 to $1,999 19.5% 17.5% 16.8% 17.1% 13.8% 10.9% 16.3%
$2,000 to $9,999 26.1% 25.8% 24.1% 25.4% 24.9% 23.8% 25.1%
$10,000 or more 5.1% 4.2% 5.3% 8.8% 11.1% 12.0% 7.3%
Claim amount missing, or $1 or less 12.2% 13.4% 15.0% 15.9% 20.1% 26.3% 16.4%
Outcome of Complaint
Settled 13.7% 15.9% 15.1% 14.9% 15.2% 12.5% 14.7%
Withdrawn 9.3% 11.3% 13.2% 13.3% 14.5% 19.3% 13.1%
Assessed 77.0% 72.8% 71.7% 71.8% 70.2% 68.2% 72.2%
AMONG ASSESSED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Presence of ES Violations
No ES violation 20.3% 23.3% 24.9% 31.4% 42.5% 51.0% 30.3%
One or more ES violations 79.7% 76.7% 75.1% 68.6% 57.5% 49.0% 69.7%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4% 0.5% 0.7% 1.4%
Monetary violations only 77.0% 73.6% 72.3% 65.9% 55.5% 46.0% 67.0%
Non-monetary violations only 0.9% 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.5% 2.3% 1.3%
Violation Rate 
Monetary violation 78.8% 75.3% 73.8% 67.4% 56.1% 46.7% 68.3%
Non-monetary violation 2.7% 3.1% 2.7% 2.6% 2.0% 3.0% 2.7%
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Disposition
Closed - Voluntary Compliance during Triage 7.7% 11.9% 13.2% 14.0% 14.9% 20.8% 12.7%
Closed - Voluntary Compliance during Investigation 36.5% 40.0% 40.1% 39.0% 43.9% 51.0% 40.4%
Compliance Ordered 55.8% 48.1% 46.7% 47.1% 41.2% 28.3% 46.9%
Employment Standards Violatedg
Unpaid wages 64.4% 55.9% 51.6% 46.8% 35.0% 17.6% 49.8%
Termination pay 31.7% 40.0% 45.5% 47.8% 52.0% 61.0% 43.8%
Vacation pay/time 51.5% 46.8% 41.6% 42.0% 33.2% 20.3% 42.2%
Public holidays/pay 17.6% 16.7% 14.9% 11.8% 6.4% 5.7% 13.5%
Overtime pay 10.9% 9.4% 10.0% 8.9% 6.4% 3.5% 8.9%
Deductions from wages 4.3% 5.1% 6.6% 5.8% 4.6% 2.7% 5.1%
Severance pay 0.3% 0.7% 2.0% 3.3% 14.0% 29.1% 5.1%
Reprisal 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.1% 3.5% 3.9% 2.7%
Minimum wage 2.5% 2.7% 3.2% 1.8% 1.2% 0.3% 2.2%
Hours of Work (non monetary) 1.1% 1.3% 1.1% 1.4% 0.9% 1.5% 1.2%
Company Sizeb
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Table 1.4c: Company Size of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2012/13 to 2014/15
1 to 5 
employees
6 to 10 
employees 
11 to 19 
employees 
20 to 49 
employees
50 to 199 
Employees
200 or more 
Employees Total
Median Entitlement Amounts per Standard
Total $1,048     $928     $990     $1,135     $1,202     $1,275     $1,048     
Reprisal $2,506     $2,115     $3,605     $2,712     $1,794     $2,725     $2,510     
Severance pay $808     $3,157     $4,112     $8,102     $5,653     $5,740     $5,497     
Termination pay $815     $750     $944     $1,092     $1,248     $1,680     $980     
Unpaid wages $849     $670     $677     $701     $711     $297     $708     
Minimum wage $678     $228     $1,014     $294     $366     $484     $437     
Overtime pay $419     $359     $407     $489     $776     $676     $430     
Deductions from wages $313     $220     $273     $269     $237     $118     $252     
Public holidays/pay $184     $165     $203     $206     $181     $123     $180     
Vacation pay/time $132     $140     $120     $209     $204     $153     $152     
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $1,048     $928     $990     $1,135    $1,202    $1,275    $1,048    
Less than $300 16.3% 20.1% 19.7%     18.1%     18.8%     19.2%     18.6%
$300 to $999 32.1% 32.2% 30.5%     28.7%     26.7%     24.8%     30.0%
$1,000 to $1,999 22.1% 20.5% 19.7%     18.4%     16.0%     14.4%     19.3%
$2,000 to $9,999 26.3% 24.6% 26.2%     28.6%     26.5%     23.7%     26.2%
$10,000 or more 3.1% 2.6% 3.8%     6.2%     12.1%     17.9%     5.9%
Percentage of Original Claim Amount Awardedh
0 to 49% 16.4% 19.6% 20.5%     22.0% 23.4% 20.3%     20.0%
50 to 99% 29.1% 27.7% 27.9%     30.9% 30.7% 32.5%     29.3%
100% 15.7% 13.3% 12.0%     13.7% 10.8% 12.1%     13.3%
100 to 150% 28.9% 28.5% 27.3%     24.1% 24.8% 23.3%     26.7%
More than 150% 10.0% 10.8% 12.3%     9.2% 10.3% 11.8%     10.6%
h Among complaints with monetary entitlements, and total claim amounts greater than $1
a Includes companies where employer disposition is unknown or missing
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
g  Monetary violations only, among all validated complaints
Company Sizeb
* Data from Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey, public-use microdata, 2011-2015
** Data from Statistics Canada CANSIM Tables: 551-0001, 551-0003, 551-0005, 552-0001. Company size is grouped slightly differently: 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19 
employees, 20-49 employees, 50-199 employees, 200 or more employees
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
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Table 2.1a: Characteristics of Settled ES Complaints, Facilitated and Non-Facilitated, 2008/09 to 2014/15
Assessed Withdrawn Settled Total Facilitated Non-Facilitated Total
% of complaints 69.9% 21.4% 8.7% 100.0% 17.8% 82.2% 100.0%
# of complaints 84,471       25,869       10,553    120,893    1,879      8,674          10,553     
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Complainant Work Status
Still Working 6.7% 14.1% 10.2% 8.6% 5.8% 11.1% 10.2%
Fired 28.4% 24.3% 30.9% 27.8% 37.3% 29.5% 30.9%
Laid Off 15.6% 11.9% 13.9% 14.6% 12.4% 14.3% 13.9%
Quit 22.7% 29.6% 23.4% 24.2% 23.1% 23.5% 23.4%
Other 26.6% 20.1% 21.6% 24.8% 21.4% 21.6% 21.6%
Employer Status
In businessa 83.1% 95.0% 96.7% 86.9% 97.7% 96.5% 96.7%
Out of business or bankrupt/insolvent 16.9% 5.0% 3.3% 13.1% 2.3% 3.5% 3.3%
Company Sizeb 
1 to 5 employees 18.4% 12.3% 16.0% 17.3% 18.8% 15.5% 16.0%
6 to 10 employees 19.1% 16.4% 20.5% 19.0% 23.2% 20.0% 20.5%
11 to 19 employees 18.5% 18.8% 19.2% 18.7% 17.2% 19.5% 19.2%
20 to 49 employees 18.4% 18.8% 18.8% 18.5% 15.3% 19.5% 18.8%
50 to 199 employees 15.1% 17.3% 16.1% 15.5% 16.6% 16.0% 16.1%
200 or more employees 10.5% 16.4% 9.4% 11.1% 8.9% 9.5% 9.4%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services 20.7% 20.9% 20.2% 20.7% 18.2% 20.6% 20.2%
Retail trade 13.5% 14.9% 14.0% 13.8% 16.4% 13.5% 14.0%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 25.4% 25.7% 25.3% 25.4% 24.9% 25.4% 25.3%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 11.8% 13.4% 12.6% 12.1% 13.0% 12.5% 12.6%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 28.6% 25.1% 27.9% 28.0% 27.4% 28.0% 27.9%
Claim Outcomes Settlement Types
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Assessed Withdrawn Settled Total Facilitated Non-Facilitated Total
Claims per standard
Unpaid wages 47.8% 50.3% 44.1% 48.0% 45.1% 43.9% 44.1%
Termination pay 48.5% 28.4% 46.4% 44.0% 54.1% 44.7% 46.4%
Vacation pay/time 37.5% 31.6% 33.9% 35.9% 34.8% 33.7% 33.9%
Severance pay 16.5% 9.2% 14.8% 14.8% 17.9% 14.2% 14.8%
Public holidays/pay 10.9% 8.2% 15.0% 10.7% 13.2% 15.3% 15.0%
Overtime pay 10.2% 7.4% 17.2% 10.2% 15.5% 17.6% 17.2%
Reprisal 8.4% 5.6% 12.5% 8.2% 11.4% 12.7% 12.5%
Daily/weekly rest periods 6.3% 6.6% 9.1% 6.6% 8.5% 9.2% 9.1%
Deductions from wages 6.6% 5.6% 8.3% 6.5% 9.0% 8.2% 8.3%
Leaves of absence 4.2% 3.5% 7.7% 4.3% 7.5% 7.7% 7.7%
Minimum wage 3.3% 2.5% 4.8% 3.3% 5.6% 4.6% 4.8%
Claim amounts
Median (excluding missing) $880       $500      $1,054    $800    $1,400     $1,000         $772     
Less than $300 10.6% 15.9% 8.7% 11.6% 6.1% 9.3% 8.7%
$300 to $999 22.4% 25.6% 19.8% 22.9% 16.8% 20.4% 19.8%
$1,000 to $1,999 15.0% 13.5% 15.9% 14.8% 16.3% 15.8% 15.9%
$2,000 to $9,999 23.9% 16.6% 28.2% 22.7% 31.6% 27.4% 28.2%
$10,000 or more 8.3% 4.8% 7.7% 7.5% 9.1% 7.4% 7.7%
Claim amount missing, or $1 or less 19.7% 23.6% 19.7% 20.6% 20.0% 19.7% 19.7%
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, warehousing
a Includes companies where employer disposition is unknown or missing
Settlement TypesClaim Outcomes
Table 2.1b: Characteristics of Settled ES Complaints, Facilitated and Non-Facilitated, 2008/09 to 2014/15
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
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Table 3.1a: Characteristics of ES Inspections, 2011/12 to 2014/15
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
% of inspections in each year 14.6% 33.6% 27.1% 24.7% 100.0%  
# of inspections in each year 1,026            2,350            1,897            1,731            7,004            
Presence of ES Violations
No ES violation 241            531            480            612            1,864            
One or more ES violations 785            1,819            1,417            1,119            5,140            
Presence of ES Violations (% of Violations)
No violation 23.5% 22.6% 25.3% 35.4% 26.6%
Any violation 76.5% 77.4% 74.7% 64.6% 73.4%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 30.2% 30.6% 31.5% 22.5% 28.8%
Monetary violations only 10.9% 10.6% 9.8% 8.1% 9.8%
Non-monetary violations only 27.3% 29.2% 26.1% 25.2% 27.1%
Violation reported but no information on type 8.1% 7.0% 7.3% 8.8% 7.7%
Violation Rate
Monetary violation 41.1% 41.2% 41.2% 30.6% 38.6%
Non-monetary violation 57.5% 59.9% 57.6% 47.8% 55.9%
Inspection Type 
Expanded investigation 22.7% 10.6% 17.1% 30.0% 18.9%
Targeted inspection (includes THAs) 44.9% 64.4% 49.2% 47.5% 53.2%
Regular or other type of inspection 32.4% 25.0% 33.7% 22.5% 27.8%
Company Size
1 to 5 employees 29.7% 29.5% 30.0% 28.6% 29.5%
6 to 10 employees 23.8% 22.7% 20.6% 22.7% 22.3%
11 to 19 employees 17.1% 15.2% 18.6% 17.6% 17.0%
20 to 49 employees 17.1% 17.7% 15.8% 16.0% 16.7%
50 or more employees 12.2% 14.9% 15.0% 15.1% 14.6%
Industry (based on the NAICS)
Accommodation and food services 24.1% 36.4% 34.2% 32.0% 32.9%
Retail trade 9.7% 29.4% 19.9% 22.5% 22.2%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 29.7% 17.6% 15.2% 22.6% 20.0%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 20.4% 7.5% 14.4% 10.9% 12.1%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 16.1% 9.2% 16.3% 12.0% 12.8%
Fiscal Year when Investigation Occurred
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Table 3.1b: Characteristics of ES Inspections, 2011/12 to 2014/15
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
AMONG INSPECTIONS WITH VIOLATIONS
Entitlements by Employment Standard 
Monetary Entitlements
Public holidays/pay 49.3% 45.0% 47.4% 43.7% 46.1%
Overtime pay 21.7% 20.9% 21.1% 18.2% 20.5%
Vacation pay/time 14.8% 16.0% 13.6% 15.7% 15.1%
Minimum wage 3.4% 3.6% 4.0% 3.5% 3.7%
Unpaid wages 2.3% 2.2% 3.8% 2.8% 2.8%
Record keeping 37.7% 40.5% 36.2% 33.3% 37.4%
Excess daily/weekly hours of work 42.0% 34.6% 35.0% 36.7% 36.3%
Vacation pay - Written agreement 33.3% 34.3% 32.9% 33.5% 33.6%
Wage statements 20.8% 18.8% 20.9% 18.3% 19.6%
Public holidays/pay 16.0% 16.7% 18.6% 17.8% 17.3%
Poster/postering 14.0% 16.0% 15.6% 14.0% 15.1%
Vacation pay/time 14.8% 16.0% 13.6% 15.7% 15.1%
Deductions from wages 5.4% 8.3% 7.1% 6.9% 7.2%
Eating periods 6.3% 7.1% 7.0% 7.5% 7.1%
Daily/weekly rest periods 6.4% 6.2% 5.1% 6.9% 6.1%
Total entitlement amount per business
Median $659           $769           $747           $730           $731           
Less than $300 30.6% 28.3% 29.8% 30.2% 29.5%
$300 to $999 27.7% 28.1% 26.2% 25.5% 27.0%
$1,000 to $1,999 16.4% 17.5% 15.9% 16.6% 16.7%
$2,000 to $9,999 18.5% 20.9% 23.0% 23.4% 21.6%
$10,000 or more 6.9% 5.3% 5.1% 4.3% 5.3%
Disposition 
Voluntary Compliance 89.9% 85.9% 92.4% 88.8% 88.9%
Compliance Ordered 10.1% 14.1% 7.6% 11.2% 11.1%
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
Non-Monetary Entitlements
Fiscal Year when Investigation Occurred
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
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Regular or Other Type 
of  Inspection Total
% of each type of inspection 18.9% 53.2% 27.8% 100%
# of each type of inspection 1,327 3,728 1,948 7,003
Presence of ES Violations 
No ES violation 18.0% 28.0% 29.8% 26.6%
One or more ES violations 82.0% 72.0% 70.2% 73.4%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 32.9% 27.8% 27.9% 28.8%
Monetary violations only 13.3% 8.4% 10.0% 9.8%
Non-monetary violations only 27.4% 28.0% 25.4% 27.1%
Violation reported but no information on type 8.5% 7.8% 6.9% 7.7%
Violation Rate
Monetary violation 46.1% 36.2% 37.9% 38.6%
Non-monetary violation 60.2% 55.8% 53.3% 55.9%
Company Size
1 to 5 employees 16.6% 33.1% 30.0% 29.5%
6 to 10 employees 23.9% 21.9% 21.9% 22.3%
11 to 19 employees 22.6% 15.1% 17.2% 17.0%
20 to 49 employees 18.2% 16.0% 17.1% 16.7%
50 or more employees 18.8% 13.8% 13.7% 14.6%
Industry (based on the NAICS)
Accommodation and food services 33.9% 32.9% 32.2% 32.9%
Retail trade 14.2% 23.6% 25.1% 22.2%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 19.6% 22.2% 15.8% 20.0%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 10.1% 14.2% 9.2% 12.1%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 22.1% 7.0% 17.7% 12.8%
Type of Inspection
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Regular or Other Type 
of  Inspection Total
AMONG INSPECTIONS WITH VIOLATIONS
Entitlements by Employment Standard
Monetary Entitlements
Public holidays/pay 48.7% 44.3% 47.3% 46.1%
Overtime pay 24.9% 19.2% 19.5% 20.5%
Vacation pay/time 7.7% 6.0% 8.4% 7.0%
Minimum wage 3.3% 4.0% 3.3% 3.7%
Unpaid wages 2.9% 2.3% 3.6% 2.8%
Record keeping 34.6% 38.3% 37.8% 37.4%
Daily/weekly rest periods 39.4% 35.1% 36.3% 36.3%
Vacation pay - Written agreement 31.1% 34.5% 33.8% 33.6%
Public holidays/pay 17.7% 17.0% 17.7% 17.3%
Poster/postering 14.2% 16.2% 13.9% 15.1%
Vacation pay/time 14.5% 14.3% 17.2% 15.1%
Deductions from wages 7.1% 7.1% 7.5% 7.2%
Excess daily/weekly hours of work 6.9% 6.4% 8.4% 7.1%
Eating periods 6.9% 6.4% 8.4% 7.1%
Wage statements 7.7% 5.6% 5.8% 6.1%
Total entitlement amount per business
Median $962               $686                   $733               $731             
Less than $300 26.0% 31.1% 29.4% 29.5%
$300 to $999 24.3% 27.3% 28.6% 27.0%
$1,000 to $1,999 16.3% 17.3% 15.7% 16.7%
$2,000 to $9,999 26.0% 20.3% 20.3% 21.6%
$10,000 or more 7.4% 4.0% 6.0% 5.3%
Disposition 
Voluntary Compliance 91.2% 88.2% 88.7% 89.0%
Compliance Ordered 8.8% 11.8% 11.3% 11.0%
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
Type of Inspection
Non-Monetary Entitlements
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
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Table 3.3a: Outcomes of ES Inspections, by Industry, 2011/12 to 2014/15
Accommodation 












% of Ontario workers employed in each industry* 9.0% 14.7% 27.3% 17.1% 31.9% 100%
% of Ontario businesses in each industry** 6.6% 12.8% 38.0% 13.5% 29.0%
# of Ontario businesses in each industry** 108,039          208,988       618,367          219,222        472,654         
% of inspections in each industry 32.9% 22.2% 20.0% 12.1% 12.8% 100%
# of inspections in each industry 2,275 1,537 1,380 834        886         6,912
Presence of ES Violations 
No ES violation 21.9% 27.7% 28.1% 31.2% 28.6% 26.4%
One or more ES violations 78.1% 72.3% 71.9% 68.8% 71.4% 73.6%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 33.2% 27.9% 27.1% 28.2% 23.4% 28.9%
Monetary violations only 10.9% 9.3% 8.8% 11.3% 8.1% 9.8%
Non-monetary violations only 26.1% 27.0% 29.7% 21.8% 30.5% 27.1%
Violation reported but no information on type 7.9% 8.1% 6.2% 7.6% 9.5% 7.8%
Violation Rate
Monetary violation 44.1% 37.2% 35.9% 39.6% 31.5% 38.8%
Non-monetary violation 59.3% 54.9% 56.8% 50.0% 53.9% 56.0%
Inspection Type 
Expanded investigation 19.6% 12.1% 18.6% 15.9% 32.7% 19.0%
Targeted investigation (includes THAs) 53.4% 56.7% 59.4% 62.9% 29.1% 53.4%
Regular or Other Type of  Investigation 27.0% 31.2% 22.0% 21.2% 38.1% 27.7%
Company Size
1 to 5 employees 26.9% 35.4% 36.9% 23.8% 19.9% 29.4%
6 to 10 employees 26.0% 23.5% 19.2% 18.9% 18.7% 22.3%
11 to 19 employees 20.6% 13.5% 12.9% 17.8% 18.8% 17.0%
20 to 49 employees 18.4% 15.1% 11.3% 18.5% 20.9% 16.6%
50 or more employees 8.1% 12.5% 19.7% 21.1% 21.6% 14.6%
Industrial Sector (based on the NAICS)
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Table 3.3b: Outcomes of ES Inspections, by Industry, 2011/12 to 2014/15
Accommodation 












AMONG INSPECTIONS WITH VIOLATIONS
Entitlements by Employment Standard
Monetary Entitlements
Public holidays/pay 51.3% 45.7% 41.6% 50.9% 35.9% 46.3%
Overtime pay 19.2% 22.5% 17.5% 22.3% 25.0% 20.6%
Vacation pay/time 6.9% 6.0% 7.8% 7.8% 7.1% 7.0%
Minimum wage 5.7% 2.4% 2.8% 2.9% 2.4% 3.7%
Unpaid wages 3.7% 2.1% 2.2% 3.7% 1.3% 2.8%
Record keeping 40.7% 39.9% 38.2% 26.0% 33.9% 37.6%
Excess daily/weekly hours of work 34.9% 38.6% 35.5% 38.4% 36.8% 36.4%
Vacation pay - Written agreement 38.1% 32.8% 28.5% 37.0% 28.6% 33.8%
Wage statements 19.4% 20.2% 23.6% 16.2% 16.4% 19.7%
Public holidays/pay 16.8% 18.8% 16.4% 18.8% 15.8% 17.3%
Poster/postering 17.6% 12.5% 17.0% 11.8% 12.9% 15.2%
Vacation pay/time 15.1% 18.9% 14.2% 9.1% 15.3% 15.1%
Deductions from wages 6.9% 6.5% 7.5% 5.7% 10.0% 7.2%
Eating periods 7.8% 6.1% 5.7% 9.4% 6.6% 7.1%
Daily/weekly rest periods 6.0% 5.7% 5.3% 6.1% 8.2% 6.1%
Total entitlement amount per business
Median $806         $654      $648         $705        $954        $731    
Less than $300 27.6% 31.8% 31.9% 31.6% 25.1% 29.5%    
$300 to $999 27.6% 26.0% 27.0% 26.7% 26.2% 26.9%    
$1,000 to $1,999 18.3% 15.9% 12.7% 21.0% 14.0% 16.6%    
$2,000 to $9,999 23.7% 20.1% 21.4% 16.1% 24.3% 21.6%    
$10,000 or more 2.8% 6.1% 7.1% 4.6% 10.4% 5.3%    
Disposition 
Voluntary Compliance 89.9% 88.3% 87.7% 91.8% 87.4% 89.0%    
Compliance Ordered 10.1% 11.7% 12.3% 8.2% 12.6% 11.0%    
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
** Data from Statistics Canada CANSIM Tables: 551-0001, 551-0003, 551-0005, 552-0001
Industrial Sector (based on the NAICS)
Non-Monetary Entitlements
* Data from Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey, public-use microdata, 2010-2015
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
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Table 3.4a: Outcomes of ES Inspections, by Company Size, 2011/12 to 2014/15
1 to 5 
employees
6 to 10 
employees 
11 to 19 
employees 
20 to 49 
employees
50 or more 
employees Total
% of Ontario workers employed in each company size* 100%
% of Ontario companies based on employee size** 56.2% 18.7% 12.0% 8.2% 4.1% 100%
% of companies of each size inspected 29.5% 22.3% 17.0% 16.7% 14.6% 100%
# of companies of each size inspected 1,751 1,323 1,008 992         868         5,942         
Presence of ES Violations 
No ES violation 30.0% 22.1% 21.5% 25.3% 32.3% 26.4%
One or more ES violations 70.0% 77.9% 78.5% 74.7% 67.7% 73.6%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 26.0% 33.3% 29.7% 33.6% 23.3% 29.1%
Monetary violations only 7.5% 9.7% 13.1% 10.2% 8.9% 9.6%
Non-monetary violations only 29.2% 27.1% 29.3% 24.6% 28.3% 27.8%
Violation reported but no information on type 7.3% 7.9% 6.4% 6.4% 7.3% 7.1%
Violation Rate
Monetary violation 33.6% 42.9% 42.8% 43.8% 32.1% 38.7%
Non-monetary violation 55.2% 60.3% 58.9% 58.2% 51.6% 57.0%
Inspection Type 
Expanded investigation 9.4% 18.0% 22.3% 18.2% 21.5% 16.8%
Targeted investigation (includes THAs) 61.4% 53.7% 48.6% 52.3% 51.5% 54.6%
Regular or Other Type of  Investigation 29.2% 28.3% 29.1% 29.4% 27.0% 28.7%
Industry (based on the NAICS)
Accommodation and food services 30.6% 38.8% 40.5% 36.9% 18.5% 33.4%
Retail trade 27.3% 23.8% 18.0% 20.5% 19.3% 22.7%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 23.6% 16.2% 14.3% 12.8% 25.5% 18.9%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 9.8% 10.3% 12.7% 13.5% 17.6% 12.1%




Table 3.4b: Outcomes of ES Inspections, by Company Size, 2011/12 to 2014/15
1 to 5 
employees
6 to 10 
employees 
11 to 19 
employees 
20 to 49 
employees
50 or more 
employees Total
AMONG INSPECTIONS WITH VIOLATIONS
Entitlements by Employment Standard
Monetary Entitlements
Public holidays/pay 45.0% 50.5% 47.4% 44.1% 37.9% 45.6%
Overtime pay 10.7% 20.1% 23.8% 32.7% 21.0% 20.5%
Vacation pay 9.0% 6.6% 6.3% 4.7% 4.6% 6.6%
Minimum wage 4.7% 4.4% 2.5% 3.4% 2.7% 3.7%
Unpaid wages 2.5% 2.9% 2.9% 2.2% 2.9% 2.7%
Record keeping 46.9% 41.6% 35.7% 32.7% 27.8% 38.6%
Excess daily/weekly hours of work 21.3% 33.8% 42.8% 48.4% 48.2% 36.4%
Vacation pay - Written agreement 36.9% 36.7% 35.7% 33.3% 22.7% 34.1%
Wage statements 36.0% 21.2% 12.9% 9.7% 8.4% 20.1%
Public holidays/pay 14.3% 19.8% 18.9% 15.8% 16.8% 17.0%
Poster/postering 23.1% 14.8% 12.4% 12.2% 8.0% 15.3%
Vacation pay/time 15.0% 19.2% 14.3% 11.8% 14.9% 15.3%
Deductions from wages 3.2% 5.7% 8.5% 10.0% 12.8% 7.2%
Eating periods 3.6% 9.3% 7.0% 8.0% 10.5% 7.2%
Daily/weekly rest periods 4.3% 5.0% 5.5% 8.1% 9.0% 5.9%
Total entitlement amount per business
Median $403        $666        $810        $1,247 $1,797 $711        
Less than $300 43.2% 29.4% 29.5% 23.0% 17.6% 30.3%
$300 to $999 30.4% 31.2% 26.0% 23.7% 20.1% 27.3%
$1,000 to $1,999 14.1% 21.3% 13.9% 15.2% 14.3% 16.1%
$2,000 to $9,999 11.4% 16.2% 27.4% 28.1% 31.5% 21.2%
$10,000 or more 0.9% 1.9% 3.2% 9.9% 16.5% 5.2%
Disposition
Voluntary Compliance 88.3% 90.4% 89.6% 90.4% 87.9% 89.4%
Compliance Ordered 11.7% 9.6% 10.4% 9.6% 12.1% 10.6%
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
* Data from Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey, public-use microdata, 2011-2015 
** Data from Statistics Canada CANSIM Tables: 551-0001, 551-0003, 551-0005, 552-0001. Company size is grouped slightly differently: 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19 
employees, 20-49 employees, 50-199 employees, 200 or more employees




Table 4.1: The Use of Compliance and Deterrence Tools as a Result of Complaints, 2009/10 to 2014/15
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# of complaints with any violation 9,957     8,702     8,133     6,767     6,643     5,650     45,852     
Use of Compliance Orders
# of complaints with a Compliance Order issued 52     73     52     46     120     74     417     
% of complaints with a violation where a Compliance Order was issued 0.5% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 1.8% 1.3% 0.9%
Use of Notices of Contravention (NOC)
# of complaints with at least one Notice of Contravention Issued 79     69     66     59     61     58     392     
Total # of Notice of Contravention issued 84     82     75     63     80     65     449     
% of complaints with a violation where a Notice of Contravention was issued 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.9%
Total amount of Notice of Contravention fines, per complaint
$250 75.9% 78.3% 78.8% 69.5% 67.2% 77.6% 74.7%
More than $250 24.1% 21.7% 21.2% 30.5% 32.8% 22.4% 25.4%
AMONG COMPLAINTS WITH MONETARY VIOLATIONS THAT REQUIRED THE USE OF A COMPLIANCE TOOL
Among complaints with monetary violations 9,878     8,613     8,040     6,675     6,516     5,541     45,263     
# of complaints with monetary violations where employers voluntarily comply 4,671     4,800     4,035     3,500     3,347     2,788     23,141     
# complaints with monetary violations where employers did not voluntarily comply 5,207     3,813     4,005     3,175     3,169     2,753     22,122     
Use of Orders to Pay Wages
# with only an employer Order to Pay Wages 2,382     2,155     2,075     1,863     1,838     1,806     12,119     
# with a Directors Order to Pay Wages 648     616     614     674     621     384     3,557     
# with a Related Employer Order to Pay Wages 3     40     24     78     38     33     216     
% with only an employer Order to Pay Wages 45.7% 56.5% 51.8% 58.7% 58.0% 65.6% 54.8%
% with a Directors Order to Pay Wages 12.4% 16.2% 15.3% 21.2% 19.6% 13.9% 16.1%
% with a  Related Employer Order to Pay Wages 0.1% 1.0% 0.6% 2.5% 1.2% 1.2% 1.0%
# with any type of Order to Pay Wages 3,032     2,808     2,709     2,563     2,483     2,217     15,812     
% with any type of Order to Pay Wages 58.2% 73.6% 67.6% 80.7% 78.4% 80.5% 71.5%
Use of Orders to Compensate/Reinstate
# with any type of Order to Compensate/Reinstate 89     122     97     109     141     115     673     
# where reinstatement was required 6     5     5     1     6     --   23     
% with any type of Order to Compensate/Reinstate 1.7%     3.2%     2.4%     3.4%     4.4%     4.2%     3.0%    
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
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Table 4.2: The Use of Compliance and Deterrence Tools as a Result of Inspections, 2012/13 to 2014/15
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# of inspections with any violation 1,819         1,417         1,119         4,355         
Use of Compliance Orders
# of inspections with a Compliance Order issued 1,440         1,045         904         3,389         
% of inspections with a violation where a Compliance Order was issued 79.2% 73.7% 80.8% 77.8%
Use of Notices of Contravention (NOC)
# of complaints with at least one Notice of Contravention Issued 27         20         31         78         
Total # of Notice of Contravention issued 38         21         34         93         
% of complaints with a violation where a Notice of Contravention was issued 1.5% 1.4% 2.8% 1.8%
Total amount of Notice of Contravention fines, per complaint
$250 74.1% 75.0% 83.3% 77.9%
More than $250 25.0% 16.7% 21.6% 22.1%
AMONG INSPECTIONS WITH MONETARY VIOLATIONS THAT REQUIRED THE USE OF A COMPLIANCE TOOL
# of inspections with monetary violations 968          782          530          2,280         
# of inspections with monetary violations where employers voluntarily comply 946          764          523          2,233         
# of inspections with monetary violations that required the use of a compliance tool 22          18          7          47         
Use of Orders to Pay Wages
# with any type of Order to Pay Wages 11          11          4          26         
% with any type of Order to Pay Wages 50.0% 61.1% 57.1% 55.3%
Fiscal Year of Inspection
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Table 4.3: Recovery of Notice of Contravention Fines
Among Complaints 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# with any Notice of Contravention issued 79       69       66       59       61       58       392       
Outcome of complaints with Notices of Contravention
% with Notices of Contravention satisfied 50.6% 68.1% 50.0% 49.2% 44.3% 41.4% 51.0%
% with Notices of Contravention not satisfied 49.4% 31.9% 50.0% 50.8% 55.7% 58.6% 49.0%
% of complaints with Notices of Contravention sent to collections 48.1% 52.2% 42.4% 66.1% 59.0% 58.6% 53.8%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 21.1% 50.0% 33.3% 30.8% 19.4% 11.8% 27.6%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied* 78.9% 50.0% 66.7% 69.2% 80.6% 88.2% 72.4%
Total fines originally assessed** $27,295      $24,000      $22,000      $25,500      $24,250      $19,750      $142,795      
Total fines recovered $13,910      $14,054      $11,018      $13,665      $9,525      $6,803      $68,976      
% of fines recovered 51.0% 58.6% 50.1% 53.6% 39.3% 34.4% 48.3%
Among Inspections 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# with any Notice of Contravention issued 27      20      31      78      
Outcome of inspections with Notices of Contravention
% with Notices of Contravention satisfied 55.6% 90.0% 64.5% 67.9%
% with Notices of Contravention not satisfied 44.4% 10.0% 35.5% 32.1%
14.8% 10.0% 6.5% 10.3%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 25.0% 50.0% -- 25.0%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied* 75.0% 50.0% 100.0% 75.0%
Total fines originally assessed** $18,000      $22,500      $15,000      $55,500      
Total fines recovered $9,254      $13,750      $9,750      $32,754      
% of fines recovered 51.4% 61.1% 65.0% 59.0%
* Excluding complaints/inspections that are under OLRB review
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
Fiscal Year of Inspection
** Does not account for changes to assessments as a result of OLRB reviews
% of inspections with Notices of Contravention sent to collections
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Table 4.4: The Use of Deterrence Tools Under the Provincial Offences Act , 2008/09 to 2014/15*
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Average
Part I Tickets Issued
# of files/businesses 294       257       176       386       276       275       275       277       
# of charges/tickets 337       280       207       445       318       326       340       322       
Average fine per charge/ticket $356       $353       $356       $359       $356       $357       $356       $356       
Average fine per file/businesses $408       $384       $418       $413       $410       $424       $441       $414       
Total fines for all charges/tickets $119,900       $98,735       $73,595       $159,610       $113,295       $116,525       $121,145       $114,686       
# of files/businesses that are contested** 20       18       14       17       28       not avail. not avail. --
Part III Offense Convictions
# of files/businesses 26       14       5       6       18       15       8       13       
# of charges 104       44       14       22       48       42       18       42       
Average fine per charge $16,007       $2,484       $1,949       $8,205       $9,490       $6,982       $4,844       $7,137       
Average fine per file/business $64,029       $7,806       $5,457       $30,083       $25,306       $19,549       $10,899       $23,304       
Total fines for all convictions $1,664,755       $109,290       $27,284       $180,500       $455,500       $293,235       $87,191       $402,536       
# of files/businesses with jail sentence 1       0       0       0       1       1       0       --
# of files/businesses that are contested** 21       12       6       4       9       not avail. not avail. --
** Contested files are grouped based on the fiscal year of the file disposition date, which may differ from the fiscal year of the conviction.
Fiscal Year of Conviction Date
* Information about the number of Part I and Part III convictions and their associated fines are compiled from information published in the Ministry of Labour's online 'Convictions 
Archive' collected across many years: http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/enforcement/archive.php. Information about the number of contested convictions are drawn from 
ESA Prosecution/Administrative Tribunal Litigation Reports provided by the Ministry of Labour. 
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Table 5.1: Prevalence of OLRB Reviews for Complaints, Inspections and Notices of Contravention, 2011/12 to 2014/15
FOR COMPLAINTS 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Total number of assessed complaints 11,503         9,963         9,562         8,479         39,507         
Number of assessed complaints with an OLRB review* 877         800         707         663         3,047         
Total number of reviews relating to assessed complaints** 987         888         798         728         3,401         
% of assessed complaints with an OLRB review 7.6% 8.0% 7.4% 7.8% 7.7%
Total number of complaints with any monetary order 2,776         2,637         2,542         2,263         10,218         
Number of complaints with any monetary order with a review 540         516         471         434         1,961         
%  complaints with any monetary order with a review 19.5% 19.6% 18.5% 19.2% 19.2%
Total number of complaints with a Directors Order to Pay Wages 614         674         621         384         2,293         
Number of complaints with a review of a Directors Order to Pay Wages 54         81         47         13         195         
% of complaints with a review of a Directors Order to Pay Wages 8.8% 12.0% 7.6% 3.4% 8.5%
Total number of complaints denied 3,370         3,196         2,919         2,829         12,314         
Number of denied complaints with a review 234         223         175         184         816         
% of denied complaints with a review 6.9% 7.0% 6.0% 6.5% 6.6%
FOR INSPECTIONS 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Total number of inspections where any order was issued 2,350         1,897         1,731         7,004         
Number of inspections with a review of an order 7         12         1         24         
Total number of reviews relating to inspections 30         18         3         51         
% of inspections with a review of an order 0.3% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3%
Total number of inspections where a monetary order was issued 14         13         6         40         
Number of inspections where a monetary order was issued with a review 4         6         1         15         
% of inspections where a monetary order was issued with a review 28.6% 46.2% 16.7% 37.5%
FOR NOTICES OF CONTRAVENTION 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# complaints with a Notice of Contravention issued 66         59         61         58         244         
# of complaints with a Notice of Contravention reviewed 14         6         5         --  25         
% of complaints with a Notice of Contravention reviewed 21.2% 10.2% 8.2% --  10.2%
# inspections with a Notice of Contravention issued nr  27         20         31         78         
# of inspections with a Notice of Contravention reviewed nr  2         1         -- 3         
% of inspections with a Notice of Contravention reviewed nr  7.4% 5.0% -- 3.8%
* Includes reviews in-progress. Excludes the small number of reviews for complaints that were settled or withdrawn.
** Includes multiple reviews relating to a single assessed complaint
nr Indicates cells where the number of cases is too small to release or analyze  
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
Fiscal Year of Inspection
Year of Complaint/Inspection which led to NOC
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Table 5.2: OLRB Review Outcomes, 2011/12 to 2014/15
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
# of reviews with final decision recorded in ESIS 941           825           725           409           2,900           
Review Outcome
Allowed* 5.8% 6.3% 4.0% 4.2% 5.3%
Allowed in part* 2.8% 1.3% 1.5% 1.2% 1.8%
Dismissed with a hearing* 9.6% 7.8% 6.9% 4.6% 7.7%
Dismissed without a hearing 18.0% 20.4% 22.6% 22.2% 20.4%
Settled 53.6% 57.6% 54.1% 56.5% 55.2%
Withdrawn 10.3% 6.7% 10.9% 11.2% 9.6%
OLRB Adjudication Status
Adjudicated by the OLRB 18.2% 15.4% 12.4% 10.0% 14.8%
Not adjudicated by the OLRB 81.8% 84.6% 87.6% 90.0% 85.2%
% with Deposits 68.7% 73.6% 73.9% 82.7% 73.5%
* Indicates adjudicated applications
Fiscal Year of Complaint/Inspection 
which led to Review
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# of reviews with a final decision recorded 1,735 187           666             2,900
Type of File
Claim 98.4% 99.5% 100.0% 98.6%
Inspection 1.6% 0.5% -- 1.4%
Review Outcome
Allowed* 2.9% 20.3% 3.8% 5.3%
Allowed in part* 2.0% 4.8% 1.1% 1.8%
Dismissed with a hearing* 5.8% 10.2% 11.7% 7.7%
Dismissed without a hearing 24.3% 24.1% 13.1% 20.4%
Settled 59.8% 39.0% 53.2% 55.2%
Withdrawn 5.3% 1.6% 17.3% 9.6%
OLRB Adjudication Status
Adjudicated by the OLRB 10.7% 35.3% 16.5% 14.8%
Not adjudicated by the OLRB 89.3% 64.7% 83.5% 85.2%
Had a Deposit (%) 82.6% 12.8% -- 73.5%
Financial Outcome of Adjudicated Reviews
No money owed 28.6% 57.6% -- -- 
50% or less of original order owed 11.4% 12.1% -- -- 
More than 50% but less than 100% of original order owed 4.3% 1.5% -- -- 
100% or more of original order owed 55.7% 28.8% -- -- 
Financial Outcome of Settled Reviews
No money owed 14.1% 47.9% -- -- 
50% or less of original order owed 38.9% 26.0% -- -- 
More than 50% but less than 100% of original order owed 40.9% 24.7% -- -- 
100% or more of original order owed 6.2% 1.4% -- -- 
*   Indicates adjudicated applications
** These are the three most common types of ES reviews submitted to the OLRB
Review of Monetary Orders
119
Table 6.1a: Outcomes of Compliance Tools Used in Complaints, 2009/10 to 2014/15
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Complaints with Compliance Orders 
# of complaints with any Compliance Order issued 52      73      52      46      120      74      417       
Outcome of complaints with Compliance Orders
% with Compliance Orders fully satisfied 100.0% 98.6% 100.0% 95.7% 95.0% 97.3% 97.4%
% with Compliance Orders not satisfied -- 1.4% -- 4.3% 5.0% 2.7% 2.6%
Complaints with Only an Employer Order to Pay Wages*
# of complaints with only an employer Order to Pay Wages 2,382      2,155      2,075      1,863      1,838      1,806      12,119       
Outcome of complaints with only an employer Order to Pay Wages
% with Order to Pay Wages fully satisfied 40.7% 47.0% 41.3% 42.2% 36.9% 35.5% 40.8%
% with Order to Pay Wages partially satisfied 3.5% 4.1% 5.6% 3.4% 5.8% 4.1% 4.4%
% with Order to Pay Wages not satisfied 55.8% 48.9% 53.0% 54.4% 57.3% 60.4% 54.8%
% of complaints with only an employer Order to Pay Wages sent to collections 65.0% 60.9% 62.9% 67.2% 69.5% 59.1% 64.1%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 15.8% 20.8% 18.6% 20.5% 15.4% 9.8% 17.0%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied** 84.2% 79.2% 81.4% 79.5% 84.6% 90.2% 83.0%
Complaints with a Director Order to Pay Wages*
# of complaints with a Director Order to Pay Wages 648      616      614      674      621      384      3,557       
Outcome of complaints with a Director Order to Pay Wages
% with Order to Pay Wages fully satisfied 32.4% 36.2% 32.4% 26.4% 19.8% 12.0% 27.5%
% with Order to Pay Wages partially satisfied 10.2% 9.3% 9.0% 9.1% 8.4% 8.6% 9.1%
% with Order to Pay Wages not satisfied 57.4% 54.5% 58.6% 64.5% 71.8% 79.4% 63.4%
% of complaints with a Director Order to Pay Wages sent to collections 94.3% 93.5% 96.6% 98.1% 96.9% 98.2% 96.1%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 30.1% 34.8% 32.1% 25.9% 19.3% 11.2% 26.6%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied** 69.9% 65.2% 67.9% 74.1% 80.7% 88.8% 73.4%
Complaints with Related Employer Order to Pay Wages*
# with a Related Employer Order to Pay Wages nr 40      24      78      38      33      213       
Outcome of complaints with a Related Employer Order to Pay Wages
% with Order to Pay Wages fully satisfied nr 2.5% 33.3% 26.9% 34.2% 39.4% 26.3%
% with Order to Pay Wages partially satisfied nr 22.5% 12.5% 3.8% 15.8% --- 9.9%
% with Order to Pay Wages not satisfied nr 75.0% 54.2% 69.2% 50.0% 60.6% 63.8%
% of complaints with a Related Employer Order to Pay Wages sent to collections nr 92.5% 83.3% 84.6% 76.3% 60.6% 80.8%
% of those sent to collections satisfied nr -- 30.0% 21.2% 17.2% 10.0% 15.7%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied** nr 100.0% 70.0% 78.8% 82.8% 90.0% 84.3%
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
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Table 6.1b: Outcomes of Compliance Tools Used in Complaints, 2009/10 to 2014/15
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Complaints with any Order to Pay Wages*
# of complaints with any Order to Pay Wages 3,032 2,808 2,709 2,563 2,483 2,217 15,812  
Outcome of complaints with any Order to Pay Wages
% with Order to Pay Wages fully satisfied (by any party) 39.0% 44.1% 39.3% 38.2% 32.4% 31.6% 37.7%
% with Order to Pay Wages partially satisfied (by any party) 4.9% 5.5% 6.4% 5.0% 6.6% 4.8% 5.5%
% with Order to Pay Wages not satisfied 56.1% 50.5% 54.3% 56.8% 60.9% 63.6% 56.7%
% of complaints with any Order to Pay Wages sent to collections 71.3% 68.5% 70.7% 75.3% 76.6% 65.8% 71.4%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 19.9% 24.6% 22.9% 22.7% 16.5% 10.2% 19.9%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied** 80.1% 75.4% 77.1% 77.3% 83.5% 89.8% 80.1%
Total assessments from any Order to Pay Wages*** $7,990,685   $7,539,680   $7,151,827   $6,712,530   $7,176,324   $6,944,749   $43,515,796   
Total payments of any Order to Pay Wages $3,166,534   $3,353,369   $2,830,829   $2,622,812   $2,126,257   $1,816,993   $15,916,795   
% of assessments recovered 39.6% 44.5% 39.6% 39.1% 29.6% 26.2% 36.6%
Complaints with any Order to Compensate/Reinstate*
# of complaints with any Order to Compensate/ Reinstate 89      122      97      109      141      115      673        
Outcome of Complaints with any Order to Compensate/ Reinstate
% with Order to Compensate/Reinstate fully satisfied 86.5% 90.2% 75.3% 77.1% 69.5% 62.6% 76.4%
% with Order to Compensate/Reinstate partially satisfied 3.4% 1.6% 1.0% 5.5% 6.4% 18.3% 6.2%
% with Order to Compensate/Reinstate not satisfied 10.1% 8.2% 23.7% 17.4% 24.1% 19.1% 17.4%
% with any Order to Compensate/ Reinstate sent to collections 13.5% 18.9% 20.6% 24.8% 34.0% 24.3% 23.5%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 41.7% 60.9% 31.6% 34.6% 31.3% 21.4% 35.3%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied** 58.3% 39.1% 68.4% 65.4% 68.8% 78.6% 64.7%
Total assessments from any Order to Compensate/Reinstate*** $653,611     $807,824     $513,200     $637,499     $837,452     $598,903     $4,048,488      
Total payments of any Order to Compensate/Reinstate $474,664     $688,988     $376,749     $520,384     $609,265     $535,675     $3,205,725      
% of assessments recovered 72.6% 85.3% 73.4% 81.6% 72.8% 89.4% 79.2%
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
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Table 6.1c: Outcomes of Compliance Tools Used in Complaints, 2009/10 to 2014/15
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Complaints with any monetary order*
# of complaints with any monetary order 3,095     2,895     2,776     2,637     2,542     2,263     16,208     
Outcome of Complaints with any monetary order
% with order fully satisfied 39.9% 45.5% 40.4% 39.3% 33.4% 31.9% 38.7%
% with order partially satisfied 4.9% 5.5% 6.4% 5.2% 6.8% 5.7% 5.7%
% with order not satisfied 55.2% 49.1% 53.2% 55.6% 59.7% 62.4% 55.5%
% of complaints with any monetary order sent to collections 70.1% 66.8% 69.2% 73.6% 75.2% 64.7% 70.0%
% of those sent to collections satisfied 20.0% 24.7% 23.0% 22.7% 16.7% 10.2% 19.9%
% of those sent to collections not satisfied** 80.0% 75.3% 77.0% 77.3% 83.3% 89.8% 80.1%
Total assessments from any monetary order*** $8,642,270   $8,346,886   $7,665,027   $7,350,029   $8,013,776   $7,541,097   $47,559,085   
Total payments of any monetary order**** $3,639,173   $4,041,739   $3,207,578   $3,143,196   $2,735,521   $2,352,669   $19,119,876   
% of assessments recovered 42.1% 48.4% 41.8% 42.8% 34.1% 31.2% 40.2%
Complaints with any Monetary Violation (includes those where employers voluntarily comply) 
# of complaints with any monetary violation 9,878      8,613      8,040      6,675      6,516      5,541      45,263      
# of complaints where employer complied voluntarily 4,671      4,800      4,035      3,500      3,347      2,788      23,141      
# of complaints where a monetary order was issued 3,095      2,895      2,776      2,637      2,542      2,263      16,208      
# of complaints with no voluntary compliance and no monetary order issued 2,112      918      1,229      538      627      490      5,914      
Outcome of complaints with any monetary violation
% satisfied (voluntarily or via an order) 59.8% 71.0% 64.1% 68.0% 64.4% 63.4% 65.0%
% partially satisfied 1.5% 1.8% 2.2% 2.0% 2.7% 2.3% 2.0%
% not satisfied 38.7% 27.2% 33.7% 30.0% 32.9% 34.3% 33.0%
Total entitlements assessed $35,856,987  $23,367,775  $19,731,404  $15,968,140  $18,737,380  $15,338,308  $128,999,993  
Total entitlements recovered**** $10,520,047  $10,602,895  $8,573,635  $8,217,173  $7,626,619  $6,443,847  $51,984,215  
Recovered through employer voluntary compliance $6,880,874  $6,561,155  $5,366,057  $5,073,977  $4,891,097  $4,091,178  $32,864,339  
Recovered through the use of monetary orders*** $3,639,173  $4,041,739  $3,207,578  $3,143,196  $2,735,521  $2,352,669  $19,119,876  
% of entitlements recovered 29.3% 45.4% 43.5% 51.5% 40.7% 42.0% 40.3%
* Among complaints with a monetary violation where the use of a compliance tool was required
** Excluding complaints that are under OLRB review
nr  Indicates cells where the number of cases is too small to release or analyze 
*** Does not account for changes to assessments as a result of OLRB reviews; excludes the 2% of complaints where the total order assessment was for more than 200% of the total 
entitlement for the complainant assessed by the ESO. Thus these figures provide an estimate of the total monetary recovery rates for individual complainants through MOL administrative 
processes, but not the total funds handled by the MOL in relation to ES complaints. 
Fiscal Year when Complaint was Submitted
**** Does not include monies recovered via the OLRB review (disbursement of deposits) or settlement processes.
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Table 6.2: Outcome of Monetary Orders Issued for Complaints, by Complaint Characteristics, 2009/10 to 2014/15
Fully Satisfied Partially Satisfied Not Satisfied Total 
% of complaints with a monetary order with each outcome 38.7% 5.7% 55.5% 100.0%
# of complaints with a monetary order with each outcome 6,280               927               9,001               16,208              
Complainant Work Status
Still Working 6.3% 5.8% 5.2% 5.6%
Fired 31.9% 18.1% 11.4% 19.7%
Laid Off 12.4% 18.0% 20.1% 17.0%
Quit 25.8% 27.5% 25.6% 25.8%
Other 23.6% 30.6% 37.8% 31.9%
Company Sizeb
1 to 5 employees 25.1% 25.3% 30.4% 28.3%
6 to 10 employees 23.0% 20.4% 24.8% 23.9%
11 to 19 employees 19.5% 16.5% 21.2% 20.3%
20 to 49 employees 15.8% 19.6% 16.3% 16.4%
50 to 199 employees 10.7% 15.1% 6.9% 8.7%
200 or more employees 5.9% 3.2% 0.3% 2.4%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services 21.6% 25.4% 27.3% 25.0%
Retail trade 12.7% 9.1% 8.7% 10.2%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 27.4% 28.3% 24.8% 26.0%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 11.3% 13.2% 9.8% 10.6%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 27.0% 23.9% 29.4% 28.2%
Employment Standards Violated
Unpaid wages 49.2% 70.0% 77.9% 66.3%
Vacation pay/time 48.7% 60.5% 60.2% 55.8%
Termination pay 43.8% 41.9% 41.5% 42.4%
Public holidays/pay 16.4% 17.3% 15.8% 16.1%
Overtime pay 12.4% 10.2% 9.2% 10.5%
Severance pay 5.7% 4.2% 2.9% 4.1%
Deductions from wages 6.4% 4.3% 2.2% 3.9%
Reprisal 6.5% 5.2% 1.1% 3.4%
Minimum wage 2.8% 3.3% 2.0% 2.4%
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $1,591              $2,228              $1,597              $1,621              
Less than $300 9.7% 4.2% 8.3% 8.6%
$300 to $999 26.0% 24.3% 26.8% 26.4%
$1,000 to $1,999 21.2% 18.4% 22.5% 21.8%
$2,000 to $9,999 33.6% 42.2% 36.4% 35.6%
$10,000 or more 9.4% 10.9% 5.9% 7.5%
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
Outcome of Monetary Orders
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
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Table 6.3: Outcomes of Compliance Tools Used in Inspections, 2012/13 to 2014/15
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Total
Inspections with Compliance Orders 
# of inspections with any Compliance Order issued 1,440            1,045             904             3,389             
Outcome of inspections with Compliance Orders
     % with Compliance Orders fully satisfied 100.0% 99.8% 99.8% 99.9%
     % with Compliance Orders not satisfied -- 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
Inspections with any monetary order
# of inspections with any monetary order 14             13             6             33             
Outcome of inspections with any monetary order
     % with order satisfied 57.1% 53.8% 66.7% 57.6%
     % with order not satisfied 42.9% 46.2% 33.3% 42.4%
% of inspections with any monetary order sent to collections 14.3% 15.4% 16.7% 15.2%
Total assessments from any monetary order $118,404             $58,472             $17,215             $194,091             
Total payments of any monetary order* $99,264             $45,161             $13,606             $158,031             
% of assessments recovered 83.8% 77.2% 79.0% 81.4%
Inspections with any Monetary Violation (includes those where employers voluntarily comply) 
# with any monetary violation 968              782              530              2,280              
     # of complaints where employer complied voluntarily 946              764              523              2,233              
     # of complaints where a monetary order was issued 14              13              6              33              
Outcome of inspections with any monetary violation
     % satisfied (voluntarily or via an order) 98.3% 98.5% 99.1% 98.6%
     % not satisfied 1.7% 1.5% 0.9% 1.4%
Total entitlements assessed $2,827,134            $3,016,276            $1,344,957            $7,188,367            
Total recovered* $2,704,060            $2,894,572            $1,321,110            $6,919,741            
% of entitlements recovered 95.6% 96.0% 98.2% 96.3%
* Does not include monies recovered via the OLRB review (disbursement of deposits) or settlement processes.
Fiscal Year of Inspection
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Table 7.1a: Operational Status of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2008/09 to 2014/15
In Businessa




% of complaints relating to businesses with each status 86.9% 5.5% 7.7% 100.0%
# of complaints relating to businesses with each status 105,003              6,592              9,298              120,893              
AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Company Sizeb
1 to 5 employees 14.7% 16.5% 5.8% 14.5%
6 to 10 employees 16.8% 20.5% 10.4% 16.8%
11 to 19 employees 17.2% 20.3% 12.4% 17.2%
20 to 49 employees 18.7% 19.7% 23.2% 18.9%
50 to 199 employees 17.4% 7.0% 24.7% 17.0%
200 or more employees 15.2% 15.8% 23.5% 15.5%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services 19.9% 38.1% 13.9% 20.7%
Retail trade 14.3% 10.9% 10.5% 13.9%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 25.9% 21.6% 20.6% 25.5%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 12.3% 11.1% 11.0% 12.2%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 27.6% 18.3% 44.0% 27.8%
Employment Standard(s) Claimed
Unpaid wages 47.8% 62.8% 39.4% 48.0%
Termination pay 41.1% 60.9% 64.8% 44.0%
Vacation pay/time 34.3% 51.9% 43.0% 35.9%
Severance pay 11.7% 20.2% 46.0% 14.8%
Overtime pay 11.1% 6.9% 3.5% 10.2%
Public holidays/pay 11.0% 13.4% 4.9% 10.7%
Reprisal 9.3% 1.5% 0.7% 8.2%
Daily/weekly rest periods 7.4% 2.0% 1.0% 6.6%
Deductions from wages 7.2% 2.8% 1.8% 6.5%
Leaves of absence 4.9% 0.7% 0.4% 4.3%
Minimum wage 3.5% 2.7% 0.7% 3.3%
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Table 7.1b: Operational Status of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2008/09 to 2014/15
In Businessa




AMONG ALL ACCEPTED COMPLAINTS
Total Amount Claimed (for all standards combined)
Median $1,100              $1,915              $4,978              $1,248              
Less than $300 12.7% 6.0% 3.0% 11.6%
$300 to $999 23.9% 21.7% 11.4% 22.9%
$1,000 to $1,999 14.9% 18.4% 10.9% 14.8%
$2,000 to $9,999 21.4% 33.7% 29.4% 22.7%
$10,000 or more 5.6% 10.1% 26.8% 7.5%
Claim amount missing, or $1 or less 21.4% 10.1% 18.5% 20.6%
Outcome of Complaint
Settled 9.7% 4.7% 0.4% 8.7%
Withdrawn 23.4% 13.6% 4.1% 21.4%
Assessed 66.9% 81.7% 95.5% 69.9%
AMONG ASSESSED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Presence of ES Violations
No ES violation 35.1% 13.7% 6.2% 30.7%
One or more ES violations 64.9% 86.3% 93.8% 69.3%
Type of ES violations
Monetary and non-monetary violations 0.9% 0.6% 0.1% 0.8%
Monetary violations only 63.0% 85.6% 93.7% 67.7%
Non-monetary violations only 1.0% 1.0% --- 0.8%
Violation Rate
Monetary violations 63.9% 86.2% 93.8% 68.5%
Non-monetary violations 1.9% 1.6% 0.1% 1.6%
AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Disposition
Voluntary Compliance during Triage 17.9% 2.7% --- 14.2%
Voluntary Compliance during Investigation 44.6% 12.1% 1.4% 35.9%
Compliance Ordered 37.4% 85.3% 98.6% 49.9%
Employment Standards Violatedg
Termination pay 39.9% 66.9% 76.9% 47.3%
Vacation pay/time 46.2% 59.6% 42.5% 46.7%
Unpaid wages 45.9% 65.5% 36.4% 46.1%
Public holidays/pay 13.1% 14.6% 2.7% 11.8%
Severance pay 4.0% 8.1% 36.8% 9.0%
Overtime pay 9.5% 6.0% 1.7% 8.1%
Deductions from wages 5.7% 1.2% 1.5% 4.8%
Minimum wage 2.6% 1.8% 0.3% 2.2%
Reprisal 2.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.6%
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Table 7.1c: Operational Status of Businesses that ES Complaints are Filed Against, 2008/09 to 2014/15
In Businessa




AMONG VALIDATED COMPLAINTS ONLY
Median Entitlement Amount per Standard
Severance pay $4,658              $5,905              $8,003              $6,651              
Reprisal $2,891              $6,359              $500              $2,909              
Termination pay $858              $1,487              $5,888              $1,266              
Unpaid wages $574              $982              $1,170              $6,621              
Overtime pay $444              $360              $386              $436              
Minimum wage $284              $487              $79              $293              
Deductions from wages $240              $214              $138              $225              
Public holidays/pay $180              $147              $125              $174              
Vacation pay/time $115              $261              $417              $150              
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $836              $2,010              $7,888              $1,109              
Less than $300 22.5% 7.0% 4.2% 18.6%
$300 to $999 32.4% 23.3% 10.7% 28.6%
$1,000 to $1,999 18.4% 19.5% 9.7% 17.3%
$2,000 to $9,999 22.4% 40.2% 31.9% 25.2%
$10,000 or more 4.2% 10.1% 43.6% 10.3%
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
g  Monetary violations only, among all validated complaints
Operational Status
a Includes companies where employer disposition is unknown or missing
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
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Proof of Claim Total
% of complaints in group 93.0% 7.0% 100.0%
# of complaints in group 4,295                       325                       4,620                      
Company Sizeb
1 to 5 employees 6.2% 11.2% 7.1%
6 to 10 employees 9.7% 17.6% 11.0%
11 to 19 employees 14.6% 15.2% 14.7%
20 to 49 employees 21.7% 39.2% 24.7%
50 to 199 employees 27.8% 13.6% 25.3%
200 or more employees 20.0% 3.2% 17.2%
Industry (based on the NAICS)c 
Accommodation and food services 13.9% 17.4% 14.3%
Retail trade 11.8% 14.0% 12.1%
Service Industries - primarily private-sectord 18.9% 13.3% 18.2%
Service Industries - primarily public-sectore 10.9% 6.4% 10.4%
Manufacturing and primary industriesf 44.5% 48.9% 45.0%
Employment Standards Violatedg
Termination pay 65.6% 59.4% 65.1%
Vacation pay/time 52.8% 56.3% 53.1%
Unpaid wages 47.9% 57.2% 48.6%
Severance pay 32.9% 10.5% 31.3%
Public holidays/pay 3.9% 7.4% 4.1%
Overtime pay 2.1% 5.5% 2.4%
Deductions from wages 1.0% 1.5% 1.0%
Total Entitlement Amount
Median $4,507                      $2,395                      $4,262                      
Less than $300 6.2% 6.8% 6.2%
$300 to $999 14.4% 16.9% 14.6%
$1,000 to $1,999 12.6% 20.9% 13.2%
$2,000 to $9,999 36.9% 37.5% 37.0%
$10,000 or more 29.9% 17.8% 29.1%
* Among complaints related to bankrupt/insolvent companies with monetary entitlements where the employer did not voluntarily comply, and where monetary orders remain unsatisfied
d Industries include: finance, insurance, real estate, leasing, professional, scientific and technical services, management, administrative and other support services
g  Monetary violations only, among all validated complaints
b Information about company size is only available for complaints submitted from 2012/13 onwards
c Information about industry is only available for complaints submitted from 2010/11 onwards
e Industries include: educational services, health care and social assistance, public administration, information, culture, and recreation 
f Industries include: agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, oil, gas, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, transportation, and warehousing
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